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Yale University to study for six months. She gave invaluable advice and 
even accepted to read some of my work in progress. Also Prof. Harry 
Attridge kindly encouraged me to continue my work. Likewise, I thank 
Prof. Paul-Hubert Poirier for patiently answering the numerous questions 
that I had for him, when I participated in the NNGN seminar at Laval Uni-
versity in 2010. I also wish to thank David Tibet who many years ago got 
me into Nag Hammadi Studies through his fantastic music. I wish to ex-
press a very special thanks to Dylan Burns, who has spent hours and hours 
reading and correcting my dissertation to minimize the otherwise huge 
amount of flaws of my very best school English. He has not only corrected 
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about these beautiful Nag Hammadi texts. I also thank all my colleagues at 
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However, the greatest of all thanks is for my husband Christian who has 
patiently supported me in every possible way, showing admirable strength 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation examines the use of ancient Platonic and Stoic philosophy 
of language in two texts from the Nag Hammadi Codices: the Trimorphic 
Protennoia (NHC XIII, 1) (hereafter TriPro) and the Thunder: Perfect Mind 
(NHC VI,2) (hereafter Thunder). These texts employ language-related 
speculation in their descriptions of the descent of divine Thought. In its de­
scent into the sensible world, Thought manifests itself progressively in lin­
guistic terms as Sound, Voice, and Word. I shall suggest that we call this 
kind of descent a "Linguistic Manifestation". 
The manifestation of the divine in linguistic terms is a well-known fea­
ture in ancient literature. We see examples of this especially in Jewish and 
Christian sources in which the Word (λόγος) or Voice of God (φωνή θεοΰ) 
is a central feature. Within the Nag Hammadi Codices we also find several 
examples of linguistic manifestations of divinity, as well as examples of 
use of language-related terminology in theological expositions.1 
This study is limited to dealing with TriPro and Thunder only, since they 
share more than one characteristic, and these common traits separate them 
from other occurrences of what one might call a "theology of language". 
These two texts integrate language-related speculation into revelatory 
frameworks, which are shaped as monologues performed by divine female 
figures. Thus, besides their linguistic manifestations, both texts articulate 
an aretalogical style by employing "I am"-proclamations (^MOK re/ne) in 
the presentation of the female revealers. In addition, it seems that the figure 
of Epinoia plays an important role in the overall unfolding of the two trac­
tates. Moreover, both texts are clearly inspired by Jewish Wisdom tradi­
tions concerning the Thought of the Father as the mediatrix of heaven and 
earth. These similarities are hard to disregard when reading through the 
texts, and they clearly invite for a comparative analysis of them. Finally, 
the texts are even connected codicologically, insofar as codex XIII, which 
1 See, for instance, the Gospel of Truth (NHC 1,3 and XII,2); the Holy Book of the Great 
Invisible Spirit {Gospel of the Egyptians) (NHC 111,2 and IV,2); the Discourse on the 
Eighth and the Ninth (NHC VI, 6) and others. 
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contains TriPro, had already in Antiquity, been tucked inside the covers of 
codex VI in which Thunder is found. 
Because of the above connections, I will present a new approach for re­
searching the two Nag Hammadi texts, which takes into consideration the 
similarities between them as well as their common source of inspiration: 
philosophy of language. With regard to Thunder, the research to date has to 
a great extent been on the subject of explaining the nature and function of 
the many paradoxical self-proclamations of the female revealer. The para­
doxes are mainly interpreted either as an expression of the transcendence of 
the female revealer or as a way of describing her universality. The para­
doxes are generally understood in such a way that the female revealer is 
able either to contain all these differences, and thus transcend them at the 
same time, or to contain them and thus be everything that the world repre­
sents. These interpretations of Thunder's paradoxes are in themselves quite 
persuasive and have been accepted as the consensus among scholars of 
"Gnosticism". However, I find that Thunder itself concentrates signifi­
cantly on language-related questions and employs concepts which belong 
to a somewhat technical, linguistic discussion in Greek philosophical 
sources that goes back to Plato and the Stoics. In my view, the use of these 
concepts in Thunder not only shows that the author of Thunder was inter­
ested in language-philosophical questions, but also that the author managed 
to integrate already existing thoughts on language into the text and made 
them the key to understanding its main concern. One of the reasons for this 
may have been that ancient philosophy of language dealt with the same 
questions as Thunder, namely the relation between language and reality. 
With regard to TriPro, the research to date has mainly concentrated on 
its relation to the Gospel of John and the Apocryphon of John (NHC 11,1; 
ΙΙΙ,Ι; IV, 1 and BG 8502, 2), and with good reason, since the former offers a 
clear parallel to the "I am"-proclamations and to the manifestation of God 
as Logos/Word. The latter provides a parallel to the structure of TriPro, in 
that the so-called Pronoia hymn found in the long version of the 
Apocryphon of John presents a tripartite descent of the divine Thought, 
Pronoia. Moreover, this text also uses the aretalogical style, using "I am"-
proclamations in the presentation of the revealer. However, the Pronoia 
hymn does not offer a parallel to the linguistic manifestation of Protennoia. 
The use of linguistic terminology in TriPro is thoroughgoing and appar­
ently of fundamental importance. Besides two articles by Paul-Hubert Poir­
ier (2009) and Philippe Luisier (2006), this topic has not been treated in 
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2 Poirier 1995. 
3 Poirier 2006. 
4 The other two are Janssens 1974 and Schenke 1984. 
5 Turner 2001. 
6 McGuire 1994. 
7 Layton 1986. 
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detail, and the purpose of this dissertation is therefore to provide a thorough 
investigation of an issue which, in my opinion, needs attention. 
Since the research into TriPro and Thunder is relatively limited, I shall 
discuss relevant scholarship throughout the following chapters; nonethe-
less, I shall already at this point mention a few scholars upon whose work I 
rely greatly. Firstly, the work of Paul-Hubert Poirier is inevitable, since he 
has provided editions with thorough commentaries of both texts. The com-
mentary on Thunder2 remains the only commentary to date, and the one on 
TriPro3 is the newest and most exhaustive of the three that are available.4 
With regard to TriPro, I am inspired by the insights of John D. Turner, who 
has drawn attention to the parallel between the linguistic manifestation of 
Protennoia and the Stoic material as it is presented by Diogenes Laertius.5 
Furthermore, the articles by Anne McGuire 6 and Bentley Layton7 will play 
a key role in the analysis of Thunder. 
In what follows I shall give a short outline of the three chapters which 
constitute the main body of the dissertation. As has already been men-
tioned, I analyze the two Nag Hammadi texts against the background of 
central issues from ancient philosophy of language, investigating how these 
particular features are incorporated and redefined in the two much later 
revelatory frameworks. Thus, the first of the three main chapters deals with 
ancient philosophy of language. Beginning with the Platonic dialogue enti-
tled Cratylus, which provides the earliest instance of a language-related 
speculation, we shall see how Socrates, despite his naturalistic approach to 
the question of the correctness of names, also acknowledges that names not 
always capture the true essence of the thing they name. In order to grasp 
the true essence of a thing, one must look at the thing itself. The insuffi-
ciency of names was a problem which was solved by a method of definition 
by division, that is, the method of diairesis, known from passages in the 
Phaedrus and the Sophist. Several important features with regard to this 
method will eventually become decisive for the understanding of Thunder. 
After this, I shall examine the major issues of Stoic dialectics. Through a 
reading of a central passage in Diogenes Laertius, it will become apparent 
Linguistic Manifestations of Divine Thought 
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how the different levels of a verbal expression go from inarticulate 
sound/voice (φωνή) over articulate but unintelligible speech (λέξις) to the 
fully articulate and intelligible word/sentence (λόγος). This will become the 
basis for the analysis of the two Nag Hammadi texts. 
Chapters three and four provide a thoroughgoing analysis of selected 
passages from TriPro and Thunder. The passages are chosen due to their 
linguistic focus. I will argue that the specific progressive sequence of lin­
guistic manifestations found in these texts is of Stoic origin, but that they 
turn the levels of semanticity "upside-down". Whereas in the Stoic theory it 
is the end point of the process, namely, Word/Discourse (λόγος), that has 
the highest value, in the two Nag Hammadi treatises it is rather the begin­
ning of the process (in fact, Silence) that has highest value. It is important 
to emphasize that I do not suggest a Stoic reading of these texts, but rather 
that we acknowledge the Stoic theory as an underlying, dialectic matrix in 
them. I have chosen to present the analysis of TriPro first (chapter three), 
since many of the insights offered there support my interpretation of Thun­
der. Besides my proposal to understand TriPro 's use of the Stoic sequence 
of a verbal expression "upside-down", I shall suggest a reason for the lin­
guistic nature of Protennoia's descent. Thunder, which is analyzed in chap­
ter four, expands its use of ancient philosophy of language to draw also on 
Platonic language-related topics, such as the notion of the name and that of 
diairesis. This is the outset for a new proposal with regard to the under­
standing of the function of paradox in Thunder. I will argue that the oppo­
site categories not only are to be understood as paradoxes, but also as 
diairetic descriptions of the female revealer. Chapter five summarizes the 
major points of my argument in a conclusion. 
In what follows I shall give a short outline of the "Sethian" tradition to 
which TriPro has traditionally been said to belong. Thunder, too, I under­
stand to have strong affiliations with the same tradition. 
The "Sethian " tradition 
As the present dissertation deals with two Nag Hammadi texts of which 
one (TriPro) has been categorized as belonging to the "Sethian" tradition, it 
is necessary to briefly touch upon scholarly discussion of the very term 
"Sethian'V'Sethianism".8 The Nag Hammadi research has seen two main 
positions here: one represented by Hans-Martin Schenke, who speaks for 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
the use of the term, and another represented by Frederik Wisse, who speaks 
against it. In-between is a golden mean on which the present dissertation is 
premised. 
It is clear from the sources at our disposal that no distinct group of peo-
ple in Antiquity called themselves "Sethians". As in the case with the term 
"Gnostic", the term "Sethian" derives from the heresiological writings. The 
first witness to the term "Sethian" is found in Hippolytus' Refutation The 
term was brought back to life by modern scholarship at least since the dis-
covery of the Nag Hammadi Library. Meanwhile, Irenaeus, who was the 
first to describe a system similar to the one we find in the "Sethian" revela-
tion par excellence, the Apocryphon of John, used the term "Barbelo-
Gnostic" as a designation for this kind of thinking. 1 0 Thus, in Antiquity the 
opponents of the users of texts like the Apocryphon of John and TriPro did 
not agree on any one designation for them. This suggests either that there 
was no distinct group of "Sethians" or as John Turner writes: 
...these church fathers were unaware of their precise identity. It may be 
that they merely derived these designations - as a modern reader might do 
- from the contents of their writings. 1 1 
With the 1974 article of Schenke "Das sethianische System nach Nag-
Hammadi-Handschriften", followed up by "The Phenomenon of Gnostic 
Sethianism" (1981), it was suggested that a group of fourteen texts from the 
Nag Hammadi Library had so many themes and mythologoumena in com-
mon that they should be grouped together. These are: three copies of the 
Apocryphon of John (NHC II,1;III,1; IV, 1), the Hypostasis of the Archons 
(11,4), two copies of the Gospel of the Egyptians (111,2; IV,2), the Apoca-
lypse of Adam (V,5), the Three Steles of Seth (VII,5), Zostrianos (VIII, 1), 
Melchizedek (IX, 1), the Thought ofNorea (IX,2), Marsanes (X), Allogènes 
(XI,3) and TriPro (XIII, 1). To this group Schenke added the version of the 
Apocryphon of John from the Berlin Gnostic Codex 8502, 2, as well as the 
9 Refutatio Omnium Haeresium, V, 19.1-22.1. The use of the term "Sethian" is followed 
up by Epiphanius, Panarion sect.III: 39.1.1-10.7. 
I Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 1.29. It is, however, debated whether Irenaeus himself 
actually used the term or it is a later addition. 
I I Turner 2001: 59, and as Schenke 1981: 590-91 points out by referring to Wisse 1972, 
"what the antiheretical writers of the church said about Sethianism and Sethians is en-
tirely inadequate for distinguishing meaningfully and unambiguously, which Gnostic 
texts are Sethian". 
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1 2 Cf. Epiphanius, Panarion sect. II, 26 and III, 39 and 40. Turner 2001: 61 adds the 
report of the "Sethoitae" by Pseudo-Tertullian Adversus omnes haereses 2. In 1986 
Bentley Layton suggested that the Thunder: Perfect Mind is affiliated to the Sethian 
tradition. His proposal is discussed in the chapter on Thunder. 
1 3 The following enumeration is based on the description of the Sethian characteristics 
in Schenke 1974: 166-171. 
1 4 The self-designations in the texts vary between "the unshakable race", "great race" 
and others, cf. Turner 2001: 58. 
1 5 In some texts the name of the demiurge is spelled Jakabaoth, as we see in TriPro. 
1 6 Turner 2001: 63-64. 
17 Ibid.: 255-301. 
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parallel in Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.29, the Untitled Treatise of Codex 
Brucianus, and the descriptions of the "Gnostics", "Sethians" and 
"Archontics" of Epiphanius, Panarion.12 Schenke called this group of texts 
"Sethian" and thus revived the term invented by the heresiologists. 
The rationale behind the grouping of the fourteen Nag Hammadi texts, 
plus a few others, lies in their sharing of seven distinct themes: 1 3 (1) the 
self-designation of the "we" in the texts as the "seed of Seth" or the like, 1 4 
and (2) the reference to Seth as a divine saviour figure. (3) The heavenly 
father of Seth: Adamas/Pigeradamas. (4) The notion of the Four 
Lights/Aeons of Autogenes: Harmozel, Oroiael, Daveithai and Eleleth. (5) 
The divine triad consisting of the Father/the Invisible Spirit, the Moth-
er/Barbelo and the Son/Autogenes. (6) We also encounter the demiurge, the 
ruler of the Underworld: Jaldabaoth,1 5 as well as (7) the notion of a certain 
Weltzeitalterlehre. Apart from these seven themes Schenke notes (8) that 
some of the Sethian texts were secondarily Christianized. 
John Turner counts fourteen features which characterize the Sethian text 
corpus. Besides the eight just mentioned above he points to: the triadic di-
vision of Barbelo; a special prayer; a specific deployment of negative the-
ology; a specific philosophical terminology; a triad or tetrad of "ministers" 
of the Four Lights: Gamaliel, Gabriel, Samblo and Abrasax. Finally, he 
adds the baptismal rite of the Five Seals. 1 6 Although Turner is very much 
aware of the uncertainty of the term "Sethian" being used as a self-desig-
nation by a specific social group, he firmly upholds the term by writing a 
"Hypothetical History of the Gnostic Sethianism".1 7 Turner's history falls 
into six phases of development by interaction with Christianity and Plato-
nism, all explaining the diversity among the Sethian texts. His proposal is 
very helpful in showing connections between texts and traditions which are 
otherwise difficult to decode, but it still remains a hypothesis (cf. the very 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
title of that section of his book). There are indeed great diversities among 
the texts, both because not all of the "Sethian" themes outlined above are 
found in every one of the texts, and also because of different employment 
of similar mythologoumena. Turner's hypothetical history has been criti-
cized for not being sufficiently persuasive. 1 8 However, this history provides 
us with an understanding of a development of texts during a period of two 
hundred years, texts which are united by many themes but also differ espe-
cially in relation to the influence from contemporary philosophy. 
Meanwhile, does it at all make sense to take over a heresiological term, 
which is actually only one among many, and use it as a collective designa-
tion for such a varied group of texts? Not necessarily, which is also why the 
category of "Sethianism" has not gone unchallenged. Frederik 
Wisse presented a counterstrike already in 1972 to the classification of the 
Nag Hammadi Library as a "Sethian" library by Jean Doresse. 1 9 He ques-
tioned the very use of the term "Sethian" in both ancient and modern liter-
ature and adduced a number of arguments in an article from 1981 "Stalking 
Those Elusive Sethians", a tough critique of Schenke's "Sethian" system. 
Wisse argues polemically that: "His [Schenke' s] "Sethian" books are the 
best proof that there never was a "Sethian" theological system". 2 0 More-
over, the themes isolated by Schenke were just "free-floating" 
theologoumena and mythologoumena used by "individuals with a similar 
attitude towards this world, otherworldly vision and ascetic lifestyle".21 
Thus, he pleads against the assumption that there was a sectarian group of 
"Sethians" behind these texts. 2 2 
More recently, Karen King has convincingly shown that the term 
"Sethianism", like the category "Gnosticism", should be used with the up-
permost transparency: 
King 2003: 158 and note 28, where she underlines that her own work "shows increas-
ing rather that decreasing conformity to other Christian works, such as the Gospel of 
John", in contrast to Turner's hypothesis, cf. King 1997. 
1 9 Doresse 1958: 281-282. 
2 0 Wisse 1981: 575. 
2 1 Ibid.: 575-576. 
2 2 Also Gedaliahu Stroumsa sees reason to avoid the term "Sethianism": "Sethianism... 
remains a category postulated for the sake of convenience. The obvious danger, in other 
words, lies in hypostasizing Sethianism, taking, in the Heresiologists' fashion, various 
mythical elements as evidence of a single and rigid system of thought, indicating a pre-
cise sociological reality - a sect." Stroumsa 1984: 6-7. 
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2 4 Ibid.: 156. 
2 5 Williams 1985: 186-188. 
2 6 Rasimus 2009: 59. 
27 Ibid. : 62, figure 4. 
2 8 For a recent contribution to the study of "Sethianism", see D. Burns' dissertation 
from Yale University, 2011. In this, Burns places the "Sethian Gnostic" apocalypses in 
a Christian Gnostic milieu, despite their obvious Neoplatonic metaphysics. 
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Although categorization is an important hermeneutical tool, it is necessary 
to articulate clearly the purposes of such classification, and above all to 
note the provisional status of all categorization. 2 3 
On the other hand she also sees "Sethianism" as a "useful subcategory of 
the Nag Hammadi materials". 2 4 King hereby positions herself on a golden 
mean that leans towards Schenke's position, a mean which Michael Wil-
liams also supports, although from a slightly different perspective. In his 
investigation of the social reality behind the self-designation "the immova-
ble race", he sees problems both in Wisse's rejection of any sort of 
"Sethian" community as well as in Schenke's identification of the 
"Sethian" texts as the product of a single social group. 2 5 
In 2009, Tuomas Rasimus published his dissertation Paradise Reconsid-
ered in Gnostic Mythmaking. In his study, he redefines and renames 
Schenke's category of "Sethianism" to the somewhat broader term: "Clas-
sic Gnostic". The texts which were identified by Schenke as "Sethian" cor-
respond to Rasimus' "Sethite" and "Barbeloite" sources, to which he adds 
the "Ophite" sources. Thus, the three types of mythology constitute 
Rasimus' "Classic Gnostic" tradition. He admits that this category is artifi-
cial, but also claims that it is "a convenient reference tool for a typological 
constructed category."2 6 He manages to arrange this rather diverse group of 
texts in a figure, visualizing the points that all these texts, nevertheless, do 
have in common. 2 7 I agree that this new category is convenient and quite 
convincing, in that it maps out the differences and similarities between its 
sub-categories. Thus, we are given a clear idea of the interrelations between 
the "Ophite", "Sethite", and "Barbeloite" mythologies.2 8 
Throughout this dissertation, I will employ the "Classic Gnostic" cate-
gory as well as its subcategories. I use them as heuristic tools to categorize 
thematically related texts without claiming that they were produced and 
read by one sociologically definable group. With Rasimus, I classify 
TriPro under the "Barbeloite" tradition. Furthermore, I shall suggest that 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Thunder has close affinities with both the "Ophite" and "Barbeloite" tradi-
tions. 
As mentioned above, I shall begin with an outline of central topics from 
the ancient philosophy of language. 
Chapter 2: Ancient Philosophy of Language 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with ancient philosophy of language as it is expressed in 
Platonic and Stoic dialectics. It will serve as background information for 
the following chapters on TriPro and Thunder, two texts within which lan-
guage-related speculations are essential. As already mentioned, it is my 
conviction that ancient philosophy of language is of great importance for 
the analysis and understanding of the two Nag Hammadi texts. Scholarship 
often compares much "Gnostic" literature with Platonism, although Pla-
tonic dialectics has rarely been used. Meanwhile, as opposed to the use of 
Platonism in general, scholars have only seldom used Stoicism in the anal-
ysis of "Gnostic" texts. To my knowledge I am only preceded by T. Onuki, 
who published the monograph Gnosis und Stoa in 1989 2 9, and more re-
cently by the 2010 volume Stoicism in early Christianity, edited by T. 
Rasimus, T. Engberg-Pedersen and I. Dunderberg.3 0 
It is important here to stress two points: (1) that there were no concept of 
philosophy of language in antiquity3 1, so the term is employed here as a 
matter of convenience, (2) that it is by no means my intention to provide 
either a Platonic or a Stoic "reading" of TriPro and Thunder. These texts 
are a part of a literary milieu that was not only influenced by Greek philos-
The study of Onuki is groundbreaking in that he is the first to compare Stoicism with 
Gnostic sources, in this case the Apocryphon of John. Onuki argues that the Apocryphon 
of John is very much aware of, but polemicizes against, Stoic philosophy especially 
with regard to cosmology, astronomy, and providence and fate. 
3 0 This volume presents 13 stimulating articles, which deal with Stoicism in relation to 
Early Christianity. What is of special interest for the present study are the last four arti-
cles in the volume, which deal with "Gnostic" and Valentinian sources. 
The idea of introducing Stoicism in the study of the New Testament, Paul in particular, 
was already established by Troels Engberg-Pedersen in his book Paul and the Stoics 
from 2000. See also Perkins 1980. 
3 1 In its present use the term seems to derive from 20 t h century contemporary philoso-
phy. For an overview of the "history of the philosophy of language" and the "problems 
of the philosophy of language", see the two articles by Simon Blackburn 1995. 
18 
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ophy, but which is also deeply involved in the biblical tradition, both Jew­
ish and Christian. Thus it is impossible to reduce the source of inspiration 
of the texts to one single tradition. What is possible, though, is to show how 
the authors of the two Nag Hammadi texts have been able to integrate an­
cient philosophy of language into their descriptions of divine manifesta­
tions. 
As will become apparent throughout the analysis of TriPro and Thunder, 
the philosophy of language has not been used on a "one-to-one" scale in 
these texts, but rather to express wholly different issues than it originally 
was meant to do. Nevertheless, the theories of language are certainly pre­
sent in the two Nag Hammadi texts, although mostly as an underlying ma­
trix that gives voice to subjects which the ancient writers of the two Nag 
Hammadi texts might have found difficult to express otherwise. My aim is 
to show how these writers have used the theories of language as what one 
might call literary tools. 
To meet this purpose I find it necessary to clarify how the ancient theo­
ries of language were originally framed. As it is not the subject matter of 
this dissertation, I will not present a thoroughgoing survey of ancient phi­
losophy of language. That would take up a whole study of its own. Instead, 
with regard to Platonism I wish to focus on two topics in the Platonic dia­
logues: (1) the correctness of names, which is the topic of the Cratylus, and 
(2) the method of diairesis, which is employed in several Platonic dia­
logues, particularly the Phaedrus and the Sophist. 
With regard to the Stoic material I will discuss two distinct parts of their 
dialectic: περί φωνής (on voice) and περί λεκτοΰ (on lekton), although the 
former in slightly more detail than the latter, since it is of great importance 
of the analysis of the two Nag Hammadi texts. Furthermore, I will discuss 
the relation between the Cratylus and Stoic linguistic theory. 
We shall begin with Plato and move on chronologically to the Stoics. 
Plato on language 
To begin with, it is important to emphasize that there is no such thing as a 
"Platonic Theory of Language". Although Plato did let the characters in his 
dialogues reflect on what we call "language" today, no fixed theory of lan­
guage exists from Plato's hand. Nonetheless, two language-related topics 
which figure in a few Platonic dialogues are of special interest to the pre­
sent dissertation. These are: (1) the discussion of the correctness of names, 
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which is attested in the Cratylus, and (2) the method of definition by divi-
sion (diairesis/διαίρεϋΐς), which is found in several dialogues, primarily the 
Phaedrus, the Sophist and the Statesman. 
First I will give a presentation of the Cratylus and an outline of Socrates' 
position on the correctness of names within this dialogue. 3 2 
The Cratylus - on names 
Among the sources at our disposition, Plato's Cratylus is one of the first 
texts from antiquity that deals with language-theoretical questions. It marks 
the beginning of a long tradition of language-related speculations within 
the field of philosophy, a tradition which is echoed in the religious litera­
ture of later times. As pointed out above Plato did not operate with a con­
cept of "language" as such. The topic was rather the ability of speech 
(λόγος), that is, the actual act of saying something. In the same manner Pla­
to did not use the concept of "words" either but rather of "names" as desig-
33 
nators for things and concepts. 
The Cratylus is a dialogue on the correctness of the "names" of which 
our speech consists. At the beginning of the dialogue Socrates is invited to 
clarify the discussion between his pupil Hermogenes and Cratylus, another 
philosopher. The discussion between the two deals with the question of 
whether the name of an item is a "natural" (φυσική) one or whether it has 
been given by pure convention (νόμος). 
Throughout the discussion, at first between Socrates and Hermogenes 
(first part: 383a-391b; second part: 391b-420e; third part: 421a-427d) and 
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next between Socrates and Cratylus (427d-440e)3 4, it becomes clear that the 
position of Socrates lies between that of Hermogenes and Cratylus. 3 5 
To begin with, Hermogenes complains about Cratylus' conclusion, that 
"Hermogenes" is not his real name, even though everyone calls him that. 
Underlying this claim of Cratylus' is the theory that the name of a given 
thing or in this case a person is naturally attached to the person it names. 
By contrast, Hermogenes is of the opinion that names are given to items by 
convention, that is, they are human inventions. The name of an item is its 
real name, but if at some point this name is changed to another one, the 
new name is as correct as the old one (384d). But Hermogenes is indignant 
at being teased by Cratylus and asks Socrates to join the conversation on 
the correctness of names. 
Socrates actually agrees with Cratylus at the outset that a name is natu-
rally connected to the thing it names. This standpoint is founded on the 
theory of forms. Socrates makes Hermogenes agree that things have an in-
dependent nature (form/ίδέα), so actions must also have an independent 
nature. In some actions, tools must play a natural role, thus there must be 
natural criteria for the production of these tools. Naming is an act, and in 
this act the name plays the role of a tool. From this it follows that natural 
criteria also exist for the construction of names (especially 386e-390a). 3 6 
This leads Socrates into those parts of the dialogue (391b-420e and 
421a-427d) which, according to Sedley, have been neglected by many 
scholars because of its "far-fetched etymologies". They are so bad that they 
actually constitute an embarrassment.3 7 
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Towards the end of the section on etymology, Socrates explains how 
correct names are made. The different sounds of the letters in themselves 
bear the basic meanings. For instance, Socrates explains how the letter rho 
is a tool to express change since pronouncing rho makes the tongue vibrate. 
Therefore it is contained in names for change and movement such as ρεΐν, 
pofj, τρόμφ etc. If the sounds, as letters, are correctly put together, they 
form the perfect image of the essence of the given item (426c-427d). 
In the last part of the dialogue, Cratylus is included in the conversation. 
Even though Socrates continues to believe that a name is naturally connect­
ed to its item, he does not think that all names are perfect images of things. 
There can be both good and bad name-givers, and correspondingly good 
and bad names, and it is possible to say something false by applying a false 
name to a given thing or person (429a-431e). With this Cratylus disagrees, 
since he thinks that names are the only certain path to knowledge about re­
ality. But Socrates continues to show Cratylus that a name can be com­
bined with sounds/letters which do not resemble the thing itself. For in­
stance, lambda, which is associated with softness and smoothness, actually 
occurs in a name for hardness: σκληρότης (434c). In this way Socrates 
makes Cratylus admit that some names are less good, but may still be used 
according to convention (434d-435a). 
The passages that follow are important because what is in fact the issue 
for Socrates now becomes clear. The discussion has developed into dealing 
with the question whether by knowing the names of things we automatical­
ly also know the things themselves. With the preceding discussion in mind 
Socrates naturally thinks that, since not all names are good and precise im­
ages of the things they name, we cannot rely on names in our search for 
knowledge about the things themselves, that is, the essence of the things, 
namely, reality (την ούσίαν): 3 8 
Socrates: "How realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps too great 
a question for you or me to determine; but it is worthwhile to have reached 
even this conclusion, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from 
names but much better through themselves than through names." 
He explains the insufficiency of names by referring to the situation of the 
name-givers of ancient times which he described already in 411b-c: they 
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became "dizzy" in their hurry to look around at things, which therefore 
seemed as if in a "heraclitean" flux. Thus, they gave names from the as­
sumption that everything is in flux (439c). 
The dialogue ends with Socrates telling Cratylus about a returning dream 
that shows that the only things truly knowable are the unchanging forms in 
contrast to imprecise names (439c-440e). 
In this way Socrates ends up not agreeing with either Hermogenes or 
Cratylus. On the one hand, he disagrees with Hermogenes' theory of con­
vention, explaining that names are naturally connected to the things they 
name. On the other hand, he also disagrees with Cratylus in that he finds 
that the name-givers of ancient times were unable to provide things with 
perfect names. Consequently, the only thing we can do in order to be able 
to grasp reality is to look at the things themselves and not rely on their 
names, which might be wrong images of them. 
This analysis of the Cratylus shows that the dialogue is not primarily 
about etymologies but rather, on a much more general level, about the rela­
tion of language to reality.3 9 
In my analysis of Thunder, I shall argue that something similar is at 
stake in this much later Nag Hammadi text. 
Another topic of Platonic dialectics which will prove to be of central im­
portance especially for the interpretation of Thunder is the notion of 
diairesis. To this we shall turn in what follows. 
The Platonic method of diairesis 
The method of diairesis (διαίρεσις) is a method of definition by division. It 
is attested mainly in the Phaedrus, where it is presented for the first time 4 0, 
and in the Sophist and the Statesman, where examples of its usage are giv­
en. 4 1 Even though it is a specific method of definition, the term diairesis is 
employed to cover many kinds of divisions within the field of dialectics. 
For instance, the term both covers divisions between concepts or words and 
between the smaller parts of language: syllables or letters. Thus the term is 
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not restricted to a single type of division. However, it seems that every sort 
of division has its roots within a more comprehensive method of diairesis. 
In his article from 1973, J. M. E. Moravcsik states that the method of 
diairesis should be interpreted as a development of Plato's Theory of 
Forms. He bases his argument on the assumption that diairesis is primarily 
formulated and employed in the later dialogues. It may thus be seen as a 
new way of drawing ontological distinctions.4 2 This is an interesting point, 
since it tells us what a diairesis is all about: finding a way to speak about 
what really is, that is, finding the right definitions for things and concepts 
of reality (that is, Forms), as well as mapping out the relationships among 
the Forms. 4 3 
In what follows, I will discuss certain details with regard to the Platonic 
notion of diairesis as it is described in the Phaedrus and the Sophist, re­
spectively. 
The Phaedrus 
What is a diairesis! To answer this question, I will take a look at how the 
method is first described in the Phaedrus. The main passages for the ac­
count of the diairesis are 265d-266c. 
The beginning of this passage (265d) is an explanation by Socrates of the 
principle of perceiving and bringing together, that is, what is later in the 
dialogue called the method of collection (συναγωγή). It deserves a short 
comment, as it is usually mentioned in relation to the method of diairesis, 
or at least as a similar method of definition.44 According to this particular 
passage in the Phaedrus, collection is about "perceiving and bringing to­
gether in one idea the scattered particulars, that one may make clear by def­
inition the particular thing he wishes to explain". 4 5 
In 265e Socrates goes on to explain the principle of division, the 
diairesis: 
That of dividing again and again by classes, where the natural joints are.. . 
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In the latter of these two short passages it becomes clear what is at least one 
major purpose of the methods of collection and division: they are "aids to 
speech and thought". That is, through either the collection of the scattered 
particulars or the division of the one into many, the definition of the subject 
in question is given. The former gathers together the particulars which have 
something in common in that they somehow share a common nature. This 
allows one to see the essence of the gathered group of things. 4 6 The latter 
divides a given kind/form (είδος) into two classes. In this way these meth­
ods help thought and speech to understand and communicate the precise 
essence of the subject matter. Their practitioners are called dialecticians. 
The relation between collection and diairesis is not entirely clear, ac­
cording to J. A. Philip. In an article from 1966, he asks whether the method 
of collection is to be understood as preceding the diairesis, i.e., as an opera­
tion that is required before the diairesis of the summum genus41 can begin. 
Philip does not think this is the case, since "the role of collection in the 
choice of summum genus is not exemplified..." Collection is rather a sur­
vey of the extension of the different classes which are implicated in the 
diairesis.49 Although in Phaedrus 266b the method of collection seems to 
be just as important to Socrates as the diairesis, the method of diairesis 
comes more into focus in the following dialogues. Thus I find it very pos­
sible to understand the collection as a survey of classes within the process 
4 0 Crombie 1971: 368-370. 
4 7 The summum genus being the point of departure of the diairesis, which will be divid­
ed into species. 
4 8 Philip 1966: 341. 
4 9 Ibid. : 342. Although Philip provides an attempt to grasp the function of a collection as 
a sort of survey which may take place during the process of the diairesis, he concludes 
that ". . .the phase of collection is perhaps insufficiently clarified..." 
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and furthermore in 266b: 
Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and 
bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other 
man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divid­
ed into many, him I follow after and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a 
god". And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or 
wrong, God knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians. 
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of the diairesis. From this it follows, moreover, that collection is not so 
well defined as the diairesis. 
I. M. Crombie sheds some light on this question in his book from 1971. 
He also understands collection as a part of diairesis but in a much more 
specific way than Philip. Crombie writes: 
Division or diairesis is intimately connected with collection, not only be­
cause Plato insists that collections without divisions are dangerous, but also 
because he requires divisions to be done "at a joint". But to discern where 
the joints come is to collect the two sub-kinds between which they come. 5 0 
In this way the collection is seen as the part of division where the dichoto­
mies are identified. But whereas Philip focuses on the great collection of 
sub-kinds gathered in the process of diairesis, Crombie focuses on the sin­
gle step in making the division between only one dichotomy. However, by 
and large they agree with each other. 
To elucidate how the method of diairesis is practised, I now turn to the 
Sophist in which examples of its usage are found. 
The Sophist 
The main issue at stake in the Sophist is the definition of the sophist, as 
compared to the philosopher and a statesman. The investigation is set off 
by the entrance of the Eleatic stranger to the scene as a guest of Theodoros, 
who has joined Socrates and Theaitetos in conversation. The method which 
is used for the definition of the sophist is that of division - diairesis. 
Through seven attempts at a definition,51 the sophist is characterized as one 
who, through false utterances, creates illusions and false imitations. The 
question is then how false utterances are possible in the first place, since 
they deal with "non-being", and to utter anything about "non-being" is to 
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say nothing. Thus the dialogue takes a turn in dealing with being versus 
non-being. 5 2 
Before looking at the discussions embodied in the definitions, I will con-
centrate on the method being used: diairesis. Since Plato does not system-
atically formulate the directions for the use of the specific method, I shall 
follow the description that has been pieced together by modern scholars 
from the Platonic dialogues which make use of diairesis. 
The process of diairesis may be summarized as follows: The definition 
of a given subject is made through a series of divisions that divide the vari-
ous subcategories of the subject into opposites/dichotomies, and, step by 
step, leave one of these opposites behind in order to arrive at the point 
where no further division can be made. The division begins with the con-
cept chosen by the dialectician. This concept is the genus. The genus is 
then divided into subgenera until the final stage of the division, where the 
undividable concept, the infima species, is reached. 5 3 The division is pri-
marily made between dichotomies, although Plato emphasizes that they 
must be made according to the natural "joints" or "members" of nature, as 
we saw in the Phaedrus (265e). 5 4 
A good example of diairesis is given at 235b-c, where the philosopher is 
compared to a hunter chasing his prey: 
It is decided then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-
making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against 
us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason, our king, then deliver 
him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in 
any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always 
dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For as-
suredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped 
from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and every-
where in this methodological way. 
Another characteristic of the method of diairesis is that in the division of a 
genus into subgenera, the emphasis is laid on the right-hand member of 
each division. This is already mentioned in the Phaedrus (266a) in direct 
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connection with the dialogue's description of the method which was pre­
sented above. The focus on the right-hand members seems to eliminate the 
left-hand members, in order to reach down to the final infima spe­
cies! definiendum.55 However, it is not to be understood in such a way that 
the final undividable concept - the infima species - is the only real concept. 
If so, the whole hierarchy of divisions would be thrown away. An im­
portant issue is, namely, that diairesis shows the "unity of the many". As 
Philip puts it: 
It is based on the fact that each and every one of the things we call "exist-
ents" is "a one and a many". That is, each kind or class or common nature 
or universal is at once a unity - the unity of its nature - and so determinate, 
and an indeterminate plurality as consisting of an indefinite number of par­
ticular instances exhibiting or partaking in that nature. We have the natural 
community of the kind or class and the natural plurality of its members . 5 6 
When the definition is made, the dialectician will have the exact definition 
of the "name", that is, the particular word that he started out to define. He 
will have "achieved a definition of the function or thing (έργον) to which 
that name refers". 5 7 This recalls the Cratylus, in which the very act of nam­
ing was fundamentally questioned since it would be impossible to grasp the 
essence of a thing or a deed in a name invented by a dizzy forefather. Are 
we to comprehend the method of diairesis as a continuation of the critique 
of naming that began in the Cratylus, in such a way that the diairesis gives 
the dialectician or the philosopher the precise definition, and thus the pre­
cise essence which lies behind the particular name? I think the answer must 
be positive. If we must make use of names (language), it is certainly im­
portant to know the exact meaning of the names and thereby also the reality 
which should undoubtedly be reflected in them. 
According to Moravcsik 1973a, naming is actually an important but ne­
glected aspect of the diairesis. Moravcsik does not focus on the name 
whose essence the dialectician would choose to define. Rather, he points to 
the process of division in which many elements in the various dichotomies 
are named. What are named are primarily the kinds {genera) which are di-
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vided from the original Form (name). The kinds are therefore also forms, 
although "of a less generic nature". 5 8 The final undividable concept which 
is reached at the end is not to be regarded as only the sum of the names 
enumerated along the descent of the diairesis. It is more than that. It is a 
whole, a unity of the many as I stated above. This point is emphasized by 
Philip, Moravcsik and Friis Johansen 5 9 and is found again at the end of the 
Sophist itself (268c), where the Eleatic Stranger settles on the definition of 
a sophist: 
Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the 
end to the beginning? 
This means that every name which is listed during the diairesis is to be in-
cluded in the final name - the final logos. Does this mean that the name 
comprises both sides of the various dichotomies or only the right-hand 
members of the division? The question is not answered by Plato, although 
it seems as if the right-hand members are preferred. On the other hand, it is 
not an inflexible rule either, as some divisions in the Sophist begin from the 
left-hand members. 6 0 
In an article from 1983, S. Minardi throws some light on this question by 
emphasizing that diairesis also elaborates the differences between con-
cepts. He agrees that the outcome of a division is a definition of an object 
through its name, which implies a wide range of different concepts. These 
are all somehow included in the subject in question. But Minardi also in-
sists that diairesis is associated with remembrance. He writes: 
We can rightly consider that divisions do not rest upon a calculus, but upon 
reminiscence; in fact the only meaning of anamnesis - other than any met-
aphorical sense - is that knowledge is remembrance (clarification, re-
calling), of something we know, with which we have a close relation. 6 1 
Thus, the act of proceeding through a diairesis is, according to Minardi, a 
process of remembrance. Remembering all the differences of the object in 
question is at the same time recognizing these differences. Thus, "recalling 
a concept means recalling all its differences, its variety, without thinking 
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that it can be homogeneous and single as its name can be." 6 2 "Knowledge 
means knowledge of differences", Minardi continues, referring to the 
Theaetetus 208d-210a. This is certainly an aspect of the diairesis which is 
not emphasized elsewhere. Nevertheless, I think it is a central aspect which 
is of great importance especially of my analysis of the Thunder: Perfect 
Mind. Moreover, Minardi points to the question dealt with in the Cratylus 
that was discussed above, namely that of the relation between a thing and 
its name. He recognizes the critique of naming which is found in the 
Cratylus and sees the method of diairesis as Plato's answer to the problem: 
A name is now regarded as a source of deceptions that we must fight. 
Diairesis is the method Plato proposes to fight this linguistic bewitch-
ment . 6 3 
Minardi here confirms the present understanding of Plato's critique of 
naming in the Cratylus, that is, that a name does not necessarily reflect the 
actual essence of the thing it names, and hence that our way of speaking 
about things - reality - is insufficient. Secondly, Minardi regards the meth-
od of diairesis as a solution to this problem. The method comprises all as-
pects of the name/subject in question and discloses the differences between 
the various concepts contained in the single name. All this comes to the 
fore as the dialectician or the performer of the diairesis remembers and 
knows about these differences. So, although the method of diairesis uses 
names and concepts that are human-made, it uncovers the complexity of 
the single name, which in this way is made known. Knowing the complexi-
ty and diversity comprised within the name, one will also know the essence 
and reality behind it. In the Sophist this discussion is carried out within the 
context of a reflection on the nature of being versus non-being. It has come 
about through a conversation concerning the identity of the sophist, who is 
eventually characterized as one who through false utterances creates illu-
sions and false imitations. Since he creates something, this something must 
exist, but how may illusions exist when they are false and thus without be-
ing (i.e. non-being)? 6 4 The Sophist finds a solution in the interweaving of 
being and non-being, the latter existing as something which is "different 
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from being" and not as being absolute nothing (in Parmenides' sense). Be­
ing may thus consist of both change and rest. 6 5 Thus a unity of the many 
both participates in being but is not identical with it. The method of 
diairesis is used to make known the differences between forms which are 
being defined only in relation to one another. Therefore it becomes possible 
to claim that non-being is, because it exists in relation to, and especially as 
different from, being. 6 6 Following this line of thought it is furthermore con­
cluded that with regard to language it is possible to say something false, 
that is, to say something which is different from what is actually the case. 6 7 
Whereas Plato and Aristotle6 8 contributed significantly to the philosoph­
ical reflection on language, they did not provide a systematic description of 
the structure and form of language. In this the Stoics are considered pio­
neers. 6 9 They developed and revised several aspects of the language related 
theories first formulated in the Platonic dialogues. Their insights became 
seminal for further linguistic studies. 7 0 
In the next chapter I shall thus discuss a few central characteristics of 
Stoic dialectics.7 1 
ω Friis Johansen (1998) 2007: 293. 
6 6 Ibid.: 295; Rosen 1983: 277. 
6 7 My description of the complicated discussion which takes place in the Sophist by no 
means explicates the many details of the argument exhaustively. I have sought to point 
out the central issues which I find of special interest for the analysis of the two Nag 
Hammadi texts. For a treatment which does the entire dialogue justice, see for instance 
Rosen 1983. 
6 8 Aristotle exerted great influence on Stoic dialectics and was a major exponent of lan­
guage related speculation. In spite of the significance of Aristotle, the focus of the pre­
sent study on Thunder and TriPro does not require a thorough discussion of his reflec­
tion on language. For an analysis of the Aristotelian notion of diairesis see von 
Fragstein 1967. 
6 9 Long 1986: 131. 
7 0 For instance, the grammarian Dionysius Thrax (second century B.C.) was deeply in­
fluenced by the Stoics. Cf. Long 1986: 131. For a relatively new translation of the 
grammar of Dionysius Thrax see: Lallot 1998. 
7 1 For the presentation of Stoic dialectics I rely on the work of the following scholars: 
Long 2005, 1986 and 1971; Long and Sedley 1987a and 1987b; Ax 1986; Sandbach 
(1975) 1989; Hülser 1979; Lloyd 1971. 
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/ z L o n g 1971:75. 
7 3 In the present chapter I will employ the terms "Stoic" and "Stoicism" for the sake of 
convenience, despite the many diversities which undoubtedly exist within the long Stoic 
tradition. 
7 4 Long 1971: 75. Even though Long finds it pedantic to count dialectics to logic, he 
recognizes that the Stoics did so themselves. 
7 5 Long 1986: 121. Attested by Diogenes Laertius VII, 4 1 . Cf. Hülser FDS: 40-41 
(fragment 33). According to Hülser 1979: 290 the Stoics took over the division of logic 
into dialectics and rhetoric from Xenocrates (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 2, 6f). 
7 6 Long 1986: 123. 
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Introduction 
The Stoics acknowledged Aristotle's threefold division of philosophy into 
logic, physics and ethics. This chapter deals with one major part of logic, 
namely dialectics. It is well known that the different elements of Stoic 
thought are inextricably linked together, and this is also true in the case of 
dialectics, which involves the study of both ethics and physics. Some 
scholars claim that holding dialectics under logic is "pedantic and mislead-
ing", as it should be regarded as metaphysics instead. 7 2 While it is not the 
aim of this chapter to sort out the question of definition with regard to dia-
lectics and its relationship with other parts of Stoic philosophy,7 3 I will 
consider dialectics a part of the field of logic, as the Stoics themselves 
did. 7 4 
The aim of this chapter is to draw attention to and explicate the linguistic 
insights of the Stoics especially with regard to the examination of the dif-
ferent levels of intelligibility within an utterance. As will become apparent 
later, these insights will play a key role in my analysis of the two Nag 
Hammadi texts in question. Furthermore, I intend to touch upon the most 
difficult term associated with Stoic dialectics: the lekton (λεκτόν). I will 
leave aside rhetoric, which is understood to be a parallel to dialectics under 
the field of logic. 7 5 
The subject of Stoic dialectic is, as Long has formulated to the point: 
"words, things, and the relations which hold between them". 7 6 As is too 
often the case with various aspects of Stoic thought, we do not have any 
primary sources about Stoic dialectics. The main account is given by Dio­
genes Laertius (primarily VII, 55-57, but also remarks scattered throughout 
VII, 41-82). Diogenes tells us that the Stoics divided their dialectic into two 
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main categories: on σημαίνοντα ("things which signify") and 
σημαινόμενα ("things which are signified"), the former being concerned 
with language as sound, writing, verbal expressions, etymology, formal 
grammar, metrics, poems and music, as well as parts of both speech and 
rhetoric.7 8 Thus, the "things which signify" are the parts of the Stoic lin­
guistic theory which concerned the corporeal subjects. Meanwhile the 
"things which are signified" are understood as incorporeal, being about 
what is said, that is, the meaning of what is being said, in other words the 
lekton. Furthermore, the σημαινόμενα covers simple and complex proposi­
tions, modalities, syllogisms and fallacies.7 9 
Even though dialectic is subdivided into two individual topics, they are 
strongly related to each other through what is the overall concern of logic: 
logos (λόγος). Since logos here means both speech and reason, 8 0 the inter­
relation between the two subdivisions of dialectics is apparent. What mat­
ters are, first and foremost, language and its relation to reason and reality. 
How are speech and thought related? Furthermore, how is this speech, i.e. 
language, related to our world/reality? The answers to these questions are 
given in both sections of Stoic dialectics. In what follows I shall investigate 
the two parts of Stoic dialectics individually focusing on a few central 
themes which will become useful for the interpretation of the two Nag 
Hammadi texts. 
I will begin with the things which signify. 
The things which signify 
τέχνη περί φωνής 
What is of special interest to the present study is the Stoic theory of a ver­
bal expression. In what follows I will provide an examination of a few cen­
tral passages from Diogenes Laertius concerning the Stoic τέχνη περι 
D.L. VII, 62: Διαλεκτική δέ έστιν, ώς φησι Ποσειδώνιος, επιστήμη αληθών και 
ψευδών και ούθετέρων, τυγχάνει δ ' αύτη, ώς ό Χρύσιππος φησι, περι σημαίνοντα και 
σημαινόμενα. Έν μεν ουν τη περί φωνής θεωρία τοιαύτα λέγεται τοις Στωϊκοΐς. 
7 8 Lloyd 1971: 58, who explains that the inclusion of certain parts of speech and rhetoric 
into the Stoic theory is due to the fact that the Stoics considered language as based on 
natural signs as opposed to conventional signs. Rhetoric is thus not entirely excluded 
from dialectics, as is also seen by Hülser 1979: 288. 
7 9 Hülser 1979: 285-286. 
8 0 Sandbach (1975) 1989: 95. 
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φωνής, i.e. the Stoic theory of voice. The τέχνη implies a thorough analysis 
of the different components of speech and their relation to each other. The­
se are sound/voice (φωνή), speech (λέξις) and sentence/logos (λόγος). Inci­
dentally, the three concepts were the invention of Aristotle (although they 
are already implicit in Plato) but taken up and developed by the Stoics and 
other Hellenistic Schools. But it was the Stoic theory of language that be­
came "trendsetting".8 1 As will become clear through the reading of the pas­
sages from Diogenes, the Stoic τέχνη περι φωνής was worked out in the 
form of a diairesis. It is, in other words, a definition of φωνή by division. 
The Stoic understanding of voice, speech and sentence/logos is reported 
by Diogenes Laertius, as following VII55-57: 8 2 
(55) Της δέ διαλεκτικής θεωρίας συμφώνως δοκεΐ τοις πλείστοις άπό του 
περί φωνής ένάρχεσθαι τόπου. "Εστι δέ φωνή αήρ πεπληγμένος, ή το ϊδιον 
αίσθητόν ακοής, ως φησι Διογένης ό Βαβυλώνιος έν τή Περι φωνής τέχνη. 
Ζφου μέν έστι φωνή αήρ ύπό ορμής πεπληγμένος, ανθρώπου δέ μέν έστιν 
έναρθρος και άπό διανοίας εκπεμπόμενη, ώς ό Διογένης φησίν, ήτις άπό 
δεκατεσσάρων ετών τελειοΰται. Και σώμα δ' έστιν ή φωνή κατά τους 
Στωικούς, ώς φησιν Άρχέδημός τε έν τη Περι φωνής και Διογένης και 
Αντίπατρος και Χρύσιππος έν τη δευτέρα τών Φυσικών. (56) Πάν γαρ τό 
ποιούν σώμα έστι, ποιεί δέ ή φωνή προσιοΰσα τοις άκούουσιν άπό τών 
φωνούντων. 
Λέξις δέ έστιν κατά τούς Στωικούς, ώς φησι ό Διογένης, φωνή 
εγγράμματος, οίον Ήμερα [έστί]. Λόγος δέ έστι φωνή σημαντική άπό 
διανοίας εκπεμπόμενη, <οΐον Ήμερα έστί>. Διάλεκτος δέ έστι λέξις 
κεχαραγμένη εθνικώς τε και Έλληνικώς, ή λέξις ποταπή, τουτέστι ποια 
κατά διάλεκτον, οίον κατά μέν τήν Ατθίδα Θάλαττα, κατά δέ τήν Ίάδα 
Ήμερη. 
Της δέ λέξεως στοιχειά έστι τά είκοσιτέσσαρα γράμματα. Τριχώς δέ 
λέγεται τό γράμμα, <τό τε στοιχεΐον> ο τε χαράκτη ρ του στοιχείου και τό 
ΑΧ 1986:138-139, 141. The analysis of the Stoic τέχνη περι φωνής which follows, 
builds to a great extent upon the detailed presentation by Ax in his seminal work from 
1986. Besides the chapter on Stoic dialectics (pp. 138-211) he analyses thoroughly the 
notion of "voice" in both Roman and Greek traditions. 
8 2 The Greek text derives from the critical edition of Diogenes Laertius (Diogenis 
Laetii. Vitae Philosophorum) edited by M. Marcovich in 1999. As emphasized by Ax 
1986: 141, the Stoic texts are very fragmentarily transmitted to us, and in the case of 
Diogenes Laertius, it is a secondary transmission from the doxographer Diocles. For 
this reason Ax has reservations regarding the exactitude of the Stoic theory. Cf. Ax 
1986: 152. 
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The translation is my own. 
8 4 What I put here in parentheses is an addition which appears in the edition of Hülser. 
The editions of Marcovich and Hülser do not correspond completely to each other. 
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όνομα, oîov Άλφα. (57) Φωνήεντα δέ έστι τών στοιχείων έπτά, α, ε, η , ι, ο, 
υ, ω, άφωνα δέ εξ, β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ. Διαφέρει δέ φωνή και λέξις, δτι φωνή μέν 
και ό ήχος έστι, λέξις δέ το εναρθρον μόνον. Λέξις δέ λόγου διαφέρει, δτι 
λόγος <μέν> άει σημαντικός έστι, λέξις δέ και ασήμαντος γίνεται, ως ή 
Βλίτυρι [λόγος δέ ουδαμώς]. Διαφέρει δέ και τό λέγειν του προφέρεσθαι, 
προφέρονται μέν γαρ αί φωναί, λέγεται δέ τα πράγματα, ά δή και λεκτά 
τυγχάνει. 
Translation:8 3 
(55) Of the dialectic theory, most agree to begin with the topic of voice. 
Now voice is air that has been struck or the object that is perceptible espe­
cially to the hearing, as Diogenes the Babylonian says in the treatise On 
Voice. While the voice of an animal is air that has been struck by impulse, 
(the voice of a) human being is (air that is) articulate and (is) issued from 
thought, as Diogenes says, which comes to maturity in the fourteenth year. 
Furthermore, voice according to the Stoics is a body, as says Archedemos 
in his On Voice, and Diogenes, and Antipatros, and Chrysippos in the se­
cond book of his Physics. (56) For all that is effective is a body; and the 
voice is effective as proceeding from those who give voice to those who 
hear (it). 
Speech (lexis) is according to the Stoics, as Diogenes says, a writable 
voice, such as 'day' . A sentence (logos) is an intelligible voice, issuing 
from thought <such as, 'it is day'>. Dialect is a speech (lexis) that has been 
'stamped' with a character of its own, both in the manner of foreigners and 
of Greeks, or a speech from a particular region, that is, with a special form 
in accordance with its dialect, such as the Attic HhalattcC (sea), and the 
Ionic '/zëmerë'(day). 
The elements of speech (lexis) are the twenty-four letters. 'Letter' is said to 
have three meanings: <the (phonetic value of the ) 8 4 element>, the graphic 
form of the element, and the name, such as 'Alpha'. (57) Of the elements 
there are seven vowels: a, e, ë, /, ο, y, ö\ and six mutes: h, g, d, k, ρ, t. 
Voice differs from speech (lexis) in that a sound too is voice, but speech 
(lexis) is only what is articulate. Speech (lexis) differs from sentence (log­
os), in that a sentence (logos) is always intelligible, whereas speech (lexis) 
may be unintelligible, i.e. 'blityri', [which a sentence (logos) never is]. Fur­
thermore, saying differs from pronouncing. For voices are pronounced, but 
things are said, which are also the lekta. 
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In these three paragraphs it is shown how the Stoics, according to Diogenes 
Laertius, distinguish between the different constituents of a verbal expres­
sion. 
In this text it is first stated that in the field of dialectic one may begin 
from an examination of φωνή. In this specific linguistic context, φωνή 
means a voice that is so far without any meaning and articulation. There­
fore it is merely a sound. This is reflected in the German translation by K. 
Hülser, who translates φωνή by "Stimme" but also adds in parenthesis "den 
Laut, das sprachliche Zeichen". 8 5 Similarly, it is emphasized by W. Ax, that 
"φωνή...ist für Diogenes primär die Stimme in ihrer physiologischen 
proprie-Bedeutung."8 6 This means that the interest lies with the physicality 
of the voice as is shown by the immediate description of it as "άήρ 
πεπληγμένος", that is, air which is being struck. This has to do with the 
Stoic understanding of voice as a material entity, a body (σώμα δ' έστιν ή 
φωνή). It is material since it has an effect on the ear by being hearable: Παν 
γαρ το ποιούν σώμα έστι, ποιεί δε ή φωνή προσιοΰσα τοις άκούουσιν από 
τών φωνούντων ("For all that is effective is a body; and the voice is effec­
tive as proceeding from those who give voice to those who hear (it)"). Al­
ready at the beginning it was stated that a voice is, what is attainable specif­
ically to the hearing (ή το ϊδιον αίσθητον ακοής). 
That the interest of the Stoics lies with the human capacity to speak is 
expressed by the differentiation between animal and human voice. Whereas 
animal voice is described as "ύπό ορμής πεπληγμένος" (being struck by 
impulse), human voice is "έναρθρος και από διανοίας εκπεμπόμενη", that 
is, articulate and issued from thought. Thus the first diairesis of φωνή is the 
one between human voice and animal sound/voice. Worth noting is here 
that in relation to animal sound/voice the human voice is articulate, where­
as in relation to λέξις, which is the next level of the verbal expression, the 
φωνή is inarticulate. This will become clear in a moment. 
Hülser 1987: 522-523. 
8 6 Ax 1986:190. Ax 1986: 166-190 analyses thoroughly the meaning of φωνή in Dioge­
nes. One of the main questions is whether to Diogenes φωνή means "voice" or 
"tone"/"ring", i.e. pure sound. The conclusion is (very roughly) that φωνή as "voice" is 
"eine Spezies des übergeordneten Schall-genus" (190). On the other hand, Ax still 
leaves some doubt with regard to the definition recalling the definition of φωνή in rela­
tion to that of λέξις, where φωνή is described as a ήχος, i.e. as pure sound. See analysis 
below. 
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The next distinction within the sequence of a verbal expression is be­
tween that of φωνή and λέξις. As is also pointed out by Ax, a λέξις may 
be of two kinds: εγγράμματος and έναρθρος. 8 7 Firstly, λέξις is understood 
as a written voice (φωνή εγγράμματος), which means a voice/sound which 
it is possible to write down since it is articulate. The single elements 
(στοιχεία) of the voice/sound come together in a λέξις, which makes it 
writable. Hülser's translation of λέξις by "Phonemreihe" makes the interre-
latedness of φωνή and λέξις even clearer, since the "Phonemreihe" eluci­
dates the nature of λέξις as a compound of the different στοιχεία. Secondly, 
if we look a bit ahead in the text, the difference between φωνή and λέξις is 
explained further: Διαφέρει δέ φωνή και λέξις, οτι φωνή μέν και ό ήχος 
έστι, λέξις δέ τό εναρθρον μόνον ("Voice differs from speech (lexis) in that 
a sound too is voice, but speech (lexis) is only what is articulate"). Here the 
articulateness (εναρθρον) of a λέξις is emphasized as opposed to φωνή 
when it is a mere sound (ήχος). The diairesis lies here in fact between the 
articulated voice (λέξις) and the unarticulated sound (ήχος) which is also a 
voice. 
The third distinction is that between λέξις and λόγος. Already in para­
graph 56 it was asserted that: Αόγος δέ έστι φωνή σημαντική άπό διανοίας 
εκπεμπόμενη ("A sentence (logos) is a signifying/intelligible voice, issued 
from thought"). So what differentiates λόγος from both φωνή and λέξις is 
that it is an intelligible voice (φωνή σημαντική). In paragraph 57 it is fur­
ther pinned down: "Speech (lexis) differs from sentence (logos), in that a 
sentence (logos) is always intelligible, whereas speech (lexis) may be unin­
telligible, i.e. 'blityri', [which a sentence (logos) never is]". A sentence 
(λόγος) is always intelligible whereas speech (λέξις) can be, but is not nec­
essarily.8 8 An example of unintelligible speech is "βλίτυρι". This is clearly 
a possible composition of elements which is both pronounceable and writa­
ble, but it is at the same time completely without meaning. 8 9 
To sum up: a human voice (φωνή) is uttered from thought (διάνοια). As 
opposed to animal sound/voice the human voice is articulate. However, 
considered in relation to the different divisions of φωνή in a verbal expres­
sion the first step in this expression is what one might call a ήχος-φωνή (a 
"sound-voice"), since it is inarticulate as opposed to λέξις. Speech (λέξις) is 
87 Ibid: 192. 
8 8 Cf. Ax 1986: 199-200. 
8 9 For a thorough investigation of the "Sprachphänomen" βλίτυρι, see Ax 1986: 195-
199. 
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Attested by Philo: De vita Mosis II § 127-129, Vol. 4 p. 229 sq. C-W. Cf. FDS 531. 
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different from voice in that it is articulated. It is, however, not necessarily 
an intelligible speech. A sentence (λόγος) constitutes the highest semantic 
level of a verbal expression. It is articulate and always intelligible at the 
same time. The sequence of a verbal expression could be visualized as fol­
lows: 
διάνοια - φωνή - λέξις - λόγος 
thought - voice - speech - sentence 
The diairetic definition is presented systematically and fairly technically, 
and one gets the impression that this type of definition is rather "dry", only 
pointing towards its goal: the intelligible logos. In this linguistic context 
λόγος has the meaning of "sentence", although it implicates the more gen­
eral sense of λόγος, namely "reason", hence the location of dialectics under 
logic. 
On the other hand it is important to remember that the person who exe­
cutes the diairesis is not only focused on its goal, forgetting about the earli­
er steps towards the infima species!definiendum. The first steps and divi­
sions remain part of the unity. In this specific example of the division of 
φωνή, it makes perfect sense to understand diairesis as a "unity of the 
many". The voice is of course a part of the speech, since without voice no 
speech could be uttered. And both voice and speech are parts of the sen­
tence, since without voice it could not be uttered, and without speech it 
could not be articulated. The sentence, however, as the final goal is fully 
intelligible and pervaded by logos = reason. It is clear that the Stoic se­
quence of a verbal expression is directed towards the logos as the highest 
semantic level, but both voice and speech form part of this sequence. 
Through the Stoic diairesis of voice, the relation between thought and 
language is explained. It is now clear that, according to the Stoics, "Λόγος 
δέ έστι φωνή σημαντική άπό διανοίας εκπεμπόμενη". That a sentence is an 
intelligible voice which comes from thought is, in our modern ears, a ba­
nality. It is, nonetheless, important to remember that it was in fact the Sto­
ics who formulated this in a systematic way, "blazing a path" for further 
linguistic studies. 
The idea that voice is uttered from thought is furthermore closely related 
to the famous Stoic notion of λόγος ένδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός.9 0 
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9 1 Ax 1986: 203 also notes this. 
9 2 Mortley 1986: 116, who explains how later in history (by Philo) thought and speech 
were separated. 
9 3 Long 2005. See discussion below. 
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The notion that thought is inner discourse and discourse is articulated 
thought is found already in Plato's Sophist (263e): 9 1 
Then, thought and speech are the same, only the former, which is a voice­
less inner dialogue of the soul with itself, has been given the special name 
of thought. 
This shows not only that the Stoics agreed with Plato on this specific mat­
ter, but also that at this relatively early stage in the history of ancient phi­
losophy of language, thought and speech were seen as inseparable. This 
again illustrates that the logos was the most exalted tool of the human 
mind. 9 2 
The question is now how intelligible speech relates to reality. This im­
plies the reflection upon the problem of the relation between a sound or a 
name, on the one hand, and the thing this name refers to, that is, the "refer­
ent", on the other. How can we be sure that our language is consistent with 
what we speak about - our reality? The question recalls the problems 
which were dealt with in the Cratylus, and as has been shown by A. A. 
Long, the Stoics were in fact deeply influenced by the etymologies made in 
that dialogue. 9 3 The questions posed in relation to Stoic etymology lead 
naturally to a discussion of the meaning of what is said, which is dealt with 
in the second part of Stoic dialectics: the σημαινόμενα ("what is signi­
fied"). 
In what follows I will begin by sketching out the basic issues with regard 
to Stoic etymology, especially in relation to the different positions present­
ed in the Cratylus. As etymology is concerned with the σημαίνοντα, I will 
dwell upon this part of dialectics for a bit longer. After that, I will proceed 
to the σημαινόμενα, focusing on the lekton. 
Stoic etymology and the Cratylus 
The Stoics were interested in the same questions which were dealt with in 
the Cratylus, namely that of the relationship between a thing and its name. 
They were positive about the assumption that a name has a natural connec-
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tion to the thing it names, contrary to the view held by Aristotle and by 
Hermogenes in the Cratylus to the effect that names were given to things 
by pure convention. To illustrate the Stoic position, A. A. Long points to a 
short passage from Origen's Contra Celsum about "the primary sounds 
(των πρώτων φωνών) imitating the things of which they are the names, and 
hence they [that is, the Stoics] adduced [them as] elements of etymolo­
gy." 9 5 This passage comprises two elements which Long enumerates as 
points of similarity between Stoicism and the Cratylus: (1) etymology and 
(2) primary sounds. 9 6 The passage shows how the two are linked together, 
in that the primary sound, as a sort of onomatopoeia, resembles the essence 
of the thing it imitates and names, thus making up the basis for the etymol­
ogy of that name. The interest in primary sounds and etymology falls under 
the question of the origin of language. According to J. Allen, the Stoics 
found that the words formed at the beginning of human history were supe­
rior to those of their own day. They contained a "primitive wisdom". 9 7 
In his article, Long shows not only how Stoic etymology in some in­
stances is identical to the etymologies put forth by Socrates in the 
98 
Cratylus, but he also argues that parts of the Stoic "linguistic theory can 
be interpreted as a revisionary reading of the Cratylus."99 Unlike Plato, ac­
cording to Long, the Stoics did not see the letters and syllables of names as 
containing the true nature of things, for instance, that the letters iota, rhô 
etc. should signify "motion". 1 0 0 Contrary to this, Long thinks that the Stoics 
held that "certain words (not individual letters or syllables) affect our hear-
ing in ways that manifest precise similarity between sound and referent." 
These words are "sound-words" (like clangor, one of Augustine's exam-
ples of a sound-word, in this case made by a trumpet) which affect us sen-
y 4 Ibid.: 133. Origen: Contra Celsum 1.24 (SVF 2.146). 
9 5 Cels. 1.24/SVF 2A46/FDS 643. Long 2005: 36-37, although it seems as if Long has 
rendered the Greek text incorrectly by transcribing τών πρώτων φωνών as "tön protön 
onomatön". It cannot be the intention to confuse "sound" with "name", since the idea is 
that the name is made out of primary sounds. 
9 6 Long 2005: 36-37. 
9 7 Allen 2005:15. 
9 8 For instance "the name Zeus and its inflection Dia by reference to zën, 'to live', and 
dia meaning 'because of : the name Zeus signifies 'the cause of life'". Long 2005: 36. 
9 9 Long 2005: 37. He reassures that his theory is hypothetical, but he retains the domi-
nant role of the Cratylus. 
1 0 0 Ibid.: 40. Cf. the Cratylus 424b. 
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suously. Another example is the word for honey, mel, which sounds like 
the sweetness of the thing it signifies. To the Stoics the meaning of a word 
was not contained or explained only by its sound. "The word's sound is 
appropriate to but not fully constitutive of its significance."1 0 2 Long argues 
that even though the Stoics did adopt the theory of significant letters from 
the Cratylus, they offered a somewhat "looser but a less problematic expla­
nation of the connection between primary word-sounds and signifi­
cance." 1 0 3 This is to be understood in the way that the Stoics allowed prox­
imity and opposition in addition to similarity in word formation. That a 
word could contain a letter which basically signified the opposite of what 
the whole word would signify was a problem for the Socratic view in the 
Cratylus, as for instance in the case of the word σκληρότης (see above). 
The conclusion to the Cratylus is, as we saw, something of a compro­
mise or middle way between "radical conventionalism" (represented by 
Hermogenes) and "naturalism" (represented by Cratylus), where the latter 
is to be understood as the sort of naturalism which Long calls "phonetic 
naturalism". This he defines as "names whose constituent letters and sylla­
bles represent the properties of the thing named." 1 0 4 Socrates supports the 
naturalistic view that a name reflects the essence of the thing it names, alt­
hough not necessarily down to every single letter or syllable. This view is 
what Long designates as "formal naturalism", a naturalism which focuses 
on the form of the thing which is named. The phonology is subordinate. 
According to Long, this form of naturalism is strong in that "meaning 
transcends its phonetic representation: the same meaning or form can be 
expressed in different languages..." 1 0 5 The question is, then how this re­
lates to the Stoic linguistic theory in addition to adopting a naturalistic ap­
proach to the relationship between a name and its referent. Long suggests 
that the Stoics have reacted to the theories adduced in the Cratylus by for­
mulating a theory which concerned the issues which had not been answered 
by Plato, namely the account of meaning. 1 0 6 What are our words a sign for? 
What do they signify? They signify what the Stoics called a lekton, to 
which I will now turn, thus leaving the Cratylus for a while. 
101 Ibid.: 41 . Long refers to Augustine De dialectica 6. 
1 0 2 Ibid.: ΑΠ. 
1 0 3 Ibid.: 42. 
1 0 4 Long 2005: 43. 
105 Ibid.: 44. 
l06Loc.cit. 
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What is signified 
Περί λεκτόν 
The λεκτόν (lekton) is the second part of Stoic dialectics. It is usually char­
acterized either as the "meaning of an utterance" 1 0 7 or as "what is said". 1 0 8 
It is, furthermore, considered incorporeal, which in a Stoic context means 
that it actually does not exist. The two parts of Stoic dialectics are closely 
linked together, since they both participate in human rational discourse, 
which implies knowledge and language. Whereas the topic of σημαίνοντα 
deals with the physical/corporeal aspect of language, that of σημαινόμενα 
deals with the incorporeal aspect of language: the meaning or what is being 
said, in other words "what is signified". To get a clearer sense of the rela­
tion between the two parts, I offer a short passage from Sextus Empericus, 
Against the Professors (SVF 2.166): 1 0 9 
(1) ήν δέ και άλλη τις παρά τούτοις διάστασις, καθ' ην οι μέν περί τω 
σημαινομένφ τό αληθές τε και ψευδός ύπεστήσαντο, οι δέ περί τη φωνη, οι 
δέ περί τη κινήσει της διανοίας. (2) και δή της μέν πρώτης δόξης 
προεστήκασιν οί άπό της Στοάς τρία φάμενοι συζυγεΐν άλλήλοις, τό τε 
σημαινόμενον και τό σημαίνον και τό τυγχάνον, ών σημαίνον μέν είναι τήν 
φωνήν, οίον τήν Δίων, σημαινόμενον δέ αυτό τό πράγμα τό ύπ ' αυτής 
δηλούμενον και ού ήμεΐς μέν αντιλαμβανόμεθα τη ημετέρα 
παρυφισταμένου διανοία, οί δέ βάρβαροι ούκ έπαίουσι καίπερ της φωνής 
άκούοντες, τυγχάνον δέ τό εκτός ύποκείμενον, ώσπερ αυτός ό Δίων. (3) 
τούτων δέ δύο μέν είναι σώματα, καθάπερ τήν φωνήν και τό τυγχάνον, εν 
δέ άσώματον, ώσπερ τό σημαινόμενον πράγμα, και λεκτόν, δπερ αληθές τε 
γίνεται ή ψεύδος. 
Translation: 1 1 0 
There was another disagreement among them, according to which, what is 
true and false was placed by some under 'what is signified', by others un-
1 U / Cf. Sandbach (1979) 1989. 
1 0 8 Cf. Long 1971, see discussion below. 
1 0 9 The passage is frequently cited and must be considered the "classic" example of a 
clear description of the Stoic differentiation between σημαίνοντα, σημαινόμενα, and 
τυγχάνον. For instance: Long and Sedley 1987a/b § 33B; Schenkeveld and Barnes 
1999: 193-194; Long 1971: 76-77. 
1 1 0 The translation is my own. 
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der 'on voice', and yet others under 'what moves the thought'. (2) The first 
opinion was defended by the Stoics, who said that three things are linked 
together: 'the signified', and 'the signifier', and 'the external object'. The 
signifier is a voice (an utterance), such as 'Dion'; the signified is the state 
of affairs itself which is revealed by it (the voice) and which we grasp as it 
subsists coordinately with our thought, and which the Barbarians do not 
understand although they hear the voice; the external object is the external 
reality, e.g. Dion himself. (3) Of these, (they say that) two are bodies (cor­
poreal), namely the voice (the utterance) and the external object; and one is 
incorporeal, namely the signified state of affairs, and a: lekton, which is 
what may become true or false. 
In this passage it becomes clear how the Stoics, according to Sextus 
Empericus, differentiated between the three components which constitute 
the process of "A...talking about Ρ to B, and B's ability to indicate that he 
understands A to be talking about P" . 1 1 1 The Stoic theory is presented in the 
context of a discussion of different views about truth. It is stated that the 
Stoics held the view that truth (and falsehood) is predicated of "what is sig­
nified". Then, the three components τό σημαινόμενον, τό σημαίνον, and το 
τυγχάνον are enumerated and explained. That which signifies, το σημαίνον, 
is the pure utterance by A's voice. It is the articulate and intelligible sound 
which affects the hearing faculty of B. The famous example given by 
Sextus is 'Dion', which the reader is expected to imagine A uttering. What 
signifies is, of course, a body. That which is signified, τό σημαινόμενον, is 
described as being the "specific state of affairs" (τό πράγμα), namely P. It 
is indicated by what A signifies and Β grasps it as it subsists coordinately 
with (παρυφιστάμενον) his thought. Moreover, it is said, as I have also 
pointed out above, that the signified is incorporeal. It is not a body but a 
lekton, and it is a lekton that can be either true or false. The object of refer­
ence, τό τυγχάνον, is 'Dion' himself, the actual physical object which is 
being talked about. He is a body as well. 
Now, the lekton is what is signified, that is, the specific state of affairs. 
This means that it should be regarded either as "what is meant" or "what is 
said". Long argues for a translation of λεκτόν as "what is said" instead of 
"what is meant", since the former underlines the grammatical and logical 
functions of the lekton.112 That "what is said" may be either true or false as 
1 1 1 Long 1971: 76. 
1 1 2 Ibid.: 77. 
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is stated in the end of the passage from Sextus. However, the name 'Dion' 
113 
cannot be settled to be true or false and thus cannot be a lekton, unless it 
is implied that the statement is "this man is Dion". 1 1 4 Then it is possible to 
decide whether it is true or false, if the man in question is in fact Dion. A 
lekton is, in other words, what is said by A and which can be understood by 
Β to be either true or false with regard to how Β experience reality. 
Even though, in A. A. Long's own words, "the bibliography on lekta is 
now extensive" 1 1 5, he himself provides us with a clear definition of the 
lekton: 
The lekton is the meaning or fact or truth or falsehood that we express or 
understand by means of spoken or written language. Stoic lekta are neither 
words nor things nor thoughts in the sense of particular mental states: they 
are semantic and logical structures, thinkable and expressible, but objective 
in their availability to anyone to think and express and understand in any 
language. 1 1 6 
In the above cited passage from Diogenes Laertius (VII, 55-57), the lekton 
is mentioned at the end in relation to the description of the difference be­
tween saying something (το λέγειν) and just pronouncing (προφέρεσθαι): 
"Furthermore, saying differs from pronouncing. For voices are pronounced, 
but things are said, which are also the lekta" Whereas "pronouncing" is 
described as something which only concerns the voice, "speaking" con­
cerns the state of affairs, which are lekta. This last sentence from the Diog­
enes passage shows how the two parts of Stoic dialectics are connected, in 
that the lekton is clearly tied to the logos. In a pure utterance, the φωνή is 
certainly present and perhaps also in a λέξις, but an utterance is not a fully 
intelligible sentence until the λόγος is present. The fully intelligible sen­
tence is furthermore a sign of something, namely the sign of "what is said" 
or "what is meant" by the sentence. And that is the lekton, the thing signi­
fied. 
Having discussed the nature of the Stoic lekton, I will return shortly to 
the suggestion put forth by A. A. Long in his article from 2005 suggesting 
that the Stoics reacted to the theories adduced in the Cratylus and that the 
Stoic linguistic theory could "be interpreted as a revisionary reading of the 
See also Long and Sedley 1987b: 197. 
Long 1971:77. 
Long 2005:46 n. 23. 
Ibid: 46. 
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Long 2005: 37. 
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Cratylus."1" I a gree that it is plausible to assume that the Stoics have read 
and developed several ideas from the Cratylus. Their interest in etymology 
as well as primary sounds clearly reflects a central issue in the Platonic dia­
logue, with which the Stoics shared the naturalistic approach to the art of 
naming. I also find it reasonable to analyze the Stoic notion of the λεκτόν 
as an innovative and sophisticated theory of meaning, possibly stimulated 
by the absence of a similar theory in Plato. As such the Stoics developed 
the specific formal naturalism advanced by the Platonic Socrates. 
One major difference between the Platonic and Stoic linguistic theories, 
which I think must not be disregarded, is the skepticism towards language 
implied in the conclusion of Socrates in the Cratylus. Even though Socrates 
advocates a formal naturalism, he ends up emphasizing the importance of 
looking at the thing itself in order to grasp its true essence, instead of rely­
ing on its name, which might be misleading. These are only the first steps 
towards a much more developed skepticism towards language which is 
found especially in Neo-Platonism. 
This skepticism towards language is not found in Stoicism. This, I be­
lieve, is due to their monistic worldview. To a Stoic the true essence of 
things is to be found in this material world (to the extent that they would in 
fact speak of "the true essence of things"). 
Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been on a few basic topics in the field of an­
cient philosophy of language. Even though Plato did not formulate a sys­
tematic linguistic theory, his thoughts became fundamental for further lin­
guistic studies. The earliest instance of language-related speculation, to our 
knowledge, is the Platonic dialogue of Cratylus in which Socrates leads a 
discussion of the correctness of names. Names are what we today would 
call "words". The question of the correctness of names is essential because 
it raises the problem of the relation between language and reality. This is 
seen in the naturalistic position of Socrates towards naming. Although he 
advocates a naturalistic understanding of the relation between a name and 
its referent, he also acknowledges that names do not always capture the true 
essence of the things they name. Sometimes, they are even misleading. In­
stead, Socrates wants us to look at the thing itself in order to grasp its true 
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essence. In the Cratylus we see the first skepticism towards the ability of 
our language to reflect reality correctly. 
A tool used by the philosopher and the dialectician in order to grasp the 
true essence and precise definition of a concept through its name is the 
method of definition by division (diairesis), exemplified above by passages 
from the Phaedrus and the Sophist. The problem of the limited utility of 
language posed in the Cratylus is partly solved by the method of diairesis, 
since it establishes a much more complex, and yet precise, picture of the 
thing in question. Diairesis is thus not only about definitions, but indeed 
also about language, which connects the method even closer to the question 
on the correctness of names. 
Two important issues with regard to the method of diairesis which were 
emphasized above are (1) that the process of descending through a diairesis 
is a process of remembrance, and (2) that the result of a diairesis is to be 
understood as a "unity of the many". Firstly, Minardi has argued convinc­
ingly that proceeding through a diairesis is the process of remembrance 
(anamnesis). Remembering all the differences of the object in question is at 
the same time recognizing these differences. "Knowledge means 
knowledge of differences", as he stresses. This also implies an ability to 
speak about "non-being", namely as opposite to, and in relation to, "being". 
Secondly, the process of remembering the differences of the specific object 
is associated with the important aspect of a diairesis, namely, that the final 
undividable concept is a unity of the preceding plurality of concepts. The 
same unifying aspect of the diairetic process is also characteristic of the 
Stoic division of voice. The division of voice/sound (φωνή) into speech 
(λέξις) and sentence/fogos (λόγος) shows well how all levels of the division 
are included in the final logos. 
The above examination of Stoic dialectics was divided into two parts: (1) 
on "that which signifies'Von voice and (2) on "what is signified'Von lekton. 
This division follows the Stoics' own. "That which signifies" is the part of 
dialectics that deals with the corporeal aspects of language, that is, lan­
guage as sound, writing, verbal expressions etc. Through a close reading of 
the passage from Diogenes Laertius VI, 55-57, it became apparent how the 
different levels of a verbal expression go from inarticulate voice (φωνή) 
over articulate but unintelligible speech (λέξις) to the fully articulate and 
intelligible sentence/Zogos (λόγος). Moreover, it showed how the Stoic fo­
cus was directed on the logos as the primary goal, a point that is also re­
flected in the notion of a sentence/discourse (logos) as an intelligible voice 
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which comes from thought. However, as just mentioned, logos is still a uni­
ty of the different levels of a verbal expression. 
Before the discussion on "what is signified" I have dealt briefly with the 
relation between Stoic dialectics and the Cratylus. I argued, with Long, that 
the Stoics developed the approach put forth by Socrates in the Cratylus, 
which can be designated as a formal naturalism focusing on the form of a 
thing named. The Stoics too were naturalists, in that they understood "pri­
mary sounds" as imitating the things they named, although to them a 
word's sound was not fully constitutive of its significance. In other words, 
it is not entirely possible to detect the meaning of a thing by its name or 
sound, but the sound might affect us sensuously. 
What the Stoics contributed was the sophisticated theory of meaning: 
"what is signified". For the question was: what does language, or simply 
words, signify? This, of course, is the lekton, with which I have dealt in the 
last section of this chapter. The section on "what is signified" is considered 
to be about the incorporeal aspect of language in Stoic dialectics. The 
lekton is understood as "what is said/meant" by an utterance, that is, what 
A means by saying something to Β about P. Even though this theory might 
have been developed as a reaction to a lack of a similar theory by Plato, I 
emphasize here, that the Stoics did not regard language as insufficient to 
describe the true nature of things, as Plato did. The Stoics were cosmologi-
cal monists, and did not expect worldly things to have an idea behind them. 
For this reason the reality of the Stoics was within this world, and thus also 
describable with the language of this world. 
In the chapters that follow we shall see how the authors of TriPro and 
Thunder, who wrote their treatises centuries later than the first language-
related speculations took place in Greek philosophy, were able to integrate 
the insights of Plato and the Stoics into their descriptions of divine mani­
festation. The theories of language were not adopted by the Nag Hammadi 
writers on a "one-to-one"-scale but rather reformulated and reshaped to fit 
the new contexts. The theories were now being used as literary tools de­
scribing the linguistic manifestations of divine female principles. Through­
out the analysis of TriPro and Thunder we shall see how several of the top­
ics that were described in this chapter play a central role in the overall in­
terpretation and understanding of the two Nag Hammadi texts. What will in 
particular play an essentially role is the Stoic theory of a verbal expression. 
As will become apparent this theory constitutes the frame of descent of 
both Protennoia and the female revealer of Thunder. Meanwhile, the Pla-
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tonic theories of naming and division (diairesis) are also crucial especially 
to the interpretation of Thunder. 
Chapter 3: The Trimorphic Protennoia 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the Trimorphic Protennoia (NHC XIII, 1) (hereafter 
TriPro). I will begin with a general introduction to the text in which I de­
scribe the situation and condition of the manuscript. I will discuss TriPro's 
relation to Codex VI in which the manuscript was found, and underline its 
similarities with the Thunder: Perfect Mind. TriPro's affiliations with the 
Sethian tradition will be shortly touched upon as a basis for the discussion 
of the relation between TriPro and "the Sethian Revelation par excellence: 
the Apocryphon of John"m (NHC 11,1; ΙΙΙ,Ι; IV, 1; Berlin Gnostic Codex 
8502, 2). Through an analysis with special focus on selected passages I will 
investigate TriPro against the background of the preceding examination of 
the Stoic philosophy of language. I will argue that the Stoic understanding 
of a verbal expression may be seen as an underlying matrix of the linguistic 
descent of Protennoia, but also that TriPro exemplifies a somewhat oppo­
site understanding of the semantic content of Logos than the one expressed 
in the Stoic theory. Thus, I argue that in TriPro the Stoic theory must be 
understood "upside-down". 
The manuscript 
The Trimorphic Protennoia is the only text in codex XIII which is left to us 
in its full length and it is the only existing copy of the text. It runs from 
pages 35*-50* in the codex and is followed by the first ten lines of another 
text which we already know from codex 11,5: the Treatise Without Title or 
On the Origin of the World. Codex XIII was not a separate leather-bound 
codex when it was found at Nag Hammadi in 1945, but the eight folios (or 
leaves) which survive were tucked inside the front cover of codex VI, as 
may be seen on a photograph of the center of the quire published in the fac­
simile edition from 1972. 1 1 9 The photograph was taken by Jean Doresse in 
Turner 2001: 69. 
Robinson 1972b: 3. 
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1949 and published in 1961 in Revue d'égyptologie where the extra folios 
cannot be seen due to a cutting of the photo. 1 2 0 According to James M. 
Robinson it seems likely that the surviving folios were placed inside codex 
VI already in late antiquity due to the condition of the papyrus. For in-
stance, on page 35*, which is the first page of the remaining folios of codex 
XIII, there is a lacuna which is framed by a discoloured area. The discol-
oration was not, as first assumed, caused by fire 1 2 1 but was brought about 
by the leather cover of codex VI. A fragment got stuck to the leather, and 
when the examination of the material began in 1971, it was identified as 
belonging to page 35* of codex XIII. 1 2 2 
The eight folios are unfortunately deteriorated at the top of every page, 
thus the pagination is not visible. However, the handwriting of codex XIII 
resembles the one we find in codex II, which is the only codex in the Nag 
Hammadi Library which is not paginated from the scribe's hand. Taking 
into account that codex II also contains On the Origin of the World (which 
follows TriPro), and that the size and the number of lines per page of the 
123 
two codices are more or less the same, scholars have assumed that the 
two codices are by the same scribal hand, and that codex XIII originally did 
not have any pagination. 1 2 4 The pagination of codex XIII is therefore hypo-
thetical, which is normally indicated by the use of an asterisk*. 
On the basis of the full version of On the Origin of the World from codex 
II, the number of folios that follow TriPro has been calculated to 15, which 
corresponds to 30 pages. Thus there must have been a tractate (or tractates) 
preceding TriPro which has occupied pages l*-34* of the codex. The 
whole of codex XIII then hypothetically had eighty pages or forty folios, a 
codex consisting of twenty papyrus sheets. 1 2 5 
In his commentary from 2006, 1 2 6 Paul-Hubert Poirier revives the 1974 
proposal of Yvonne Janssens 1 2 7 that the tractate which is assumed to pre-
l z u Doresse 1961: pi. 4. 
121 
This belongs to the more "mythological" part of the story of the discovery, which 
tells that the peasants, who found the jars used the missing part of codex XIII to cook 
their tea, cf. Krause and Labib 1971: 14. 
1 2 2 Robinson 1972a: 78-79. 
1 2 3 Codex Π averages 35,3 and codex XIII averages 35,5 lines per page, cf. Poirier 2006: 
3. 
1 2 4 For discussions of the scribal hand of codex II see Giversen 1963: 35. About the pag­
ination see for instance Poirier 2006: 2, Turner 1990a: 359. 
1 2 5 Krause and Labib 1971: 14, Turner 1990a: 359-361, Poirier 2006: 3, note 23. 
1 2 6 Poirier 2006: 11-13. 
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cede TriPro could possibly have been yet another copy of the long version 
of the Apocryphon of John. The suggestion is "matériellement possible" 1 2 8 
and thematically plausible, since TriPro, as Poirier argues, depends on the 
long version of the Apocryphon of John, not only with regard to the 
Pronoia-hymn but also to the entire version. He therefore states: "La PrôTri 
aura dès lors été placée à la suite de l'ApocrJn comme une illustration ou 
un développement hymnique ou arétalogique de celui-ci." 1 2 9 I agree that the 
two texts are very similar in many respects and that they are interdepend-
ent, at least to some degree. 1 3 0 On the other hand, I remain sceptical about 
what this assertion might add to our understanding of the two texts besides 
establishing an even closer relationship between them than already ex-
ists. 1 3 1 
According to Robinson, who argues that the placement of TriPro inside 
the front cover of codex VI happened in antiquity, the reason for this 
placement remains obscure. He does not think that it has anything to do 
with its affinities with the other tractates of the codex, but rather that exter-
nal matters, such as the length of the tractates, had been determinative for 
its inclusion in a codex. He does not doubt that there exists "more subtle 
relationships" between the tractates within the codices, but expects this to 
become more apparent as the Nag Hammadi library is explored in more 
detail. 1 3 2 
Thirty-four years of study later, in 2006, Michael A. Williams and Lance 
Jenott published an article, "Inside the covers of codex VI" (recalling the 
title of Robinson's piece). It is an investigation of the composition of codex 
VI in which they compare the tractates to one another in order to find if the 
scribe had had a specific intention by bringing them together in one codex. 
Codex VI contains very different kinds of texts, Christian, Hermetic and 
philosophical, and is therefore an interesting and difficult compilation to 
analyse as a whole. Besides a small extract from Plato's Republic (VI,5) 
and three Hermetic tractates, the Discourse on the Eighth and the Ninth 
(VI,6), the Prayer of Thanksgiving (VI,7) and the Asclepius (VI,8), one 
finds three Christian texts: the Acts of Peter and the Twelve Apostles 
I Janssens 1974: 342 and 1978: 2. 
8 Poirier 2006:12. 
9 Loc.cit. 
0 1 will discuss the interdependence of TriPro and Ap. John below. 
I I shall discuss the similarities between them below. 
2 Robinson 1972: 82. 
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(VI, 1), the Authoritative Teaching (VI,3) and the Concept of Our Great 
Power (VI,7). Last but not least is a text which is dealt with in the present 
study: the Thunder: Perfect Mind (VI,2), which is not clearly either a 
Christian or a Hermetic text. 1 3 3 In their article, Williams and Jenott argue 
that the scribe followed a plan with specific intentions when composing 
codex VI. Thus, they say, there is a thematic continuity within this seem-
ingly heterogenous group of texts. They base their argument partly on the 
analysis of the physical appearance of the codex and partly on the thematic 
content of the texts. Concerning the latter, Williams and Jenott find that the 
red thread which runs through the entire codex may be identified as a thor-
ough-going reference to the Great Power and the Logos as "a mediator or a 
mode of appearance of the transcendent being". 1 3 4 Moreover, they point to 
the text's focus on writings or books as the media of revelation. Although I 
find the themes rather general and think that they might be said to cover 
many texts in the Nag Hammadi Library, it remains true that these common 
themes are present in the texts of codex VI. 
This was the collection together with which the remains of codex XIII 
were found. The question is, then, whether TriPro fits into the supposed 
thematic continuity of codex VI. According to Williams and Jenott, the 
placement of TriPro inside the front covers of codex VI supports and con-
firms their thesis about the design and thematic continuity of the codex. 
The final revelation of Protennoia as the Word, who "puts on" Jesus, con-
stitutes an appropriate introduction to the first text in codex VI, where Jesus 
meets his disciples in disguise. Moreover, they claim, TriPro also deals 
with the "Great Daimon" through which the Revealer works, who we also 
135 
see in VI, 8. I am not sure that these very general themes are sufficient to 
argue for a rationale behind the placement of TriPro in codex VI. However, 
Williams and Jenott also point, with N. Denzey, 1 3 6 to the parallels between 
Thunder and TriPro especially with regard to their "I am"-proclamations as 
the conclusive argument for the inclusion to make sense. 1 3 7 In my opinion 
the "I am"-proclamations are indeed an obvious parallel between Thunder 
and TriPro, but the most striking feature remains, as we shall see, these "I 
See chapter on Thunder for further identification of the text. 
Williams and Jenott 2006: 1045. 
Ibid.: 1048-1050. 
Denzey 2001a. 
Williams and Jenott 2006: 1050-1051. 
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1 3 8 Passages in the "I am"-style does occur sporadically in other Nag Hammadi texts, for 
instance, Treatise without title or On the Origin of the World (NHC 11,5 and XIII, 2) 
(114:6-15) which is a parallel text to a passage from Thunder. See chapter on Thunder 
for the analysis of the specific passage. 
1 3 9 Cf. Poirier 2006: 14. 
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am"-proclamations combined with a linguistic vocabulary that derives from 
Stoic dialectics. 
It is indeed difficult to determine whether the many similar traits in 
TriPro and Thunder are the reason for the insertion of TriPro into codex VI 
already in antiquity, and we shall probably never know for sure. However, 
the placement of both texts in codex VI is certainly interesting in the light 
of the similarities between them, and they are indeed reason enough to 
compare them, as is done in the present dissertation. 
The content of the Trimorphic Protennoia 
In what follows, I shall give an introduction to the contents of TriPro in-
cluding an outline of its genre and structure. Moreover, I shall consider the 
most prominent literary feature of TriPro: the "I am"-proclamations, which 
will imply a discussion of its literary parallels. 
TriPro is a revelation monologue performed by the First Thought of the 
Father: Protennoia (nporreNuoi^). It is one of the most poetic tractates in 
the Nag Hammadi Library due to its characteristic and thorough use of "I 
am"-sayings (&NOK ne/xe) and first-person narrative. Only the Thunder 
Perfect Mind (NHC VI,2) and the "Pronoia-hymn" in the long version of 
the Apocryphon of John (NHC 11,1 and IV, 1) resemble TriPro on this 
point. 1 3 8 The monologue is an account of Protennoia's three descents to the 
Underworld (^MNTG). She descends as Sound fepooy), Voice (CHH), and 
Word (Xoroc), respectively, with the aim of saving those who belong to her 
- "the Sons of the Light" - from the bonds of Demons, so that they may en-
ter the place where they were at first (41*:4-20). She also descends to illu-
mine those who dwell in darkness (46*:32). From time to time the mono-
logue switches to third-person singular and first-person plural narrative. 
Thus, the tractate mixes the aretalogical revelation with narrative, a fact 
that has made Poirier call it "un texte hybride". 1 3 9 The blend makes the 
tractate even more peculiar in form than, for instance, Thunder, which is 
much tighter and more monotonous in style. In the end TriPro is identified 
Linguistic Manifestations of Divine Thought 
The Discourse of Protennoia (35*l-42*:3) 
The Discourse of Protennoia is the first and longest part of TriPro. It is 
opened by the self-proclamation: "It is I, the Protennoia". Thus begins the 
manifestation of the First Thought of the Father. 
35*:l-36*:27 "I am"-proclamations. 
35*: 1-32 Thorough description of Protennoia and her relation 
to every level in the world. 
35*:32-36*:27 Protennoia as Sound. First mention of her descent 
into the Underworld as Sound. 
36*:27-33 Third-person narrative concerning the mystery. 
36*:33-37*:3 First-person (pi.) narrative. Inclusion of the readers 
in the text. 
37*:3-20 Third-person narrative about the Son who as the 
Word originates through the Sound. He reveals the 
everlasting and hidden things, as well as the things 
that are difficult to interpret. 
1 0 Sevrin 1986: 51 ; Poirier 2006: 14-15. However, as Poirier notes (ibid. n. 78) already 
Y. Janssens saw TriPro as "un hymne de révélation" cf. Janssens 1974: 2. 
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as a "revelation discourse" by J.-M. Sevrin, which is confirmed by Poir-
ier, 1 4 0 and which I think fits the tractate very well. 
The text falls into three parts, each with its own subtitle: 
1. The Discourse of Protennoia (35*:l-42*:3) 
2. OnFate(42*:4-46*:4) 
3. The Discourse of the Manifestation (46*:5-50*:21) 
The remaining three lines (50*:22-24) are the title of the text: 
The Trimorphic Protennoia in three parts. A Sacred Scripture written by 
the Father with perfect knowledge. 
The main structure of the text is naturally determined by the three separate 
parts, but an analysis of the structure of each part may be approached from 
different criteria, both formal (by the shift of persons) and thematic. In 
what follows, I will take the text's own tripartite structure as my point of 
departure and suggest a structure of each part in which both criteria are 
taken into account. 
Chapter 3: The Trimorphic Protennoia 
37*:20-38*:16 First and third-person narratives and "I am"-
proclamations. 
37*:20-38*:6 First and third-person narratives about the Sound as 
three permanences: Father, Mother and Son. It is 
perceptible as Voice and has a Word within it. 
38*:7-16 "I am"-proclamations by Protennoia. She is 
Barbelo, the Mother, the Light as well as 
Meirotheia. 
38*:16-39*:13 Third-person narrative about the Son who glorifies 
and establishes his Aeons and is glorified by them. 
39*:13-40* :7 Third-person narrative concerning the great Demon 
Yaltabaoth and the Epinoia of the Light. Yaltabaoth 
creates the lower aeons by his own power. 
40*:8-42*:2 First and third-person narratives and "I am"-
proclamations. 
40*: 8-29 First person narrative about the first descent of 
Protennoia as Sound and the soteriological aim of 
this. Third-person narrative about the disturbance of 
the Abyss and the creation of man. 
40*:29-42*:2 First-person narrative and "I am"-proclamations 
about the descent of Protennoia into Chaos to tell 
the Sons of the Light about the mystery which is to 
save them from the chains of the Demons of the 
Underworld and let them enter into the place where 
they were at first. 
42* :3 Title of the first part. 
On Fate (42*:4-46*:4) 
The second part of TriPro opens, as did the first part, with a small passage 
of "I am"-proclamations. 
42*:4-17 "I am"- proclamations by Protennoia as Sound. She 
is the Syzygetic One since she is both Thought, 
Sound and Voice as well as the Mother of the 
Sound. 
42*:17-43* :4 First-person narrative about the second descent of 
Protennoia, now in the likeness of a female. She 
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The Discourse of the Manifestation (46*:5-50*:21) 
The third and last part fills out the five remaining pages of TriPro and 
opens, as do the other two parts, with a passage of "I am"-proclamations. 
46*:5-15 "I am"-proclamations by Protennoia as Word. 
46*:16-33 Third-person narrative about the Silence, the 
Word's relation to and place within this Silence. 
46*:33-47*:lacuna Second-person admonitions to listen. 
47*:lacuna-29 First-person narrative. Reminder of the first and 
second descents. Description of the third descent of 
Protennoia as Word. 
47*:29-48*:35 First-person narrative about the Word leading 
"someone" through the baptism of the Five Seals. 
48*:35-49*:26 First-person narrative and "I am"-proclamations 
about the Word and his many manifestations. 
49*:26-50*:12 First and third-person narratives. Description of the 
Five Seals. 
50*: 12-16 First-person narrative about Protennoia as the Word 
incarnated in Jesus. 
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tells the Sons of the Light of the coming aeon and of 
this particular aeon, which is run by time, i.e. Fate. 
43*:4-44*:29 Third-person and first-person (pi.) narratives about 
the Authorities and their reaction to the descent of 
Protennoia. They do not understand the Sound and 
the Voice. 
44*:29-45*:2 Second-person admonitions. Call to the listeners: 
"the Sons of the Thought" are to listen to the Voice. 
45*:2-12 "I am"-proclamations by Protennoia as the An-
drogynous One. She brings a Voice of the Sound to 
the ears of "those who know her". 
45*:12-46*:3 First and second-person narratives. 
45*: 12-20 Second-person narrative. Invitation to "those who 
know her" to enter into the exalted, perfect light and 
become glorious through baptism. 
45*:21-46*:3 First-person narrative about the form-giving Proten-
noia and her ascent to her Light. 
46* :4 Title of the second part. 
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50*:16-20 Epilogue. First-person narrative about the ascent of 
Protennoia into the holy Light in the Silence to-
gether with her "seed". 
Title of the third part. 
Title of the tractate. 
"Colophon". 
50*:21 
50*:22 
50*:23-24 
The structure of TriPro presented here is very much in line with that of 
Poirier, with only minor variations. 1 4 1 As is apparent, the structure of the 
text does not follow the three descents of Protennoia, which would other-
wise have been very convenient for the reader. Instead, the text switches 
back and forth between "I am"-proclamations and narrative passages, and 
at the same time refers continuously to the descents. 1 4 2 Moreover, the de-
scents are not clearly divided between Protennoia's three aspects as Sound, 
Voice and Word. It is obvious that the structure of TriPro does not follow a 
logical scheme, which would have been handy in the analysis of the text. 
On the other hand, TriPro is not a piece of systematic theology and we, as 
modern readers, cannot therefore expect consistency in the manner in 
which its theology is presented. 
In what follows, I shall discuss one of the most distinctive features of 
TriPro: the "I am"-proclamations, which will include a consideration of the 
literary parallels. 
"I am"-proclamations and TriPro's literary parallels 
Protennoia's revelation discourse is characterized by the numerous "I am"-
proclamations (\UOK neAre) of the goddess. This distinctive literary feature 
is known from a relatively limited amount of sources from TriPro's nearest 
textual environment, that is, Jewish, Christian and Egyptian sources. Of 
these the most obvious parallels are the self-proclamations of the Jewish 
Wisdom figure nsDn/GOCpia/Sophia as she appears in Proverbs 8 and Sirach 
24. Not only does the Jewish Sophia from time to time present herself in "I 
am"-proclamations, she also constitutes a parallel to Protennoia's relation-
ship to the Father/the Invisible Spirit as his First Thought as well as to her 
descent into the world in order to save man from the "wrong" powers. In 
his extensive monograph Turner has shown how the Hellenistic Jewish 
Poirier 2006: 15-22. 
Janssens 1974: 343 and Poirier 2006: 15. 
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1 4 3 Turner 2001: 221-230. 
1 4 4 MacRae 1970a: 88-89. 
1 4 5 Turner 2001: 223. 
1 4 6 See for instance Scott 1992. 
1 4 7 This is supported by Turner 2000a [1990]: 375. For discussions concerning the rela­
tionship between TriPro and the Johannine prologue see, for instance, Colpe 1974; 
Janssens 1983; Robinson 1981; Denzey 2001b; Poirier 2006: 98-105 and Poirier 2010. 
1 4 8 Poirier 2006: 83-105. 
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Wisdom speculation is one of the "building blocks of Sethian doctrine". 1 4 3 
In an exemplary manner he provides an outline of the Jewish Sophia tradi­
tions in the Sethian material. Already in 1970 G. W. MacRae published an 
article on this particular issue in which he enumerates the parallels between 
the Jewish and the Gnostic Sophia. MacRae notices the Gnostic distinction 
between the higher and the lower Sophia-like figures; 1 4 4 however, Turner 
explains the different roles of the female deities very clearly: 
In the hands of the Sethian Gnostics, the biblical functions of Sophia as 
creator, nourisher, and enlightener of the world were distributed among a 
hierarchy of feminine principles: a divine mother called Barbelo, the First 
Thought of the supreme deity, the Invisible Spirit; and a lower Sophia re­
sponsible for both the creation of the physical world and the incarnation of 
portions of the supreme Mother's divine essence into human bodies . 1 4 5 
It is furthermore the general opinion that the Jewish sapiental tradition also 
had an impact on the formation of the Johannine Logos-Christ, 1 4 6 which in 
the end may be the reason why it has been obligatory since the very begin­
ning of TriPro's research history to compare TriPro with the Johannine 
Prologue. 1 4 7 It is, in fact, reasonable to draw parallels between these two 
texts not only because of their "I am"-proclamations that are obvious paral­
lels, but also with regard to their structure and contents. Without going into 
this rather detailed discussion at this point, I would like to stress one issue 
that is of special importance to the present study, namely, the linguistic fo­
cus, which plays an essential role in both the Johannine prologue as well as 
in the descents of Protennoia. The identification of Christ as the Word 
(λόγος) is a clear parallel to the third descent of Protennoia, in which she 
also proclaims to be the Word (Xoroc). There are many parallels between 
the two texts which Poirier has listed together with several other Jewish 
and Christian parallels. 1 4 8 Some of the themes that recur in both texts are 
the themes of light (Jn 1:5, 9 and TriPro 37*:7-8, 13-14, 46*:32-33), emis-
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sion (Jn 1:6 and TriPro 46*:31-32) and life (Jn 1:4 and TriPro 35*:12-13). 
Although there are numerous similarities between the Johannine Logos and 
Protennoia-Logos, there are also major differences, which, in my opinion, 
have been somewhat underestimated in previous scholarship. 
Firstly, the Johannine Logos is only Word, whereas the author of TriPro 
expands the linguistic idea, so that Protennoia is Sound, Voice and Word. 
According to Poirier, the author was thus "led to engage in a polemical 
reading of the prologue. This had the effect of devaluing the Johannine, and 
purely Christian, Logos and of elevating the Gnostic Logos". 1 4 9 Further­
more, Poirier states that "the Trimorphic Protennoia polemically reinter­
prets the Johannine prologue through use of allusions intented to convince 
the reader that the Logos-Protennoia is superior to the incarnated Logos of 
the Fourth Gospel." 1 5 0 So, even though Poirier does not elaborate on it, he 
seems to assume that the linguistic triad of Protennoia should somehow 
demonstrate a polemicizing against the Logos Christology of the Fourth 
Gospel. This could very well be the case, since this kind of reinterpretation 
of Scripture is known from other Gnostic sources, for instance the Gospel 
of Judas. In that text, part of the New Testament passion narrative is rein­
terpreted in such a way that the teaching of the disciples is exposed as false 
and the narrative as such is employed to frame an instruction in "Sethian" 
cosmology. However, the Gospel of Judas still operates within a Christian 
framework using the well-known stories to work out a subtle exegesis. 
The same may be said about TriPro. In my view, the authors of these 
texts have been deeply involved in Christian communities in which the ca­
nonical gospels have been read and interpreted. I do not believe that they 
would have integrated so much canonical material in their respective writ­
ings if they were not themselves committed to the core of the Christian sal­
vation story - the coming and crucifixion of Christ. This, however, does 
not change the fact that they tell the stories differently. In the case of 
TriPro I think that it might as well be read as an elaboration of the Logos 
Christology of the Fourth Gospel. This is connected to the second major 
difference between the Johannine Logos and Protennoia-Logos. 
This difference is that is that the Johannine Logos is identified as Word 
already at the beginning, when it is residing with God (έν άρχη ήν ό λόγος, 
και ό λόγος ήν προς τον θεόν, και θεός ήν ό λόγος) (John 1:1). Protennoia, 
1 4 9 Poirier 2010: 102. 
1 5 0 Ibid.: 101. 
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by contrast, is silent as she exists as the Thought of the Invisible One; thus 
at that stage she is not yet hearable. Only as she descends into the sensible 
world does she turn into entities that can be heard: Sound, Voice and Word 
(Logos). Understood in this way, TriPro retains the manifestation of the 
divine Word, and in addition it elaborates on the linguistic theme put for-
ward by the Fourth Gospel by adding several other linguistic terms. The 
cluster of these terms I argue derives from Stoic dialectics. Before turning 
to the analysis of the text, we shall touch upon a few other parallels to 
TriPro. 
A parallel to the "I am"-proclamations is found in the Isis aretalogies. 
They are usually considered in relation to Thunder, since they provide a 
clear parallel to the monotonous style found in that text. However, at just 
the point where they do not seem to fit with Thunder - the nature of the 
self-proclamations - they do fit with TriPro instead. In Thunder, the self-
proclamations are for the greater part formulated as paradoxes or antithe-
ses, whereas in both the Isis aretalogies and in TriPro the self-
proclamations only consist of positive designations of the goddesses. 1 5 1 
Within the Nag Hammadi library especially two parallels are found to 
the "I am"-proclamations. These are, as already mentioned, Thunder and 
the Pronoia-hymn from the long version of the Ap. John. Whereas the simi-
larities with Thunder have already been discussed and will continuously be 
considered, the relation to the Pronoia-hymn deserves our brief attention 
here. 
As mentioned above, Janssens followed by Poirier, suggested that the 
text which would have preceded TriPro in codex XIII but is now lost might 
very well have been a copy of the long version of the Ap. John.152 The as-
sumption is based on codicological calculations that show that it is 
"matériellement possible" 1 5 3 to imagine a copy of Ap. John as the opening 
text of codex XIII. Moreover, this supports Poirier's argument about 
TriPro as a development of Ap. John: "La PrôTri aura dès lors été place à 
la suite de l'ApocrJn comme une illustration ou un développement 
hymnique ou arétalogique de celui-ci." 1 5 4 As Poirier recalls, this interde-
See the chapter on Thunder for a discussion of this topic. 
Janssens 1978: 2 and Poirier 2006: 11-13. 
Poirier 2006: 12. 
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Berliner Arbeitskreis 1973: 74. Cf. Poirier 2006: 68. 
Janssens 1974: 341 and 348-352. 
Poirier 2006: 68-81, where he deals with the topic in detail. 
Janssens 1974: 341. 
See Introduction. 
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pendence between the two texts was already seen by the Berliner 
Arbeitskreis in 1973, 1 5 5 and noted again by Janssens the year after. 1 5 6 
The tripartite structure of the Pronoia-hymn which marks the three de­
scents of Pronoia into the world corresponds to the tripartite structure of 
TriPro in its whole and also to the triads with which Protennoia identifies 
herself: Sound-Voice-Word and Father-Mother-Son. Poirier shows very 
clearly to the extent to which these two texts overlap thematically and in 
terms of vocabulary. To him there is no doubt that the author of TriPro 
elaborates on the Pronoia-hymn. 1 5 7 To Janssens it was the mention of sev­
eral mythological characters that caused her to begin the translation of 
TriPro which eventually became the editio princeps of the text: 
. . .la Προτέννοια n'était-elle pas la Πρόνοια ou Pensée Première de ΓΑρ 
Jo? le nom de Barbélo était d'ailleurs présent de part et d'autre, de même 
que la Παρθένος, le Πνεύμα, ΥΈπίνοια, Γ androgyne; mais aussi Ialdabaôth-
Saclas et ses archontes... et j ' e n passe ! 1 5 8 
The parallels mentioned by Janssens are, in fact, what relates TriPro to the 
"Sethian" or especially the "Barbeloite" tradition which I discussed in the 
introduction. TriPro is certainly associated with what Rasimus calls the 
"Classic Gnostic" tradition containing both the "Sethian", "Ophite" and 
"Barbeloite" material. 1 5 9 
I agree with Pokier and others that TriPro is strongly connected to the 
Pronoia-hymn of the long version of Ap.John and that it relies on the tripar-
tite descent structure combined with traditional mytholegoumena from the 
"Barbeloite" tradition. However, TriPro is unique in this collection of texts 
because of it use of language-related terms. The tripartite descent of 
Pronoia has in TriPro become the tripartite linguistic descent of Protennoia, 
and that is the theme of the analysis that follows. 
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1 0 0 The content of which is summarized in Turner 2000b [1990]: 383. 
1 6 1 Poirier 2006. See also Schenke 1984 who translates "Ruf-Stimme-Logos"; Janssens 
1978: "son-voix-Logos"; Layton 1987: "sound-voice-word/verbal expression". 
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Linguistic manifestation in Trimorphic Protennoia 
In TriPro there is a thorough-going theme which is not found in the 
Pronoia-hymn, namely the triadic manifestation of Protennoia in the form 
of the linguistic terms Sound fepooy), Voice (CHH) and Word (Xoroc). 
These linguistic manifestations are closely linked to the three descents of 
Protennoia and they even constitute the central focus of TriPro. The centre 
of the present analysis of TriPro will be its use of language-related terms to 
describe the divine descent and manifestation in the sensible world. In the 
history of research this theme has not been left unexplored, but it has not 
been treated in great detail either. To date only two studies of any length 
have been published on the linguistic terms in TriPro. These are Paul-
Hubert Poirier's article from 2009 "La triade son - voix - parole/discours 
dans la Protennoia Trimorphe (NH XIII, 1) et ses sources" and Philippe 
Luisier's article from 2006, "De Philon d'Alexandrie à la Protennoia 
Trimorphe". They will be discussed in what follows. 
Against the background of the previous chapter on ancient philosophy of 
language I shall investigate TriPro's adoption and employment of terms 
deriving from Stoic dialectics. I will argue that the Stoic theory of Voice as 
presented by Diogenes Laertius may fruitfully be understood as an underly-
ing matrix of the phonetic triad of TriPro. Moreover, it is also my aim to 
show how the text turns the Stoic sequence "upside-down". 
ΐροοχ, CHH and Xoroc - Diversities of translation 
Before I begin the analysis, it is important to draw attention to a disagree­
ment about the translation of the Coptic words εροογ, CMH and Xoroc, 
which unfortunately causes some confusion. Most of the commentaries and 
translations of TriPro follow the suggestion made by S. Emmel in an un­
published article from 1978 (Sound, Voice and Word in NHC XIII, 1*: 
Some Philological Considerations, Claremont Graduate School). 1 6 0 Emmel 
translates the triad £ροογ, CHH and Xoroc as sound, voice and word. Simi­
larly, Poirier in his extensive commentary with translation into French of 
TriPro chooses to translate the triad as son, voix and parole/discours.161 
John D. Turner, on the other hand, who has provided the only English edi-
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Turner 2000b [1990]. 
Crum 704-705 and 334-335. See also Poirier 2006: 106 and Poirier 2009: 112. 
Turner 2000b [1990]: 383. 
Loc.cit. 
Poirier 2006: 106-107. 
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tion of the text to date, translates as voice, speech and word, respectively.1 6 2 
Both translations are possible renderings of the Coptic terms, but the diffi­
culties arise when one considers the hypothetical Greek terms behind the 
Coptic ones. Assuming that the Nag Hammadi texts originally were com­
posed in Greek this issue is of some interest in itself. Furthermore, when, as 
in the present study, the linguistic triad is considered against the back­
ground of a specific Stoic counterpart, it becomes all the more important to 
discern the Greek Vorlage of this cluster of linguistic terms. 
It is only the first two terms of the triad that cause problems with regard 
to translation, since the last term is given in its Greco-Coptic form Xoroc 
(logos). As for £ροογ and CMH the difficulties lie in the fact that the terms 
are often used interchangeably meaning either sound or voice. 1 6 3 However, 
Emmel's article sheds some light on the issue. In Turner's words: 
As S. Emmel has pointed out ("Sound, Voice and Word"), careful study of 
the first two terms £ροογ (mase. "Voice"), CMH ("fern, articulate sound, 
"Speech") and Xoroc (masc. "Word") in the Sahidic NT suggests that 
gpooy refers to sound in general whether articulate or not, while CMH gener­
ally refers to articulate sound or speech.. . 1 6 4 
Even though Turner cites Emmel's study, which speaks for a translation of 
the triad by "sound-voice-word", he still sees Emmel's article as presenting 
the possibility of translating "voice-speech-word".1 6 5 Poirier specifies the 
reading of Emmel a bit: 
...gpooy écrit-il, est utilisé en référence à des sons non humains (ήχεΐν, ήχος 
et φθόγγος en 1 Co 14, 7) ou à des sons humains non spécifiques ou 
inarticulés (άκοή, άλαλάζειν, άναφωνέω et φθόγγος en Rm 10, 18 [=Ps 
18Lxx, 5]). [...]CMH, d'autre côté, est utilisé en référence à des sons 
humains articulés (άκούειν en Ac 15, 12, άφωνος, ένωτίζεσθαι, κενοφωνία 
et κραυγή en Mt 25, 6 et Le 1, 4 2 ) . 1 6 6 
From this quotation it is clear that the distinction is made between non-
human or inarticulate human sounds on the one hand and articulate human 
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1 & / Turner 2000b [1990]: 384; Pokier 2006: 107-108. 
168 LS J: 1929. 
1 6 9 Ibid.: 1967-1968. It should be noted here that at some point the articulateness of 
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1 7 0 See chapter on Ancient Philosophy of Language. 
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sounds on the other. As we shall see below, this corresponds well to the 
Stoic sequence of a verbal expression. 
Meanwhile, Turner and Poirier both suggest that the Coptic £ροογ may 
be a translation of the Greek φθόγγος and that CMH may be a translation of 
φωνή. 1 6 7 One would therefore expect that they actually agreed on translat­
ing the triad as "sound-voice-word" on the basis of the supposed Greek 
equivalent "φθόγγος, φωνή, λογός". However, that is not the case, for even 
the Greek terms have different meanings. Thus, φθόγγος may mean sound, 
voice, speech, utterance or saying. However, the most common sense 
seems to be sound.m The meaning of φωνή differs between sound, voice, 
tone, sound of voice, speech and utterance.169 Therefore, Turner's transla­
tion "voice-speech-word" is perfectly possible. 
Furthermore, confusing as it may be, the present study argues that yet 
another Greek triad might lie behind the Coptic one. As has already been 
mentioned this is found in the Stoic theory of voice that was presented in 
the previous chapter on ancient philosophy of language. The triad I wish to 
bring into focus is the one which the Stoics, according to Diogenes 
Laertius, formulated in order to give a precise description of what goes into 
in a verbal expression. The Stoic sequence that corresponds to the hearable 
part of Protennoia's manifestation appears as follows: φωνή - λέξις -
λόγος, which according to Ax may be rendered Laut - Stimme -
Sprache. 1 7 0 Here we have the understanding of φωνή as sound. Part of the 
difficulty of translating especially φωνή and CMH is that these terms are so 
broad and that they are used as both meaning sound and voice. Thus, in the 
Stoic theory φωνή is, in fact, the heading of the entire account: τέχνη περι 
φωνής. This means that the sequence of a verbal expression is formed as a 
diairesis, a division, of φωνή which again signifies that the terms included 
in the sequence are all actually different aspects of φωνή. Understood in 
this manner, the first step in the Stoic sequence is φωνή perceived as inar­
ticulate sound (ήχος), the second is λέξις identified as an articulate voice 
(φωνή) which is writable but not necessarily intelligible. The third is the 
perfectly intelligible and articulate λόγος which is the last division of φωνή, 
and thus still part of it. 
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Since there are several possibilities for translation of the Coptic terms in 
the light of the supposed Greek Vorlage, just as there are several possibili­
ties of translation of the Greek terms, I suggest that our focus should be 
turned towards two things with regard to the triad of TriPro and its Greek 
equivalent and English translation: 1) It is of great importance that we are 
dealing with a cluster of terms and 2) that this cluster expresses a particular 
movement, from inarticulate, over articulate but unintelligible, to articulate 
and intelligible. Against this background the linguistic triad of TriPro may 
be understood as follows: gpooy is the inarticulate sound, which first comes 
forth, CHH is the articulate sound, which is heard as a voice; in other words, 
CHH is a φωνή with the specific meaning of human, articulate sound. In the 
Stoic sequence, this level corresponds to that of λέξις. At last Xoroc comes 
forth as the articulate, intelligible, rational discourse. 
Employing the common renderings of the Greek terms included in the 
Stoic triad, Turner's translation of the triad of TriPro as "voice-speech-
word" corresponds, in fact, somewhat better than that of every other trans­
lator to the way the Stoic sequence is presented. Furthermore, Turner was 
the first to make the comparison between the Stoic material and TriPro's 
linguistic descent. 1 7 1 But I am not sure whether he translates as he does on 
the basis of a comparison with the Stoic material. In any case, I agree with 
his comparison of the two triads. Moreover, they are even more closely 
connected, in that both the Stoic verbal expression and the linguistic mani­
festation of Protennoia are issued from within Thought (oiavoia/neeye or 
npoTeHHoWenmoi^).172 Inspired by Poirier who has helpfully sketched out 
the sequence of manifestation in TriPro,1731 render it as follows: 
K^pœq - Meeye - εροογ - CMH - Xoroc 
Silence -Thought - Sound - Voice - Word/Discourse 
This sequence differs slightly from the one adduced by Poirier, which does 
not include Silence and which, moreover, includes perception and knowl­
edge in parentheses. I have added Silence to the sequence because I see it 
1 / 1 Turner 2001: 83 and 153. 
1 7 2 The differences between these concepts are discussed in more detail in the chapter on 
Thunder. 
1 7 3 Poirier 2006: 106 Heeye - (MCOHCIC/COOYN) - £ροογ - CMH - Xoroc. 
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1 / 4 Poirier 2009: 114-117. 
1 7 5 See chapter on philosophy under "The things which signify". 
1 7 6 Poirier 2006: 109 and 2009: 115-116. 
1 7 7 Fragment 5, Origin In Iohannem IV, 108. The passage is also brought in Poirier 
2006: 109 and in Luisier 2006: 537. 
1 7 8 Poirier 2006: 110-111 and 2009: 116-118. 
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as an important element in the overall understanding of the linguistic mani­
festation of Protennoia. This will be further discussed below. 
Now, the Stoic sequence is not the only existing one that might form a 
background for the hearable triad "£ροογ - CMH - Xoroc". In his article from 
2009, Poirier considers in greater detail the background for this Coptic tri­
ad. He mentions the use of the terms in Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Lucretius, 
Plotinus and Augustine. 1 7 4 As I indicated in the chapter on philosophy, the 
terms in question were invented by Aristotle, although they are already im­
plicit in Plato. However, it was the Stoics who developed the use of the 
terms and it was their dialectical theories that became "trendsetting".1 7 5 
Thus it is likely that it was the Stoic theory that was adopted by later think­
ers, like Philo, Plotinus and Augustine. On the basis of Poirier's examina­
tion of the material from Augustine's De doctrina Christiana there is no 
doubt that in his account of the Wisdom's manifestation in the world a sim­
ilar metaphorical use of the linguistic terms is involved. The sequence used 
by Augustine is presented as follows: cogitatio - verbum - sonus - vox -
locutio.116 It is dealt with in more detail in the following chapter on Thun­
der, and hence it suffices for now to regard it as a parallel to the adoption 
of the Stoic material in TriPro. Before I move on to the analysis of that 
treatise, I will discuss yet another parallel to the linguistic manifestation of 
Protennoia, namely the one found in some fragments of Heracleon's com­
mentary on the Gospel of John, attested by Origin. The commentary on 
John 1:23 runs: 1 7 7 ό λόγος μέν ό σωτήρ έστιν, φωνή δέ ή έν τή έρήμω ή δια 
Ιωάννου διανοούμενη, ήχος δέ πάσα προφητική τάξις ("The Word is the 
Savior, the Voice is the one in the desert, the one thought out by John, the 
Sound is every prophetic order") This is treated briefly by Poirier, 1 7 8 who 
argues that even though Heracleon and TriPro adopt the same material in 
the same metaphorical manner: 
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1 , 9 Ibid.: 2006: 110 and 2009: 117. 
1 8 0 Luisier 2006: 537. 
1 8 1 Ibid.: 538-542 and 551-552. With regard to Thunder, he only mentions the passage 
in 14:12-13, whereas I argue in the preceding chapter that the linguistic focus is found 
all over the text. 
1 8 2 Ibid.: 540. 
1 8 3 Ibid.: 549. 
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...celui-ci est appliqué de part et d'autre à des contexts différents. Dans le 
cas de la PrôTri, ce context est philosophique et non prophétologique ou 
christologique. 1 7 9 
Thus, Poirier argues against P. Luisier, who in his article from 2006 sug-
gested reading TriPro in light of the Heracleon fragment. Through an anal-
ysis of the Greek background to the Coptic triad, Luisier had suggested that 
the Greek equivalent would have looked like this: ήχος - φωνή - λόγος. 
This differs from the Greek triads reconstructed by Poirier and Turner, in 
that it takes ήχος to be a translation of εροογ instead of φθόγγος. Luisier 
bases his argument on the Heracleon fragment, in which the same sequence 
may be detected. 1 8 0 He acknowledges that the linguistic triad is of Stoic 
origin and detects it in a wide range of ancient sources from Dionysius 
Thrax, Cicero and Plotinus over Poimandres, the Hymn of the Pearl, and 
last but not least, Thunder.m Recognizing the prevalence of the triad, 
Luisier describes it as forming "une triade somme toute banale". 1 8 2 Moreo­
ver, he finds that the specifically salvific use of the terms in both Heracleon 
and in TriPro is an adoption of the allegorical use of the terms, as found in 
Philo's work. According to Luisier, Philo employs the triad to show how 
the prophet is not just a simple instrument through whom God speaks for 
"certes il émet des sons, mais à travers sa voix, c'est en fait la parole de 
Dieu qui s'exprime". 1 8 3 Thus, Luisier understands the Heracleon fragment 
as an expression of a similar conception of the function of a prophet: 
Jean -Baptiste, quant à lui, est la voix qui retentit dans le désert, ainsi qu'il 
le dit lui-même en citant Is 40,3 : έγώ φωνή βοώντος έν τη έρήμφ (Jn 1,23). 
Finalement, avec Jésus, c'est la parole, le Logos même de Dieu qui se 
manifeste. 1 8 4 
Luisier argues that a similar interpretation of the Christian salvation history 
is involved in TriPro, formed through the tripartite grammatical theme 
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combined with references to baptism. The latter links the Nag Hammadi 
text even closer to Heracleon's commentary on John, and thus Luisier sug-
gests a prophetic context for TriPro.m This, furthermore, implies that the 
three different acts of salvific manifestations had different performers: from 
John the Baptist towards Christ the Logos. But in TriPro it is Protennoia 
who descends all three times although in different forms or aspects. This 
point has also been noted by Poirier who says: "...ce traité demeure 
étranger à la prophétologie de l'exégète gnostique de Jean." 1 8 7 Moreover, 
as will become apparent through the analysis, TriPro reinterprets the Stoic 
material in such a way that the levels of intelligibility within the sequence 
of a verbal expression are redefined. However, there is no doubt that the 
Heracleon fragment is an obvious parallel to the linguistic manifestation in 
TriPro, in that both use the linguistic material in a salvific context. On the 
other hand, they also use it very differently. 
This short investigation of the background for the linguistic triad £ροογ, 
CMH and Xoroc will serve as background information for the detailed analy­
sis of TriPro's specific use of the terms. The analysis will be carried out 
through an examination of selected passages that in one way or the other 
articulate the linguistic manifestation of Protennoia. The sections in be­
tween those passages will be continuously summarized. 
First part: the Discourse of Protennoia 
As every other major part of the text, the first part of the monologue of Pro­
tennoia begins with a passage of "I am"-proclamations (35*:l-36*:27). In 
the entire text this is the longest passage of "I am"- proclamations. As such 
it forms an introduction to the revelation by letting the reader know who 
Protennoia is in relation to every level of the world, that is, both the divine 
All (rrrapq) and the human/sensible Cosmos (KOCHOC) or Tartaros 
(T^px^poc). In this introduction Protennoia is first and foremost the 
Thought ([^NOK] xe τπρο[τβΗΝθΐ^ nH]eeye) (35*: 1). She describes her re­
lation to the divine as a co-existence with the Invisible One, which is the 
Father, and with the All. She is herself the Invisible One within the All 
™Ibid.\ 553-555. 
1 8 6 This corresponds to the suggestion put forth by Denzey 2001a, in which she argues 
for an understanding of TriPro and Thunder as prophetic literature in line with 
Montanist material. 
1 8 7 Poirier 2006: 110. 
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1 W Turner 2001: 227. 
1 8 9 The translation of enmoie, may vary between idea, thought and afterthought, whereas 
its Greek equivalent έπίνοια can have the sense of thinking, thought, notion, concept, 
idea, intelligence and afterthought, among others. Cf. LS J 648. For more on the transla­
tion of eniNOi^, see also the chapter on Thunder. 
1 9 0 For references to the Apocryphon of John I use the long version of codex II from the 
critical edition by Waldstein and Wisse 1995. 
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(35*:24), but also the Thought of the Invisible One (35*:8-9) as well as the 
All itself (35*:31). Further on, she is primarily described as the Thought of 
the Father (for instance, 36*: 17), but here in the introduction it is empha­
sized that Protennoia is exeedingly closely connected to the Father and the 
All. She is, so to speak, as inseparable from the Father as a thought is from 
our own minds. 
Protennoia's relation to the visible world is described in terms that make 
one think of pantheism: "... since I move in every creature" (eei KIM £pèa 
2NCCDNT NIM) (35*! 11-12). However, "pantheism" might not be the most 
adequate term for Protennoia's participation in the world, because that 
would somehow imply that she is present within every aspect of the world 
and perhaps even responsible for its creation, which is not the case in 
TriPro. Rather, the text clearly belongs to the "Barbeloite" tradition that 
sees the world as created by the demiurge-likeYaldabaoth. Protennoia's 
involvement with the world takes place through an aspect (or with Turner's 
words an "avatar") 1 8 8 of her, which is the Epinoia (en iNoi^) . That is de-
scribed as a movement which exists at every living level of the world (al-
though animals, plants and stones do not seem to be included), from the 
highest Powers and invisible Lights over the Archons, Angels and Demons 
to the souls in Tartaros as well as the material souls. As such, she is the one 
who awakens those who sleep and makes them see. Throughout TriPro 
there are four appearances of Epinoia: the first one is here in 35*: 13 and 
the three others are all on page 39*: 19, 30, 32. In this first instance she 
plays a "life-giving" role in that Protennoia proclaims: "It is I who am the 
life of my Epinoia" (\HOK ne πσ>Ν£ ÜT^GniNOi^).1 8 9This recalls the the 
Apocryphon of John (NHC 11,1; ΙΙΙ,Ι; IV, 1; Berlin Gnostic Codex 8502, 
2 ) 1 9 0 in which Epinoia is the aspect of Pronoia/Barbelo that is sent down to 
help awake Adam. She is called XCDH (life), since "she assists the whole 
creature" (ecp^ynoyprei HTKTICIC THPC) (20:19-20). In my opinion, that is 
also what is at stake in TriPro when Epinoia is described as a movement in 
every part of the visible world. Her presence makes the creation alive and 
Linguistic Manifestations of Divine Thought 
thus it is able to move. The life-giving aspect of Epinoia is also emphasized 
in the Hypostasis of the Archons (NHC 11,4), in which an "Ophite" reinter-
pretation of Genesis is found. In the creation account of Adam, it is Eve 
who awakes him from his sleep, which the Powers had put him into when 
they created Eve. Eve is meanwhile endowed with the divine female prin-
ciple, which is closely similar to Epinoia. When Adam wakes up, he praises 
Eve: "You have given me life. You will be called the mother of the living" 
(89:10). In fact, he praises the female spiritual principle inside Eve with 
verses that are almost identical with a certain passage in Thunder}91 Fur-
thermore, in the Apocryphon of John, Epinoia is the one who awakens Ad-
am's thinking, providing him with the capacity for reflection, which is also 
the ability to achieve knowledge. This is connected to the identification of 
Epinoia with the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. This aspect of 
Epinoia will be dealt with in detail in relation to Thunder, in which it plays 
an essential role. In my view, the role of Epinoia in TriPro clearly presup-
poses the narratives from "Classic Gnostic" texts that speak of the figure of 
Epinoia. According to Poirier, she is "le niveau inférieur de la 
Protennoia". 1 9 2 This involves, moreover, the identification of her with the 
figure of Sophia later in the text (in the last three cases where Epinoia is 
mentioned). 
After this introduction and self-description by Protennoia, the audience 
is introduced to two terms that are central in relation to the linguistic mani-
festation of Protennoia: the Sound and Silence. The two terms are intro-
cuced immediately before the announcement of the first descent. In my 
opinion, this is no accident, but as exact piece of information to the reader 
that it is as Sound that she descends. 
35*:32-36*:3 1 9 3 
^Νθκογ£ροο[γ eqCNCN 6BOX £HC]YXH 
ββίφοοπ χ[ΝΪΤφορπ 
eeicpoon £ ] P | A ] Î gïï+ïïïrfKA[PCDC ογοΝ] ΝΙΜ Μ Η ^ Υ 
^γο3 π[£]ρ[οογ ne eT£]vm βτφ[οοπ Μ £ Η Τ 
£Ρ|>Ϊ £ΜΠΜ66γ6] NàTT6g[oq NjèOXÇlTq 
See the chapter on Thunder for a thorough analysis of these verses (13:19-14:9). 
1 9 2 Poirier 2006: 26. 
1 9 3 Where nothing else is noted all translations from Coptic are my own. The Coptic text 
is rendered as in Poirier 2006: 132-169. 
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Poirier 2006: 134-135. These restorations were published already in Funk and Poirier 
2002: 332-340. 
1 9 5 Schenke 1984: 26. 
1 9 6 Turner 1990b: 402-403. 
71 
g[pM £ÏÏ+MÏÏ]TKApCDC Ν^ΤφΙτ[θ] 
I am the Soun[d who resonates qujietly, 
existing s[ince the beginning, 
existing] within the Silen[ce ever]yone there, 
and [it is] the hi[dden Sou]nd that exists within me, 
[within the] incomprehensi[ble] immeasurable 
[Thought within] the immeasurable Silen[ce]. 
In this passage the first linguistic identification of Protennoia occurs. Al­
though the papyrus is relatively deteriorated, it is easy to deduce that Pro­
tennoia proclaims that she is Sound. I follow the restorations of Poirier 1 9 4 
which make the Sound "resonate" (cïïcïï 6Β0λ) instead of "call out" ( ω φ 
6 Β 0 λ ) 1 9 5 or "speaking softly" ( φ ^ β gïï ο γ^ΗογχΗ) 1 9 6 . The passage shows 
an intimate relation between the Sound, the Thought and the Silence. Pro­
tennoia has a part in every one of them. She is the Sound and this Sound 
exists both within the Silence and is hidden within her. It is also hidden 
within the incomprehensible Thought, with which Protennoia is also herself 
identified in the very incipit of TriPro. Thus, she is the Sound in the 
Thought, and the Thought in the Silence. 
Already at this early stage of the text, it seems that there is a line of pro­
gression between these linguistic terms, beginning from the Silence and 
moving over the Thought to the Sound. There is, however, a challenge in 
how we should understand the description of the Sound as resonating "qui­
etly", moreover as "existing within the Silence". In what way is a sound 
quiet? And how is a sound able to exist within a silence? Considering the 
nature of silence in general, it must be understood as the opposite of any 
given sound, that is, sounds from nature, animals, human noise, language, 
music etc. It is easy to understand how a thought may be silent, since a 
thought produces no sound. However, these things become confusing when 
TriPro paradoxically introduces the Sound as existing quietly within the 
Silence. 
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As we saw, Turner translates £HCYXH by "softly". According to LSJ this 
is definitely an option, which might even be preferable since it allows the 
Sound to actually be a sound which is somehow audible. On the other hand, 
I find it plausible to translate it by "quietly". In this way, the paradox is re-
tained, and the Sound lies latently within the Thought in the Silence as a 
possible Sound which is not yet audible. It resonates "quietly" within the 
Thought just as when we speak to ourselves within our own minds without 
actually saying something audible. In either case the adverb £HcyxH desig-
nates a Sound not yet in full blast, that is, not yet made manifest. It also 
corresponds well with the description of the Sound as existing "since the 
beginning". 1 9 7 The Sound has always been there in the Thought within the 
Silence, as a possible mode of manifestation, or, more precisely: as the 
mode of manifestation, when manifestation is necessary. This reading is 
supported by the fact that at this stage of the text Protennoia has not yet 
descended, but is just about to announce that she will do so. Furthermore, 
after the announcement of her first descent she proclaims to be the "real" 
Sound, a Sound which is audible. 
The themes of sound and silence are interrupted by Protennoia's an-
nouncement of her descent to the Underworld in 36*:4-9 (\NOK ^e[iei e^p^i 
6T]MHT6 ïïè,HÏÏT[e] etc.). The descent is described in terms that recall a 
creation scene, in that Protennoia proclaims to be shining down upon the 
darkness, making the water pour. 1 9 8 Yet, the text quickly returns to the lin-
guistic theme. Here Protennoia emphasizes and develops her identity and 
manifestation as Sound: 
36*:9-27 
ΠβΤΟΤΠ ΗΠζρΟΟγ 6 Β θ [ λ ] 
£ΙΤΟΟΤ· 6φΜΣ61 6 Β θ λ NeiTTNCDClC 66[l] 
φΟΟΓΓ £ΝΝΙ&Τφ^.Χ.6 ΗΗΟΟγ MNNlèwT 
coycDNoy &»ΝΟΚ ne TMCOHCIC Mïïnco 
I follow the reconstruction and translation of Poirier 2006: 134-135 of eeiqpoon 
χ[ΝΝφορπ eeicpoon g]pM'i gNfMNTKA[pcDC...] "existant d[epuis le commencement, 
existant] dans le silen[ce...". Turner 1990b: 402-403 restores in the same way but trans­
lates differently: "I exist \from the first. I dwell] within the Silence" (emphasis original). 
1 9 8 The theme of water returns later in TriPro in relation to passages about baptism 
(45*:12ff), about the Living Water (46*: 17), and about baptism in relation to the Water 
of Life (48*:7ff). Here at the beginning the text introduces the theme of baptism in 
combination with the theme of creation. 
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It is I who am laden with the Sound. It is through 
me that Gnosis comes forth, since [I] 
exist in the Ineffable and Unknowable 
Ones. It is I who am the Perception and the Knowledge, 
send[ing] (out) a Sound through 
a Thought. It is I who am the real Sound. 
I resound in everyone, and they recog[nise] 
it, since a seed exists within [them]. 
It is I who am the Thought of the Father, a[n]d through 
me proceeded [the] Sound, 
that is, the Knowledge of the everlasting things since 
I am Thought of the [A]ll, joined to 
the unkn[o]wable and incomprehensible Thought. 
I revealed myself, I, in 
all those who recognised me, for it is I, 
actually, who am joined with everyone within 
the hidden Thought and in an exalted 
<S>ound and a Sound from 
the invisible Thought. 
In the context of her descent, Protennoia explains how she as Sound is the 
medium of Gnosis (rNCDCic), being herself the categories of both Perception 
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(MCOHCIC) and Knowledge (cooyN). The confusion about her mixed identity 
increases as the reader is now made aware that Protennoia is both Thought, 
Sound, Perception and Knowledge, all existing together in the immeasur-
able Silence (36*:3). However, in the light of our analysis of the first "lin-
guistic passage" all of this might not be a problem, after all. We saw that 
Protennoia as quiet Sound existed in the Silence. She was only potentially 
audible and as such not yet manifest. This passage describes Protennoia's 
entry into the visible world. The visible world is characterized by being 
sensible, that is, it is also the world of sounds, colours, smells and so forth, 
whereas the divine realm is characterized by the opposite: silence. It fol-
lows that when Protennoia enters into the world she becomes sensible, 
which in her case means that she is hearable as a sound. Therefore, this 
time Protennoia is not quiet at all. She is "laden with the Sound". She is 
now both hearable and manifest. She is "the real Sound". 
In the first six lines of this passage Protennoia reveals how as the real, 
hearable Sound she functions as a promoter of Gnosis. Thus, through her-
self and her message, hearers may gain access to the place from which she 
comes: the ineffable and the unknowable. Hence, she also claims to be Per-
ception and Knowledge. 
In this passage the line of progression of linguistic manifestations of Pro-
tennoia becomes clearer. Where the earlier linguistic passage only indicat-
ed a progression, this passage writes it out. The Silence is not mentioned 
here but the Thought and the Sound are directly related in that the latter 
proceeds from the former: "It is I who am the Thought of the Father, and 
through me proceeded the Sound". Poirier has outlined the progression of 
Protennoia as it appears now: "pensée (Meeye = έννοια) - connaissance 
(cooyN = γνώσις) - perception (αϊσθησις) - son fepooy = φθόγγος)". He 
introduces them as follows: "Ces concepts, empruntés au vocabulaire 
philosophique et grammatical, expriment les diverses étapes de la 
manifestation de la Protennoia". 1 9 9 Poirier continues by comparing the way 
in which the Sound is "sent out" (τβγο eso\) with the way in which Dioge­
nes Laertius refers to the Stoic description of the human voice as "articulate 
and issued (i.e. sent out) from thought" (...ανθρώπου...έστιν έναρθρος και 
1 9 9 Poirier 2006: 202-203. 
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Loc.cit. Poirier notes that even though έκπέμπειν does not figure under the Greek 
equivalents to τ^(ο)γ eeoX, one does find πέμπειν under those for TA(O)Y. Cf. Crum 
441b. The Greek text is from Diogenes Laertius Lives VII, 55. 
2 0 1 As Poirier 2006: 203-204 observes, one would expect that the hearers "recognize 
her" instead of "zY" (MM^C) which does not seem to refer to either her or the Sound 
which is masc. See Poirier's analysis of the difficulties presented in the Coptic text in 
this particular place. I take HH^C as refering to the Sound, which in any case is 
Protennoia herself. 
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από διανοίας εκπεμπόμενη). 2 0 0 The comparison with the Stoic material is of 
course highly appropriate and will be elaborated on as we continue the 
analysis. But it is clear already now that Protennoia has begun her descent 
in accordance with the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression. 
The self-identification of Protennoia with the concepts of Perception and 
Knowledge adds a further dimension to her linguistic manifestation. What 
is at issue is not only about the audibility of the divine but indeed also un­
derstanding the content of what is said. In the present passage Protennoia 
proclaims to "resound in everyone, and they recognise it, since a seed ex­
ists within them". 2 0 1 Firstly, this recalls the theme of recognition of the di­
vine revealer also known from the canonical gospels, although here in 
TriPro Protennoia is recognised contrary to Jesus in, for instance, John 
8:40-47. Secondly, the recognition is due to the seed (cnepM^) that exists 
within the hearers. This seed must be understood as a sort of divine element 
residing within human beings that makes them capable of receiving the di­
vine message. In TriPro it has the more particular meaning of the ability to 
recognise Protennoia in her linguistic manifestation, which begins as 
Sound. If we take into consideration the role of Epinoia discussed above, 
the ability she gave the first human beings with was exactly this: the ability 
for reflection, which makes it possible for the human being to achieve Per­
ception and Knowledge. So, as an "inferior" aspect of the divine first 
thought, Pronoia/Barbelo/Protennoia, Epinoia plants the seed of reflection 
in the human being at the creation. That seed is the one that makes the hu­
man being able to recognise the First Thought herself when she descends 
for the sake of human salvation. However, there is a difference between 
recognizing a sound and understanding the content of its message. If we 
recall the Stoic comprehension of the level of intelligibility of a sound, we 
are at the very first stage of a verbal expression, which is so far neither ar­
ticulate nor intelligible. Thus, from the perspective of the hearer, the first 
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Then 
the Son who is perfect in every respect, that 
is, the Word who came into existence through that 
Sound, who has proceeded from the height, who 
has within him the Name, being a Light, (he) 
revealed the everlasting things, and 
all the unknowables were known. 
And those things which are difficult to interpret 
and the secret things he revealed, and 
those who exist in Silence with the First 
Thought he preached to them. 
2 0 2 Cf. Poirier 2006: 210-211. 
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step of Protennoia's manifestation in the sensible world is nothing more 
than a mere sound. 
The text moves on from the "I am"-proclamations to a very short narra-
tive part in 36*:27-33 wich concerns the Mystery (OYMYCTHPION). Although 
the passage is very fragmented, it is possible to deduce a theme of visibility 
versus invisibility. Another short passage (36*:33-37*:3) includes the read-
ers of the text by using the pronoun \HOH (we). It deals with the inner trans-
formation of the believer, which makes him a "product of the fruit" that 
allows him to be delivered to the "Water of Life", that is, baptism. 2 0 2 This 
leads on to the first passage concerning the Son. 
37*:3-13 
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Poirier 2006: 212. 
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The text continues the description of the Son and his deeds for yet another 
seven lines (37*: 13-20). It is told how he reveals himself to everyone tell-
ing the mysteries and unrepeatable doctrines to those who have become 
Sons of the Light. I will focus on the part above translated, since it is di-
rectly related to the linguistic theme of the text. 
This passage is a clear example of the way in which TriPro does not fol-
low any logical scheme for the description of Protennoia's manifestation. If 
the text was arranged logically according to her threefold descent as Sound 
- Voice - Word, so that each part of the text would represent one mode of 
manifestation, the analysis would have been less complicated. However, 
TriPro is a revelation discourse and one should not expect it to be system-
atically organized. Hence, it is not surprising that the present passage an-
ticipates the manifestation of Protennoia as Word, which would logically 
be expected to come after the manifestation of Protennoia as Voice. Never-
theless, the introduction of the Word already at this point may indicate its 
importance for the linguistic triad that is developed and explained in the 
next passage of the text. There may be several reasons for the introduction 
of the Son as Word this early. One of them relates to the TriPro's internal 
composition: Since the following passage elaborates on the interdepen-
dency of the linguistic triad in a quite complex and obscure manner, the 
text assures the reader beforehand that the Logos will eventually explain or 
reveal the things that are "difficult to interpret". The rational content of the 
message of the Logos is thus emphasized. This view is supported by Poir-
ier, who argues that the passage mainly focuses on a vocabulary "de 
l'herméneutique et de l'interprétation".2 0 3 
Another reason is related to external circumstances. With this passage, 
TriPro may be thought to comment on an already circulating Johannine 
logos Christology. In fact, TriPro supports the identification of the Son as 
Word, and that is underlined by this passage. However, TriPro expands the 
linguistic manifestation to comprise levels preceding the Word. Understood 
in this way, TriPro first makes the reader aware of the similarity between 
its own theology and that of the Fourth Gospel only to go on to explain 
how the Word according to TriPro is actually part of a greater linguis-
tic/noetic context. 
Let us now move to the passage in which the Voice is introduced in rela-
tion to both Sound and Word. 
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37*:20-30 
But the Sound that came into being 
from my Thought, it is as three permanences 
that it exists: the Father, the Mother, the Son, a Voice that 
exists perceptibly, it has a Word 
within it, this who has 
every glory, and it has 
three masculinities and three 
powers and three names. They exist in 
the manner of three which are quadrangles, 
secretly within a Silence 
of the Ineffable One. 
What we have here is in Poirier's words 
un passage-clé qui montre l'articulation par emboîtement des éléments qui 
traduisent le caractère triadique fondamental de la Protennoia: le son, qui 
est Père, Mère, Fils, est une voix et possède un logos . 2 0 4 
Poirier rightly describes this as a key passage. At the same time as it clari-
fies the triadic nature of Protennoia, it also complicates the picture. While 
the passage reaffirms that the Sound's source is the Thought and introduces 
the linguistic level of Voice that comes in-between Sound and Word, it also 
presents the triad consisting of Father - Mother - Son. This triad is de-
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scribed as the three "permanences" (MONH) in which the Sound exists. Be­
fore I discuss the implications that this second triad may have, I shall con­
tinue the consideration of the linguistic manifestation of Protennoia. 
In the present passage it becomes clear that Protennoia is identified with 
a sequence of linguistic terms: Thought - Sound - Voice - Word (Meeye -
2ροογ - CMH - Xoroc). However, it is not yet entirely clear how the first two 
relate to the other two. Sound of course issues from Thought, and now the 
reader is told that the Word that was introduced in the foregoing passage is 
contained within a Voice. But how does Protennoia go from Sound to 
Voice? The text is unfortunately somewhat ambiguous on this question, 
since Sound and Voice from time to time seem to be employed inter­
changeably. This unmistakably recalls the above discussion concerning the 
translation of both the Coptic and Greek terms. But if we look a bit ahead 
in the text to the beginning of the second major part, the relation between 
Sound and Voice becomes clearer: "It is I who give the Voice of the Sound 
to the ears of those who have known me, that is, the Sons of the Light" 
(M40K. neTfNTCMH Μπ^ροογ e£paä à,MM^aoie UH6NT^YCOYCDNT e reN^e i ue 
Ν φ Η ρ ε Μπογο6ΐΝβ)(42*: 14-17). Here it seems fairly obvious that the Voice 
is something which proceeds from the Sound. Thus, the sequence is con­
firmed. As I have already observed above concerning the diversities of 
translation of the linguistic triad, I see the Stoic sequence of a verbal ex­
pression as constituting the dialectical background of the linguistic mani­
festation of Protennoia. I recall the Stoic sequence: διάνοια - φωνή - λέξις 
- λόγος. As mentioned, the Stoic sequence is characterized by a movement 
from the inarticulate over the articulate yet unintelligible to the articulate 
and intelligible. These levels of intelligibility are, in fact, all different as­
pects of φωνή in that the verbal expression is a diairesis - a division - of 
the concept of Sound. If the manifestation of Protennoia is understood 
against this background, her descent may be seen as a progression which 
begins within the Silent Thought and then moves downwards, first as the 
inarticulate Sound, then as the articulate yet still unintelligible Voice to­
wards the perfectly intelligible and articulate Word/Discourse. 
In his extensive monograph on Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic 
Tradition, Turner points to the similarity between the TriPro and the Stoic 
material: 
The creative act of the original author of the Trimorphic Protennoia was an 
interpretation of the sequence of Protennoia's successive revelatory de­
scents according to a theory of the increasing articulateness of verbal com-
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munication as one moves from unintelligible sound through articulate 
speech to explicit word, probably of Stoic provenance. 2 0 5 
It is indeed of Stoic provenance, since they were pioneers regarding these 
issues. Moreover, the way in which Protennoia is described as originating 
within the Silence and in addition as the "Logos existing in the Silence", a 
"hidden Sound", the "ineffable Logos", Turner interprets as deriving "from 
the Stoic distinction between internal reason (λόγος ένδιάθετος) and uttered 
or expressed reason (λόγος προφορικός)." 2 0 6 That is an excellent point, 
which underlines the unity of the nature of Protennoia. Her manifestation in 
the sensible world is simply an audible expression of her, who otherwise 
resides in Silence. The many different aspects with which she identifies 
herself during her descent are simply different aspects of her. She is one, 
whatever form she takes. In this way she is also capable of containing the 
newly introduced triad of Father - Mother - Son. The linguistic terms are 
especially suitable to describe the unity of Protennoia, since this cluster of 
terms itself is an example of a similar constellation. As was shown in the 
chapter on Stoic and Platonic dialectics, it is important to acknowledge that 
all concepts contained in a diairesis are parts of the concept in question. 
They all describe aspects of that concept, which may for that reason be 
conceived as a unity of the many. The same goes for Protennoia, and as 
will be argued in the next chapter, the same is also goes for the female re-
vealer of Thunder. 
In her descent Protennoia increases her intelligibility, in that she moves 
from Thought towards Logos, but before she reaches that level, she has to 
become perceptible to the human ear by at first becoming a Sound and a 
Voice. That is the reason why TriPro emphasizes the perceptibility of the 
Voice in the present passage: "a Voice that exists perceptibly..." Turner 
notices this specific audibility of the manifestation of Protennoia as an im­
portant feature, which shows that "salvation derives not only through 
knowledge or vision, but also through sound and audition." 2 0 7 Poetically 
Turner calls this sort of manifestation a "theophony". 
In research about TriPro there seems to be a tendency towards regarding 
the linguistic triad as corresponding to the triad of Father - Mother - Son, 
so that the Father is identical with the Sound, the Mother with the Voice, 
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and the Son with the Word. This was suggested by Turner in 1990, when 
he stated: 
The three Permanences of Protennoia (the Thought), Father, Mother, Son, 
correspond to the three linguistic modalities in which the Thought is mani­
fested: Voice (masc , perhaps Greek φθόγγος) corresponds to Father; 
Sound 2 0 8 (fern., perhaps Greek φωνή) corresponds to Mother; and Word 
(λόγος ) corresponds to Son . 2 0 9 
This was followed up on by Gilhus 2 1 0 and Poirier, 2 1 1 the latter of whom 
makes the comparison only somewhat hesitantly when he writes that the 
present passage (37*:20-30) "permet probablement de répondre à cette 
question", 2 1 2 namely the question about the precise identification of the 
three successive aspects of Protennoia masc. - fern. - masc. (Father -
Mother - Son). Poirier finds Turner's interpretation fitting in the context of 
the present passage. However, he notices that the way in which it is 
formulated in the text suggests "une equivalence par emboîtement: le Père 
en tant que son (εροογ, φθόγγος) est la triade, laquelle se déploie comme 
Mère-Voix (CMH, φωνή) et Fils-logos." 2 1 3 In my opinion it seems likely that 
the two triads are connected in accordance with Poirier's analysis. Janssens 
on the other hand sees the triad of Father - Mother - Son as follows: "les 
trois «demeures» de la Pensée, le Père, la Mère, le Fils, correspondent 
respectivement à la Perception (ou Pensée), à la Voix et à la Parole." 2 1 4 
However, I think it better to follow the text itself, which explicitly claims 
that it is the Sound that exists as the three permanences. 
The triadic theme is continued in the last part of the passage, in which 
the Sound is described as having three "masculinities", three "powers" and 
three "names" and they exist as three • • • (quadrangles). Even though the 
oyNxeq HM&Y may be understood as a parallel construction to a similar one 
a few lines before, which concerned the Voice (oyÏÏTeq HM&Y ïïoyXoroc 
£PM N£vrrq), I understand this one as relating to the Sound. These three tri-
Here it seems as if Turner has written Sound by mistake instead of "Speech" with 
which he otherwise translates CHH/φωνή. 
2 0 9 Turner 1990a: 432. See also 382. 
2 1 0 Gilhus 1992: 55. 
2 1 1 My emphasis. Poirier 2006: 15-17 and 220-221. 
2 1 2 Ibid.: 16. 
2 1 3 Ibid.: 221. 
2 1 4 Janssens 1978: 62. 
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ads find a parallel in the Apocryphon of John (II, 5:6-9), in which they are 
ascribed to the figure of Barbelo - the divine Pronoia. However, as Poirier 
points out, in TriPro: "il s'agit de trois triple réalités que possède ( o y N r e q 
HM&Y) le son venu à l'existence à partir de la pensée de la Protennoia." 2 1 5 In 
this way they are to be seen as aspects or emanations of the First Thought, 
who is then the actual possessor of every triad presented so far: Sound -
Voice - Word; Father - Mother - Son; three masculinities; three powers; 
three names; and three quadrangles. All this, combined with the parallel 
with the tripartite nature of Barbelo in the Apocryphon of John, points for-
ward to a passage in which Protennoia is identified with Barbelo (38*:9). 2 1 6 
I shall turn to that passage shortly. First, however, it is important to empha-
size that after this complex portrayal of the different ways in which 
Protennoia may be described as threefold, the passage is rounded off by 
recalling the placement of these qualities within the Silence of the ineffable 
One. 
After a description of the glorification of the Son (or maybe the creation 
of the Christ cf. 37*:31 in the lacuna) the text turns to give a precise expla-
nation of how we are to understand the identity of Protennoia. This is 
brought about by giving an account of the creation of the aeons by the Son. 
In fact, the short passage concerning the nature of Protennoia interrupts a 
longer narrative about the creation of the Four Light Aeons, which eventu-
ally leads to the creation of the visible world. Through this small detour, 
the reader is reminded that the Protennoia the text is talking about is actual-
ly Barbelo. 
38*:7-16 
^qfMCDN ΗΠίωΤ* NMCDN Τ Η ρ ο γ 6Τβ[>] 
Ηοκ ne nMeeye ΗΠΙΟΤΓ ïïxnpcDTeN 
now βτβπΜ n e B^PBHXCD n e o o y 6ΤΧ[ΗΚ] 
6Βθλ aofCD π ^ τ Ν ^ γ epoq eqgHn N^TO)[iTq] 
&NOK ne oiKCDH ΗΠΠΝΧ Ν&ΤΝ&Υ epo[q] 
NTMITHpq .2U<HK(DN 6Β0λ £ΙΤΟΟΤ 
^γω τ η ^ Υ n o y o e m e u\\ eNTè,CKA^q 
eqoei: ûn^poeNoc t m β τ ο γ Η ο γ τ [ 6 ] 
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epoc xe Meipooe^ τοτβ ïï^Tre^oc π£ρ[ο] 
Ογ Ν^Τ6Μ^£Τ6 HHOq- ^γ<Τ> ÏÏèOXÇlfq 
He produced the aeons to the Father of all the aeons, 
who am I, the Thought of the Father, the Protennoia, 
that is, Barbelo, the per[fect] glory 
and the invisible, hidden, immea[surable]. 
It is I who am the image of the Invisible Spirit 
and it is through me that the All received image, 
and the Mother, the Light, this which she has appointed 
being Virgin, she who is calle[d] Meirothea, the incomprehensible womb, 
the unrestrainable and immeasurable [So]und. 
In this passage TriPro briefly returns to the "I am"-style. It is clear that 
Protennoia, the Thought of the Father, is identical with Barbelo. This is ex-
pressed through one of the many examples of the ere u\\ n e construction, 
which is distinctive for TriPro.211 Protennoia's relation to the Invisible 
Spirit is reaffirmed, and her role as Mother and a "wisdom-like co-creator" 
from whom the All receives its image is supplemented with the identifica-
tion of her with Meirothea (Heipooe^). Meirothea is known from other, 
primarily "Sethian", sources, in which her androgynous nature is in 
focus. 2 1 8 In the Holy Book of the Great Invisible Spirit/ the Gospel of the 
Egyptians (NHC III, 49:1-16) and Zostrianos (NHC VIII, 6:30) she is the 
mother of Adamas.2 1 9According to Turner, "Meirothea" may likely mean 
"divine anointed one" (μυρο-θεός) instead of the usual "destiny god/godess 
(μοιρο-θεός)" and "seems to be essentially androgynous, designating not 
only the mother of the divine Adam Pigeradamas, but the divine 
Pigeradamas himself; (s)he is simultaneously father, mother and off­
spring." 2 2 0 In TriPro Meirothea is identified with Barbelo herself, the divine 
First Thought of the Father. The nature of Barbelo is accordingly 
characterized as being androgynous, in that she is usually called the 
Mother-Father.2 2 1 The androgynous nature of Protennoia may be of some 
Poirier emphasizes this feature. See Poirier 2006: 73-78. 
2 1 8 In the Three Steles of Seth (NHC VII, 119:11-12) she is called both the fern. 
Mirothea and the masc. Mirothos. 
2 1 9 Turner 2001: 211. 
2 2 0 Loc.cit. 
2 2 1 See for instance the Apocryphon of John (II, 5:7). 
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importance, since the shifts between her appearances in the likeness of a 
female and a male respectively is written out rather clearly in the text 
(42*:4-25). In my opinion these clear shifts emphasize both Protennoia's 
identity as Barbelo and also her different modes of manifestation as Sound 
(masc), Voice (fern.) and Word (masc). In 45*:2-12 Protennoia even pro­
claims to be androgynous (\ηοκ ογ£θογτΰ£ΐΜ6 ^NOK ο γ Μ ^ γ ζ,ηοκ 
ογβιωτ) at the same time as Meirothea is mentioned once more. 
Now, this description of Protennoia as Barbelo and Meirothea is com­
bined with her identification with the Sound. With regard to the linguistic 
manifestation of Protennoia, it is noteworthy that this passage, in describ­
ing the nature of Protennoia in relation to the Invisible Spirit, is replete 
with apophatic terminology. Thus, we find a wide palette of things which 
describe her negatively: invisible, hidden, immeasurable, incomprehensi­
ble, and as Sound she is unrestrainable and immeasurable. The Sound being 
the first level of her linguistic manifestations within the sensible world, it is 
still inarticulate and thus both unrestrainable and immeasurable by the hu­
man mind. 
So far so good. After this breathtaking exposition of Protennoia, the text 
picks up the thread about the Son, who is now also called the "Perfect Son" 
(nreXeioc NcpHpe) (38*:22). The passage 38*: 16-39*: 13 kickstarts a longer 
théogonie and cosmogonie narration which runs until 40*7 and which con-
stitutes the actual reason for the descent of Protennoia. 
First of all, the text describes how the Perfect Son reveals himself to his 
aeons. Then he reveals, glorifies and enthrones them. He himself is also 
glorified, both by himself and his aeons. In 38*:22 it is stated for the first 
time that the Son is "the Christ, the god who came into existence alone" 
(nexc πΝογτ6 u\\ eNT&qqpcDne o y ^ T q ) (my emphasis). The aeons glorify 
him by saying or chanting that he is. He is the son of God, the Aeon of Ae­
ons and more. Unfortunately the text continues into a lacuna at the bottom 
of page 38*. However, it is quite easy to reconstruct at least some of the 
content, since it is thematically bound up with what is developed at the top 
of page 39*. It deals with the "establishment" (τβ£θ), that is, the creation, 
of the aeons of the Son. The names and organization of his aeons are well-
known from other "Sethian" tractates such as the Apocryphon of John, the 
Holy Book of the Great Invisible Spirit/Gospel of the Egyptians et al., al­
though they vary a bit from one to another. In TriPro the record of the four 
aeons of the Son only contains three names each, which differ from other 
"Sethian" texts that have four names attached to each aeon. The names 
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Armozel, Oroial, Daveithai and Eleleth must be considered to be the main 
names of the four aeons, since they are the only names given to the corre-
sponding aeons in the Apocryphon of John.222 This is also stressed by the 
next passage, which begins in 39*: 13 where the narrative narrows down to 
the last of the four aeons: Eleleth. 
Eleleth is now called the "great Light", which is also an epithet he re-
ceives in the Apocryphon of John. Eleleth is important because it is from 
him the famous "fall of Sophia" takes place. In TriPro the myth of Sophia 
is not spelled out, but it is definitely presupposed in the text by the allu-
sions given in the passage 39*:13-40*:7. The passage narrates how a word 
(Xoroc) that comes forth from Eleleth boasts that he is King and asks who 
belongs to Chaos and to the Underworld. This saying results in the forma-
tion of the great Demon who reigns over the Underworld and Chaos and 
who is called "Saklas", "Samael" or "Yaltabaoth". This is where the reader 
is reminded of the myth of Sophia, since Yaltabaoth is "he who had taken 
power, who had snatched it away from the innocent one" (39*:28-29). The 
"innocent one" is Sophia, as becomes clear in 40*: 15. 
I shall pause for a moment to consider the meaning of this account of 
the "fall of Sophia", which does not seem to imply a fall at all. Several 
things are interesting with regard to this passage. First of all it appears 
fairly striking that in a text like TriPro, in which the linguistic theme is so 
essential, we meet a description of a word (Xoroc) coming forth from 
Eleleth, a word which is not to be mistaken for the manifestation of Proten-
noia as Word. 2 2 3 Rather, it seems to cause the creation of Yaltabaoth. Ac-
cordingly, the boasting of the word recalls the boasting of Yaldabaoth in 
the Apocryphon of John (II, 1L19-21) 2 2 4 . But if the logos coming forth 
from Eleleth is applied to Yaltabaoth, why does TriPro employ a similar 
term for one of Protennoia's manifestations? The two logoi are surely not 
identical, but how, then, are we to understand the logos from Eleleth? Poir-
ier draws attention to a similar passage in the Holy Book of the Great Invis-
ible Spirit (III, 56:22-24) on the installation of the King of Chaos, which 
comes about by a saying of the Great Light Eleleth. However, the con-
text shows that this saying is accompanied by sayings of another Great 
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Light: Oroiael. So, even though TriPro is close to the narrative found in the 
Holy Book of the Great Invisible Spirit, its focus is different. TriPro seems 
to care much for the innocence of Sophia, and one way of removing the 
guilt from Sophia is to let the aeon in which she resides to begin with (at 
least according to the Apocryphon of John) be responsible for the creation 
of the great demon and with him also of the visible world. On the other 
hand the logos of Eleleth may also signify the importance of another inter­
esting feature of this particular passage, namely the role of Epinoia in 
TriPro. 
I have already touched above upon the role of Epinoia in TriPro as the 
"inferior" aspect of Protennoia, the life-giving element that makes the 
world move. In the present context it is another aspect of Epinoia which is 
in focus, namely the reflection-providing element. The text describes how 
the word that comes forth from Eleleth has a light which is manifested and 
is endowed with Epinoia: "and at that moment his light appeared radiant 
endowed with Epinoia" (^γω κ τ ο γ Ν ο γ 6ΤΜΜ&γ ^ n q o y o e m e ογα>Ν£ βΒΟλ 
eqnpptCDoy eyÏÏT^q HM&Y NTeniNOlèw) (39*: 17-19). This logos which has 
Epinoia within it is the part that was snatched away from the "Innocent 
One" and which makes Yaltabaoth capable of creating the world according 
to the "real" aeons (40*:4-8); even though he "creates them out of his own 
power", he needs the divine logos/Epinoia to show him a model. Thus, the 
logos of Eleleth is not to be understood as being equivalent to the manifes-
tation of Protennoia, but rather as the ability that follows with the possesion 
of the divine Epinoia: the ability for reflection, that is, for knowing and un-
derstanding connections in the world. 2 2 6 In 39*:28-32 it is said explicitly 
that Epinoia is the Power that was stolen: 
Ubd ÏÏTMJXI Νθγ<50Η NTMJTCDpiT 
MMOC HTOOTC Ν - ^ τ π β ο ο ο γ NT^qxpo e 
POC ΝφΟρΠ* 6T6Tà.t Τ6 Τ6ΠΙΝΟΙ^' ΗΠΟγ 
oeiNe NTô,cei &Π[ΙΤΝ] Tro^qei eso\ M 
HOC Χ Ν Ν φ θ [ ρ ] π 
This one (Yaltabaoth) who has taken a power which he had 
stolen from this innocent one, which he had conquered 
From a Stoic point of view this could be seen as an equivalent to the all-pervading 
Logos/Pneuma. Cf. Colpe 1974: 119 and Turner 2000b [1990]: 374. 
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at first, that is, the Epinoia of the 
light who descended, her from whom 
he had come forth from the beginning. 
Here it seems as if Epinoia is identified with the Innocent One, who is iden-
tified as Sophia in 40*: 15 and in 47*:33-34 (if the reconstruction is cor-
rect). Moreover, since the innocent Sophia is described as the one who de-
scended and who was conquered (40*: 15-16), it would seem that in the 
present passage the identities of these two female figures are somewhat 
mixed up. That is how this passage has been understood by modern schol-
ars, for instance Turner, who writes: 
However, see 39*.29-30, where (Eleleth's) έπίνοια is virtually identified 
with "the innocent one", who is Sophia (40*, 15). This reference, in con­
junction with 39*, 31-32, constitutes an implicit claim that Sophia is the 
innocent creator of Yaltabaoth. 2 2 7 
Poirier agrees with this mutual identification2 2 8 and compares it with a 
mention of the "Sophia of Epinoia" in the long version of the Apocryphon 
of John (II, 9:25): TCO<|>I^ wreniNOi^. 2 2 9 The context of this single instance 
is that of the fatal decision of Sophia to make something for herself, which 
results in the creation of Yaltabaoth. 
There is no doubt that Epinoia and Sophia are tightly connected to one 
another, just as there is no doubt that TriPro is rather unclear about the 
exact relation between them - whether they are one or separated. However, 
the overall impression remains that they are separate beings: Sophia as the 
innocent creator of Yaltabaoth, who somehow descended (the text does not 
tell us how), and Epinoia as the inferior aspect of Protennoia as well as the 
power that was stolen from Sophia when she was conquered. This power, 
the Epinoia, is the reason for the descent of Protennoia, since she has come 
for the sake of her "part" that was in that place when Sophia was con­
quered. Now, the above passage is usually read as referring only to one en­
tity, namley Epinoia; however, I suggest that the passage may be under­
stood as referring to both Epinoia and Sophia. Firstly, the passage talks 
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about Yaltabaoth who has stolen a power from the Innocent One. As has 
been shown, the Innocent One can be no other than Sophia. The power 
which was stolen I understand as Epinoia, the part of Protennoia for the 
sake of which she has come. Thus, the mention of Epinoia (ετβτ^ϊ τβ 
TeniNOiv ΗπογοβίΝβ) refers back to the power ( ο γ σ ο Η ) and the relative 
WT^cei MI[ITN] (who descended) refers to the Innocent One/Sophia, who is 
also the one from whom he came forth from the beginning. This 
interpretation may be forcing the Coptic text in an impossible direction, but 
if the text does allow us to see two different persons, the passage fits far 
better into the overall picture of these characters given in TriPro. 
This variant of the classic myth of Sophia and the birth of her ignorant 
offspring, Yaltabaoth, ends with his production of the lower aons. Then 
TriPro has established the basis for its main issue: the account of the de­
scent of Protennoia. 
40*:8-42*:2 is the last passage of the first main part of TriPro. In con­
tinuation on the part of the narrative the text now blends in "I am"-
proclamations of Protennoia. The creation of the lower aeons is the primary 
motivation for the first descent of Protennoia, which is described in this 
passage. She descends by revealing herself as Sound, telling why she has 
come: for the sake of her part (Hepoc) , that is, her Epinoia, which was 
snatched away from the innocent Sophia. The Sound of Protennoia disturbs 
everyone in the "house of the ignorant light", that is, the Underworld and 
the Abyss trembles. The "Archigenetor of Ignorance", who reigns over 
Chaos and the Underworld is Yaltabaoth. He produces a man whose power 
Yaltabaoth does not know, since he is produced in the likeness of the de­
scended Protennoia. 
From 40*29-42*:2 Protennoia again recounts her descent into Chaos. 
This time the reader is given a very detailed description of the soteriologi-
cal aim of her descent. Through 1 s t person narrative and a few "I am"-
proclamations Protennoia tells that she has come to be with "her own", that 
is, "the Sons of the Light" (Ncpvipe MnoyoeiN) (41*:1), whom she empowers 
and shapes. She tells them (as their Father) a mystery (HYCTHPION) about 
her saving act: through the destruction of the gates and walls of darkness, 
she saves them from the chains of the Demons. She nullifies all the evil 
powers in order to let the Sons of the Light enter into the place where they 
were at first. Protennoia repeats that she is the first who descended (41*:20) 
because of her part (Mepoc), which is now referred to as the Spirit (nÏÏMà): 
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It is I who descended at first 
because of my part that remains, that is, 
the Spirit, which dwells in the soul, that came 
into being from the water of life and from 
the washing by the mysteries. I spoke, 
I, with the archons and the powers, 
for I descended below their 
language and I spoke my mysteries to my 
own, a hidden mystery . They were 
released from the bonds and eternal oblivion. 
Protennoia descends because of her part that remains. This part has earlier 
been identified with the Epinoia as the part/power that was stolen from the 
Innocent One by Yaltabaoth. In this passage the part of Protennoia is iden-
tified with the Spirit, which corresponds to a passage on page 47*:31-34. 
There the relations between Protennoia, her part (Epinoia/Spirit) and So-
phia are reaffirmed. But how come Epinoia is now identified with the Spir-
it? As Poirier notices, it is important not to confuse this Spirit which dwells 
in the soul with either the Invisible Spirit (37*:33 and 38*: 11) or the Holy 
Spirit (45*:29). Rather, it is simply a variant term for the part of Protennoia 
that dwells within the soul, namely: Epinoia. 2 3 0 However, I would like to 
point to fact that the beginning of TriPro describes Epinoia as the life-
giving element that moves in every creature. This may be understood as an 
2 3 0 Poirier 2006: 283. 
41*:20-29 
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equivalent to the all-pervading Stoic πνεύμα. 2 3 1 Moreover, the comparison 
with Stoic thought may be continued with regard to the way in which 
TriPro describes the Spirit as dwelling within the soul (ΐγχνι). For, 
according to Sandbach, the Stoic conception of the soul of Man was 
understood as a physical breath (πνεύμα) "which gives a man life and 
reason". 2 3 2 Without concluding that TriPro adopts the Stoic 
conceptualization of the soul and the life-and-reason-giving spirit within, I 
believe that the resemblance is striking. The Epinoia in TriPro has the same 
functions as the Stoic spirit, in that she gives life by moving at the same 
time as she herself dwells within the soul Man, being his ability for 
reflection and knowledge. The similarity with the Stoic material comes to 
an end when TriPro describes how the spirit came into being from the 
water of life and the washing by the mysteries, which clearly refers to the 
entering or awakening of the mind (or the faculty of reason) of the human 
being at baptism. 
41*:26 ff. is especially interesting in relation to the linguistic manifesta­
tion of Protennoia, since she states that she descends below the language of 
the Archons and Authorities to tell the mystery to "her own". The text ap­
pears a bit confusing in that Protennoia to begin with states that she spoke 
to the archons and powers whereupon she descended below their language 
to speak to her own about the mysteries. Because of the r^p, it seems as if 
her descent below their language is caused by the fact that she spoke to the 
archons. However, later in the text it is explicitely said that the powers did 
not recognize either the Sound or the Voice of Protennoia (cf 44*:2-12) 
when she descended. In my view this is to be understood as follows. On her 
way down, so to speak, Protennoia passes by the archons and powers who 
rule the visible world. She speaks to them because she descends linguisti­
cally. Thus, passing by the level of the archons, Protennoia is already mani­
fest as Sound; however, as will become apparent later, they do not under­
stand the content of that Sound. Moreover, the uncomprehension of the ar­
chons may also be due to the fact that the mystery which Protennoia speaks 
to "her own", that is the Sons of the Light", is a hidden mystery. Poirier 
interprets that Protennoia's descent "jusqu'au plus profond" of the lan­
guage of the archons signifies what he with Sevrin calls an example of "la 
1 Cf. for instance Sandbach 1989 [1975]: 73. 
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Polymorphie de Protennoia". 2 3 3 This means that by speaking with the ar-
chons Protennoia also changes herself into their appearance, which makes 
her able to cheat them and thus loosen the chains of "her own". 2 3 4 
The first part of TriPro ends with Protennoia bearing fruit among "her 
own", that is, the Thought of the unchanging aeon. In Protennoia they be­
come Lights (42*: 1). This may indicate that the Sons of the Light, in con­
trast to the archons and powers, do understand her message. In the second 
part of the text the content of Protennoia's message becomes clearer. 
Second part: On Fate 
The second main part of TriPro runs from 42*:4 through 46*:4. There is 
consensus about reconstructing the title of this part as [Π^Τ£ΙΜ^]ΡΜ6ΝΗ [Β] 
(46*:4). This title stands out from the remaining two since it has nothing to 
do with the identity of Protennoia, but rather with the contents of this par­
ticular part of the text, that is, the mysteries that Protennoia reveals. It deals 
with the constitution of the visible world, how it is governed by Fate 
(giM^pMeuvi), as well as the reaction of the archons to Protennoia's descent. 
These mysteries lead to an invitation to enter into the Light which involves 
baptism. I shall begin by analyzing the very introduction of this part, since 
it adds several details to the linguistic theme of the text. 
42*:4-18 
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e ine Mei Λ 6 H n H ^ c e n CN^Y ΜΠΟΜΟΤ 
Ηογο£ΐΜ6 ^γω \\Q)bJK.e NMM^Y 
It is I who am the Sound that appeared through 
my Thought, for it is I who am the (masc.) syzygetic one, 
since I am called the Thought of the Invisible One. 
Since I am called the unchanging Voice. I am 
called the (fern.) syzygetic one. I am one, being 
undefiled. It is I who am the Mother [of] 
the Sound, speaking in many ways, completing 
the All. It is in me that knowledge exists, 
the knowledge of <those who> have no end. It is I, [who] 
speak within every creature and I was known 
by the All. It is I who give 
the Voice of the Sound to the ears of those 
who have known me, that is, the Sons of the Light. 
Now I have come for the second time in the form 
of a woman and I have spoken with them. 
As the first part of TriPro began with a passage of self-proclamations, so 
does this second part. Here we find a confirmation of the sequence of lin­
guistic manifestations of Protennoia beginning with a repetition of the na­
ture of the Sound as originating from the Thought. The androgynous nature 
and "plural unity" of Protennoia are emphasized by the dictum that she is 
called "he who is syzygetic" and "she who is syzygetic". These few lines 
are arranged chiastically, so that the two times Protennoia proclaims herself 
to be syzygetic enclose the sayings concerning her identity as Thought and 
Voice. Protennoia appears in several ways throughout the text. However, in 
this passage her unity is stressed both by the characterization of her as "sy­
zygetic" (gOTpe) and as "one" (oyïe). In my view this exemplifies 
Protennoia's diairetic mode of manifestation. As has been shown, she fol-
lows the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression as a scheme for her descent, 
and since the Stoic sequence is, in fact, a definition by division (diairesis) 
of φωνή, Protennoia's descent must be considered a sort of "divine 
diairesis". The method of diairesis is characterised by showing the plurali­
ty of a single unity, a concept. I have already emphasized this several 
times. In the analysis of Thunder, it will become an even more important 
theme. 
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Now, this passage functions as an introduction to Protennoia's second 
descent, which is announced in 42*: 17-18, this time in the form of a wom­
an, a point that may refer to the gender of CHH (fern.). On the other hand 
Protennoia begins this second main part by proclaiming that she is the 
Sound. So, as mentioned before, the three descents of Protennoia as Sound, 
Voice and Word do not logically follow the three main parts of TriPro. 
Thus, in this second part Protennoia appears as both Sound and Voice. An­
yhow, this introduction strongly emphasizes the linguistic mode of mani­
festation of Protennoia, since she is the Mother of the Sound, that is, it is 
from her as Thought that the Sound is issued. It follows, of course, that the 
following emanations of that Sound - the Voice and the Word - also origi­
nate in the Thought of the Invisible One. Being Sound, Protennoia pro­
claims to be speaking in many ways. This corresponds to the way the fe­
male revealer in Thunder proclaims: "It is I who am the Voice whose 
Sound is manifold" (^NOK ne TGCHH ere N^cpe nec^pooy) (14:12-13). In 
both texts this refers to the various modes of linguistic manifestations. 
Moreover, Protennoia makes the intention behind her descent clear: to 
inspire with knowledge, since it is in her that knowledge exists. 2 3 5 Her mes­
sage is first and foremost intended for "her own", that is, the Sons of the 
Light, to whom she descended, bypassing the achons and powers. There­
fore she gives the Voice of her Sound to them, and they understand it in 
contrast to the archons. Protennoia is at this point manifest as both Sound 
and Voice and it is rather important to notice that the Sons of the Light are, 
in fact, able to understand her message. For if we again compare with the 
Stoic sequence of a verbal expression, the manifestation of Protennoia as 
the Voice of the Sound (TCMH Ιϊπ^ροογ) has now reached the level of artic-
ulateness, in that "Voice" corresponds to the Stoic level of λέξις, which is 
articulate though unintelligible. The intelligibility comes with her appear­
ance as Word (Logos). However, from the passages that follow it seems 
obvious that her message is being understood, though only by the Sons of 
the Light. Perhaps we see here a tendency towards a graduation of the re­
ceivers of Protennoia's manifestation, since at this level of Sound and 
Voice she only addresses her speech among "her own". 
Now, in her second descent, Protennoia proclaims that she has come "in 
the form of a woman" (MTICMOT ïïoyc^iMe) to tell them (the Sons of the 
Light) a mystery which is about the coming end of the aeon, about the 
Cf. also TriPro 36*:9-27. 
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changeless aeon to come, and a mystery of this particular aeon. At the bot­
tom of page 42* and at the top of page 43*, Protennoia explains how this 
aeon is run by hours and months, that is, time and Fate (£IM^PM6NH). All 
this leads to a longer narrative passage (43*:4-44*:29) about the Authori­
ties and Powers of the Underworld and their reaction to the descent of 
Protennoia, which to them sounds as thunder: 
43*:13-21 
And the lots of Fate together with those who measure the 
houses were very much disturbed over 
a great thunder and the thrones of 
the Powers were disturbed, since they were overturned and their 
King was afraid and those who pursue Fate 
gave their number of visits to the path and 
they said to the Powers "what is this disturbance 
and this shaking that has come upon us from 
a Sound (belonging) to the exalted Voice". 
Protennoia's descent causes great disturbance. Not only are the foundations 
of the Underworld shaken, the "lots of Fate" and "those who measure the 
houses" are also disturbed by a great thunder (ογ^ρογΜπβ). Through this 
description the text provides an image of the well-known and wide-spread 
conception of a divine manifestation being articulated as thunder. This 
theme is far more elaborated in Thunder, where it is combined with the no­
tion of the divine name. 2 3 6 That is not the case in TriPro, although, both 
Nag Hammdi texts employ the thunder phenomenon in relation to the lin-
2 3 6 This issue is dealt with in detail in the chapter on Thunder. 
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guistic manifestation of the divine. In my opinion this is a clear indication 
of how important the audibility of the manifestations is. These texts do not 
put focus on visions of the divine, rather it is what you experience with 
your ears that matters. 2 3 7 
The passage is part of a narrative section about the uncomprehension of 
the archons and powers. It is especially interesting that even though they 
only hear a thunder, that is, an inarticulate Sound, the content of which they 
do not understand, they do understand that this thunder is coming from 
above. This passage is followed by a rather amusing passage which de-
scribes how the powers decide to go up to the Archigenitor (Yaltabaoth) to 
ask him what this thunder is all about. The powers are obviously confused 
and express their frustration. I have chosen to bring the following extract 
from their speech: 
44*:2-12 
Behold, now [a] Sound has 
appeared [belonging]! to that inv[i]sible Voice 
of [the aeo]n which we do not know and 
we ourselves [we did not] know to whom we 
belong, for that So[u]nd which we heard 
is foreign to us and we do not know 
it. We did not know whence it was. It came, 
it put fear in our midst and relaxation in 
2 3 7 Recalling Turner's description of Protennoia's manifestation as a theophony instead 
of a theophany, Turner 2001: 153. 
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ed. 
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the members of our arms. Now, let 
us weep and mourn in great mourning 
In this short passage it is clear that the powers are aware of their own igno­
rance and this insight makes them miserable. They are frightened not only 
because of the terrifying thundering Sound, but also because their own 
comprehension of the world's constitution is suddenly put into question. 
They realize that the Voice comes from an aeon which they do not know 
and this makes them reflect about their own origin. In a passage in direct 
relation to this one, it is shown how even the Archegenetor does not know 
the Voice: "For behold, even he, the Archigenetor of our birth, because of 
whom we pride ourselves, he did not know this Voice." (6IC£HHTG r^p 
NTOq gCDCDq Π^ρΧΙΓ6Ν6Τ<Όρ ΗΠΝΧΠΟ ΘΤΝφΟΥφΟγ ÏÎMON GTBHTq HnqMM6 
eaxrjq ^+CHH) (44*:27-29). 
The following passage (44*:29-45*:2) stands in sharp contrast to the 
uncomprehending Powers of the Underworld. Now Protennoia, as the 
Voice of the Mother, speaks directly to the "Sons of the Thought" in a se-
cond-person imperative: "So now, listen to me, Sons of the Thought, to the 
Voice of the Mother of [your] mercy, for you have become worthy of the 
mystery..." ( τ β Ν ο γ <se CCDTM epoi ΝφΗρβ H n H e e y e ^TCMH N T H ^ Y 
Μ Π 6 Τ [ Ν ] Ν ^ 6 Λ 6 Ν Τ 0 3 Τ Ν 6 r^p ^ τ β τ κ ρ Η Π φ ^ ΜΠΜΥΟΤ[Η]ΡΙΟΝ...) (44*:29-32). 
Since the Sons of the Thought are worthy of the mystery, they must be able 
to understand. The term "Sons of the Thought" has not been employed in 
TriPro before this point. Earlier the term that was used for Protennoia's 
elected people was "Sons of the Light". 2 3 8 However, the two expressions 
may be considered synonymous, in that both labels seem to cover the same 
group of people to whom Protennoia descends. They are "those who have 
known" her (42*:15-16), which is repeated below (45^:11-12), and "those 
who are worthy in the Thought of my changeless aeon" (42*:26-27). 2 3 9 The 
invocation of the Sons of the Thought has correctly been compared to the 
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way in which the Jewish Wisdom calls to her sons in Proverbs 7:24 "Now, 
my sons listen to me". 2 4 0 
Although parts of her talk is hidden from us in the lacuna, Protennoia 
clearly tells them of the end of this aeon and maybe of the coming aeon. 
Through a short insertion of "I am"-sayings in the direct speech of 
Protennoia, the reader is reminded of who we are dealing with: the androg-
ynous one, the Mother and the Father and Meirotheia, the glory of the 
Mother, she who casts a "Sounded Voice" (oycHH ïïgpooy) into the ears of 
those who know her (45*:9-12). This last reference to Protennoia's linguis-
tic descents is placed right before she issues a direct invitation to enter into 
the perfect Light. It is, in my opinion, not by coincidence that the reader is 
reminded here of the linguistic manifestation of the divine Thought, as an 
introduction to what is, in fact, a baptism scene. For it is through her Sound 
and Voice that the Sons of the Light/Thought may understand where they 
belong in contrast with the powers. Moreover, it is through baptism that 
Protennoia completes her mission, which is to set free her "part'Vthe 
Spirit/Epinoia that was stolen from the Innocent One (Sophia). Thus, Pro-
tennoia also calls herself the one "who completes the All" (^NOK ne πχωκ 
βΒΟλ MnTHpq) (45*:9), that is, she brings back the missing part. 
In the passage on baptism that follows, the text returns to the second-
person narrative (45*: 12-20). Protennoia invites the "you" into the exalted, 
perfect Light, where they will be glorified, enthroned, given robes and bap­
tized. Then they will be as glorious as they once were. 2 4 1 
The last passage of this second main part of TriPro is again a first-
person narrative. This time Protennoia explains how she gives shape to the 
All and changed their forms until the All will receive a form. From 
Protennoia originated the Sound and she puts both breath and the Holy 
Spirit in them. As Poirier notices, this final saying about the Sound origi­
nating in Protennoia forms an inclusion with the self-proclamation which 
marks out the beginning of the second main part of TriPro: "It is I who am 
the Sound that appeared through my Thought" (42*:4-5). 2 4 2 
Linguistic Manifestations of Divine Thought 
Γη the translation which follows, I have left the Xoroc untranslated despite the fact 
that I render it "Word" or "Discourse" in the analysis. 
98 
In 45*:32-33 Protennoia ascends to her "branch" and sits there together 
with the Sons of the Light. The end of the second part is unfortunately dete­
riorated at the top of page 46*. 
Third part: the Discourse of the Manifestation 
The third and last part of TriPro (46*:5-50*:21) is mainly reserved for the 
manifestation of Protennoia as Word. It begins as follows: 
46*:5-33 2 4 3 
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TOC Π6 6ΒΟλ £lTOOTC NTCMH NTeCYTU 
nooyq ^poyoeiu ^ηετφοοπ £ΜΠΚ[^ 
K]e 
It is I who am the [Log]os who exist[s in the] ineffable 
[Light] exi[s]ting in [ ] 
undefiled and a Thought re[vealed itself] 
perceptible through [a great] 
Voice of the Mother, since a male offspring [ ] 
supports me, and it (fern.) exists from the begin[ning] 
in the foundation of the All. But there is a Light [that] 
exists hidden in Silence it was first to [come], 
but she alone exists as Silence. 
It is I alone, who am the Logos, ineffable, 
undefiled, immeasurable, inconceivable. 
It is a hidden Light who gives a fruit of 
life, pouring forth a water of life 
from the invisible, undefiled, immeasurable 
spring, that is, the Sound of the glory 
of the Mother, unrepeatable, the glory of the offspring 
of God, a male virgin (issued) from 
a hidden intellect, that is, 
the Silence hidden from the All, being unrepeatable, 
an immeasurable Light, the source of the A[l]l, 
the root of the entire Aeon. It is the basis that supports 
every movement of the Aeons that 
belong to the mighty glory. It is the foundation of 
every b[a]se. It is the breath of the Powers. It is the eye 
of the three permanences. She is Sound 
through a Thought and a Logos 
through the Voice who was sent 
to illumine those who exist in the dar[kn]ess 
Protennoia is now manifest as Word and in this introductory passage to the 
third main part of TriPro the relation between the different linguistic as­
pects of Protennoia is explained. Unfortunately the first third of the passage 
misses some words towards the end of the line, which makes it harder to 
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read. However, it is possible to follow the general lines of what is stated 
here. 
The beginning of the passage places the Word in relation to the previous 
aspects of Protennoia, recalling the location of Protennoia before her de-
scents into the visible world. Thus, the text begins by placing the Word in 
relation to the Light, which is further ahead in the passage said to reside 
within the Silence. In this Silence exists the Thought which reveals itself 
perceptibly as Sound and Voice. This recalls earlier passages, especially 
36*: 12-14 in which Protennoia proclaims herself to be "perception" and 
"knowledge". 2 4 4 By repeating of the former manifestations of Protennoia 
and her source of origin, the text has prepared the reader for her final mani-
festation as Word. First, however, TriPro emphasizes Protennoia's identity 
and existence as Silence from which the Light proceeds. As Poirier notices, 
the Light plays a decisive role in this passage, since "ce Logos est lumière 
et il est envoyé pour illuminer ceux qui sont dans les ténèbres." 2 4 5 Lines 9-
10 may cause some confusion, in that it is stated that she (that is, the 
Mother) alone exists as Silence whereas the first-person who speaks is the 
Word. It might seem as if there were two different persons involved. How-
ever, that is not the case. For Protennoia is one, she just appears in different 
aspects, which may eventually have different genders (cf. the sayings in 
lines 5 and 16-17). I would argue, with Poirier, that the reason for the op-
position in lines 12-13 "doit être que la procession de la Protennoia comme 
Logos n'annihile pas son existence commme silence." 2 4 6 
TriPro now combines the theme of water and fructification with the 
coming of Logos the Light. This clearly alludes to the theme of baptism, 
which has already been introduced in the second main part of TriPro. Here 
it is underlined that this last manifestation of Protennoia is also a source of 
life and salvation. Both Sevrin and Poirier understand these life-giving el-
ements as the providers of gnosis. 2 4 7 I read this role of the Word with re-
gard to the provision of the life-giving elements as a reaffirmation of the 
unity of all the manifestations of Protennoia, since in the following lines 
15-25 this statement about the Word is placed in the context of the very 
source of the All. In this way the reader understands that every manifesta-
tion of Protennoia, even this last one as Word, has a single origin, which is 
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in the Silence. The passage alludes strongly to the beginning of the entire 
text, in which it was described how Protennoia as the life of her Epinoia 
exists within every movement in the creation (35*:12ff). Moreover, the 
repetition continues in line 29 with a mentioning of the three permanences 
(HOUH), which in its previous occurence (in 37*:21-22) was understood as 
the three modes of being of the Sound as Father, Mother, and Son. In fact, 
the present passage follows the line of thought from this much earlier pres­
entation of the different manifestations of Protennoia, since the next few 
lines recapture the interrelation between her linguistic identities. She is 
Sound through a Thought and a Logos through the Voice. Thus, in this in­
troduction to the third main part of TriPro the author establishes the posi­
tion of the Word in relation to the other manifestations of Protennoia and 
confirms her line of linguistic descent, which now appears as follows: 
κ^ρω^ - Meeye - £pooy - CHH - Xoroc 
Silence -Thought - Sound - Voice - Word/Discourse 
I have argued from the beginning that this sequence corresponds to the 
Stoic sequence of a verbal expression. This implies that the descent of Pro­
tennoia must be understood as a movement from the inarticulate Sound, 
over the articulate, but unintelligible Voice, to the articulate and fully intel­
ligible Word/Discouse. Protennoia has, thus, reached her final level of 
manifestation as the rational Logos. To the Stoics the Logos constituted the 
highest semantic level in a verbal expression. It could not be more exalted 
than the Logos. However, even though TriPro employs the Stoic scheme as 
a model for describing the descent of Protennoia, it is important to ac­
knowledge that she descends from above, which means that the highest 
level of Protennoia must lie within the Silence. In this way the Stoic theory 
is used in TriPro in a way that turns it "upside-down". This needs some 
explanation, since the issue can be approached from at least two different 
perspectives. 
From the perspective of Protennoia herself the Logos is, as already indi­
cated, the last and the lowest level of her manifestation. This is the aspect 
of her which descends into the darkness to illumine those who exist there 
(cf. line 32-33 in the above passage). In her previous descents she has been 
neither fully articulate nor fully intelligible. That became apparent as she 
descended past the archons and powers, who did not understand her mes­
sage. Some, however, did understand her, namely the Sons of the Light. As 
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Word Protennoia becomes perceptible even to those trapped in the darkness 
of Chaos. It follows that from the perspective of the receivers of her revela-
tion, who at the level of Logos must be considered to be the Sons of Man, 
the mortal brethren of Protennoia, 2 4 8 she constitutes the semantic level that 
they are able to comprehend. Thus, to them the Logos must appear as the 
highest semantic level. Meanwhile, as will become apparent, through the 
baptism of the Five Seals they will eventually enter into the Light in the 
Silence. 
The text continues into a series of exhortations to the hearers to listen. 
Unfortunately, the beginning of Protennoia's speech is lost in the lacuna. 
However, from the beginning of page 47* the exhortations are turned into a 
first-person narrative in which Protennoia again recalls her previous de-
scents. From the top of page 47* in the lacuna until line 11 it seems likely 
that the text is talking about the first descent because of the reference to the 
teaching of the mystery through the Sound. The Sound exists in the Perfect 
Mind (NOYC ïïreXeioc), which naturally constitutes a clear parallel to the 
title of Thunder. Poirier acknowledges this, but understands the expression 
as an adverb, translating "Je les ai instruits des mystères par le son qui est 
d'une manière parfaitement intelligible" (my emphasis). 2 4 9 Understood in 
this manner, the text emphazises the intelligibility of Protennoia's manifes-
tation as Sound. This holds true for the Sons of the Light, but, as I argued 
above, neither for the powers nor the Sons of Man. So, in one way the 
Sound is perfectly intelligible, and in another it is not. Poirier's understand-
ing of the expression is of course possible, and the "Perfect Mind" does not 
play the role of a separate entity in the text. Nevertheless, I have translated 
the saying in such a way that the Sound is understood as existing within the 
Perfect Mind. In this way it is seen as an alternative description for the In-
visible Spirit. 
Line 11-13 recall the second descent, in which Protennoia came in the 
Voice of her Sound ( n H ^ c e n CN^Y èd'ei £ÏÏT[CMH] Μπ^£ροογ). Thus, in line 
13 the reader is prepared for the third and final descent of Protennoia as 
Word. As such she reveals herself in their "tents" (CKHNH) as well as "in the 
Chapter 3: The Trimorphic Protennoia 
likeness of their image" (\e\ ο γ ο Ν ^ τ βΒΟλ £MneiNe NTOY^IKCDN), wearing 
their "garments" (£BCCD) (47*: 15-17). From lines 19-29 the reader is again 
reminded of the beginning of the text by the statement that Protennoia as 
Word exists within every level of the cosmos from angels and powers to 
movements in matter feyXH). The difference is, though, that at the begin­
ning of TriPro it was as the Epinoia that Protennoia moved everyone. Now 
it seems as if the Word has taken over that role. The interchangeablity of 
roles could very well be understood simply as an expression of different 
aspects of Protennoia. On the other hand, I think it is important that it is the 
Word as the third, final, and rational descent of Protennoia that is capable 
of illumining those who exist in matter. She has come to illumine them be­
cause of their ignorance, but it is exactly as the rational, fully articulate, 
and intelligible Logos that she can reach them. This is closely connected to 
the motivation of her descent in the first place, which is, very suitably, reit­
erated and further explained in the passage that follows (47*:29-48*:35). 
The reason for Protennoia's coming, and now as Word, is "the Spirit that 
remains in that which [descended], which came forth [from] the [innocent] 
Sophia" ( 6TB6 UUH\ ercoxn* z?bJ[\ N£HTq] n^i Trrc^qBCDK egp]^ï ïïr^qei 
βΒΟλ [£Μ]τςοφι^ ΰ[^τπ6θθογ]) (47*:32-34). In other words, Protennoia 
descends in order to save the Divine Spirit. As was shown above, that Spirit 
is the missing "part" of Protennoia, the Epinoia, which she has come to 
recollect by leading the "mortal" ones through the baptism of the Five 
Seals, which is described on page 48*. Epinoia constitutes the human abil­
ity for reflection and knowledge and therefore it is only proper that it is 
awakened by a divine linguistic manifestation as Logos/rational Discourse. 
Thus, I argue that the actual reason for the manifestation of Protennoia in 
linguistic terms is that her task is to awaken the rational faculty in Man, 
namely his (divine) ability for reflection - the Epinoia. 
In the baptismal scene Protennoia describes how she strips the "mortal" 
and "puts upon him a shining Light, that is, the knowledge of the Thought 
of the fatherhood" (|>ϊ]+ £iCDCDq woyoeiue e q n p p i œ o y eren^ï n e ncooyue 
HnHeeye Ν Τ Μ Ν Τ 6 ΐ ψ [ τ ] ) (48*: 13-14). She delivers him to those who give 
robes, the Baptists, those who enthrone and those who glorify. Those who 
"snatch away" do so and he is taken into the Light where he "receives the 
Five Seals from the Light of the Mother, Protennoia" (48*:31-32). Taking 
part in the mysteries he becomes a light in the Light. 
The first passage on page 49* returns to the "I am"-proclamations, now 
given in the mouth of Protennoia as Word. He reveals himself to various 
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beings in the cosmos as one of their own. That is why the Archons thought 
that he was their Christ. He reveals himself as the son of the Archigenetor. 
Among the Angels he is in their likeness and among the powers he is one 
of them. Thus, among the Sons of Man he is a Son of Man. Here he re-
mains hidden, only revealing himself to his "members" (MeXoc), explaining 
to them the ineffable ordinances of the Father. The next passage, which 
runs from 49*:26 through 50*: 12, explains what these ordinances are: 
namely the Five Seals. If one has them, he has "stripped off the garments of 
ignorance and put on a shining Light" (49*:30-32). 
Page 50* is the last page of the text. It is also very fragmented at the top, 
as are many other pages in the codex. What is special about this page, 
though, is the mention of Jesus, which happens only here in TriPro. In line 
12 Protennoia as Word states that she "puts on Jesus". 
The text ends with the message of Protennoia to the effect that she is un-
restrainable together with her "seed", which she places in the holy Light 
within the incomprehensible Silence. This final statement shows how the 
actual goal for the initiate is not the comprehension of the manifestation of 
Protennoia as Word, but rather the place from which she descended, that is 
the Silence. This again shows how the employment of the Stoic sequence 
of a verbal expression in TriPro is turned "upside-down". 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have investigated the use of linguistic terminology for the 
description of Protennoia's tripartite descent into the sensible world. 
I began by considering the state of the Codex XIII manuscript and espe-
cially its placement inside the covers of Codex VI. The latter of these con-
tains Thunder. Codex VI is a fairly diverse collection of texts, which makes 
it almost impossible to find features which might have been decisive for the 
selection of these particular tractates without the risk of generalizing too 
much. Thus, although our two Nag Hammadi texts were discovered within 
the same leather cover, and despite the fact that they share several charac-
teristics, I did not find a conclusive argument for the insertion of TriPro 
within the covers of Codex VI. However, the similarities between these 
texts remain interesting and worth investigating. 
In TriPro Protennoia describes her three descents into the sensible world 
as a linguistic movement starting from within the ineffable Silence, where 
she exists as the Thought of the Father. As the Thought enters into the sen-
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sible world it becomes hearable first as a Sound (£ροογ), then as Voice 
(CHH), and at last as the Word (Xoroc). Thus, TriPro expresses the divine 
manifestation in accordance with the progressive levels comprised in a ver­
bal expression. This particular way of describing a verbal expression was 
developed by the Stoics, and I have argued that TriPro adopts their specific 
mode of describing the verbal expression from within Thought as a move­
ment from the inarticulate, over the articulate yet unintelligible, to the ar­
ticulate and fully intelligible, which may be visualized as follows: 
διάνοια - φωνή - λέξις - λόγος 
Thought - Sound/Voice - Speech - Word/Discouse 
TriPro's equivalent appears as this: 
K^pœq - Heeye - £ροογ - CHH - Xoroc 
Silence -Thought - Sound - Voice - Word/Discourse 
Even though the terms are not easily translated one to one, I have argued 
that the Coptic terms correspond to the levels articulated in the Greek se­
quence. That is due to the importance of recognizing that we are dealing 
with a cluster of terms, and that this cluster expresses a particular move­
ment from inarticulate to articulate, and from unintelligible to intelligible. 
In this way the linguistic manifestation of Protennoia is understood as a 
movement from the inarticulate Sound, over the articulate, but unintelligi­
ble Voice, to the articulate and intelligible Word/rational Discourse. 
The Stoic sequence of a verbal expression is not used on a one-to-one 
scale in TriPro, for it is clear that in this much later text the Stoic theory 
has been integrated into a revelatory, mythological scenery that changes its 
original setting. For this reason, I regard the Stoic theory as constituting an 
underlying, dialectic, matrix in TriPro, which it does in several ancient au­
thors, if one thinks of the amount of texts which in one way or the other 
employ linguistic terminology, for instance in Philo and Augustine, just to 
mention a few. The specific way in which TriPro integrates this fairly 
common cluster of linguistic terms is, however, by turning it "upside-
down". For whereas the highest semantic level in the Stoic sequence lies in 
the rational discourse, the Logos, it is the other way round in TriPro. There 
the highest semantic level is located within the Silence, since that is the 
place from which Protennoia descends, at the same time as it is the place to 
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which she invites the hearers of her message. In accordance with this, the 
different levels and modes of manifestation of Protennoia correspond to a 
differentiation between the receivers and their respective abilities for com-
prehending her. Thus, it is clear that the "Sons of the Light" do understand 
the content of Protennoia's message already at the level of Sound and 
Voice, whereas the archons and powers of the Underworld have no idea of 
what and from where that thundering Sound is. Furthermore, in her manife-
tation as Word, Protennoia has reached the level of rational discourse, 
which means that she is graspable by every living being. 
Now, it is clear that TriPro uses the Stoic sequence as a model for her 
different levels of linguistic manifestation, but why a linguistic manifesta-
tion? I believe the answer lies within Protennoia's motivation for descend-
ing in the first place, which lies in the "part" of Protennoia that was stolen 
from the Innocent One (Sophia), and which now resides within the soul of 
human beings. That part is the Spirit or Epinoia, which constitutes the hu-
man ability for reflection as well as the life-giving movement, that is, 
breath. To awaken this ability in human beings the divine First Thought 
must descend perceptibly level by level in order to become able in the third 
and final manifestation to communicate with humans on the level which 
everyone has the possibility of comprehending, that is, the level of the Lo-
gos. So, in order to save Man and the part of him which makes him "God-
like", Protennoia has to speak directly to that part by manifesting herself in 
accordance with it, that is, linguistically. 
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Introduction 
The Thunder: Perfect Mind (NHC VI,2) (hereafter Thunder) is one of the 
most enigmatic and beautiful texts of the Nag Hammadi Library, continu-
ing to fascinate and puzzle its readers. Its paradoxical mode of expression 
is exceptional for Nag Hammadi literature in general. However, we do find 
several themes which place Thunder in close connection with other Nag 
Hammadi texts, even showing intertextual relationships with Christian, 
Jewish, philosophical and even Egyptian literature. 
In the present context I will focus on one of these themes, namely the 
language-related speculation which, I will argue, occupies a key position in 
relation to the overall interpretation of Thunder. This theme has been left 
almost untouched by scholarship. As in the case of TriPro, I will show how 
the Stoic understanding of a verbal expression lies behind the linguistic 
manifestation of the female revealer, although in Thunder too it has to be 
understood "upside-down". However, that is not all. Thunder is not only to 
be understood in the context of Stoic philosophy of language: the Platonic 
dialectical method of division, diairesis, also plays a central role in this 
text, as does the Platonic notion of "the name". All this will become clear 
in the analysis of the text. 
I will begin with a short description of the manuscript. 
The manuscript 
Thunder is a relatively short text which occupies pages 13 through 21 as 
the second text in codex VI. The title of Thunder (rëëpôÛTH: Noyc 
NreXeioc) is located at the beginning of the text at the top of page 13. This 
is quite unusual for a Nag Hammadi text since normally we see the titles as 
rounding off texts, as, for instance, the three subtitles of TriPro. The codex 
is rather well preserved as the lacunas are limited to the first ten lines at the 
top of the pages. However, this does from time to time disturb the reading 
of the text. 
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l™ Krause and Labib 1971. 
2 5 1 Robinson 1972b. 
2 5 2 Emmel 1979; Robinson and Emmel 1984: 119-120. 
2 5 3 For a general overview of the research history concerning the manuscript, see Poirier 
1995: 1-8. 
2 5 4 Two contributions in Poirier 1995: 13-53 and 53-97. 
2 5 5 W.-P. Funk in Poirier 1995: 96-97. 
2 5 6 Among many other fragments of, for instance, personal letters which do not contain 
any visible dates. 
2 5 7 Barns, Browne and Sheltonl981: 4-5. 
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Even though the Nag Hammadi Library was found in 1945, the editio 
princeps of Thunder was not published until 1971 by Krause and Labib, 2 5 0 
followed by a photographic publication in the Facsimile Edition of 1972. 2 5 1 
The photographic evidence was adjusted and reanalyzed on the basis of 
other unique photographic evidence in 1979 and 1984, 2 5 2 respectively. 
Within the cartonnage of the covers of codex VI was found twenty-three 
Greek lists of names and accounts which had been used to strengthen the 
binding. However, they unfortunately do not bring us closer to a dating of 
the Coptic manuscript, since they contain no actual dates. 2 5 3 
As already dealt with in the previous chapter, something else was also 
found inside the front covers of codex VI, namely, what scholars now agree 
on calling codex XIII, containing TriPro. In relation to this, it was also dis-
cussed how the very diverse texts in codex VI may or may not be connect-
ed to one another. 
The orthography and language of codex VI is thoroughly described and 
analyzed by W.-P. Funk, 2 5 4 who concludes that the Coptic of codex VI is: 
un sahidique partiellement non standard, qui se distingue notamment par un 
certain nombre de "regionalismes" de provenance méridionale. Il en 
résulte, d'un point de vue socio-linguistique, que, de toute évidence, cette 
version de Brontè n 'a pas été produite dans un des centres de la culture 
linguistique du sahidique standard. Sur le plan géographique, la region 
comprise entre Thèbes et Hermopolis serait, comme lieu d'origine, très 
probable, et celle qui avoisine Nag Hammadi, tout à fait possible . 2 5 5 
With regard to the dating of the manuscripts, it is important to note that 
within the cartonnage of codex VII was found three contracts 2 5 6 which had 
visible dates on them: 341, 346 and 348 C.E. The latter of these dates pro-
vides a terminus a quo for at least the cover of codex VII. 2 5 7 Assuming that 
the codices were made during the same period of time, scholars more or 
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less agree on dating the manuscripts to the middle towards the end of the 
fourth century. However, the dating of the manuscripts remains imprecise 
and tentative. Moreover, a dating of the composition of the actual text is 
even more tentative, since it is the general assumption that the Nag 
Hammadi Codices are translations from earlier Greek Vorlage, and the da-
ting of those, hypothetical sources is, in fact, impossible. On the other 
hand, the contents of the Nag Hammadi scriptures points towards a second-
century manufacturing. This may be assumed against the background of the 
writings of Irenaeus of Lyon who wrote around 180. In his work he offered 
descriptions of various mythological accounts of which some are very simi-
lar to what we find in, for instance, the Apocryphon of John. Thus, it is pos-
sible that Irenaeus might have had access to texts that perhaps were earlier 
Greek versions of the Nag Hammadi texts. In addition to this, the philo-
sophical speculation reflected in many of the texts including Thunder and 
TriPro, has numerous aspects in common with what is usually labeled 
"Middle Platonism". For these reasons, the original texts are presumed to 
have been composed during the second century. 
The content of the Thunder: Perfect Mind 
In what follows I will give an introduction to the content and structure of 
Thunder. I will discuss the most characteristic elements of the text, namely 
the "I am"-proclamations formulated as paradoxes and antitheses. This will 
imply a discussion of some of the most obvious parallels to Thunder. How-
ever, first we shall see under which kind of genre Thunder may be classi-
fied. 
The question of genre 
The Thunder is a monologue performed by a divine female revealer. She 
addresses her audience through monotone series of paradoxical "I am"-
proclamations, interrupted occasionally by exhortations and encourage-
ments to the "hearers". The exceptional form of this text finds no parallel 
within the Nag Hammadi Library, which has lead Layton to call it "the 
most bizarre of all works from the Nag Hammadi corpus". 2 5 8 Thunder, 
which is indeed bizarre but beautiful, is not easy to classify. Due to its dis-
tinctive features, especially the "I am"-proclamations, the text has been 
Layton 1986: 38. 
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characterized as "poetic and hymnic", a "revelation discourse with a 
hymnic structure", 2 6 0 and as a "powerful poem". 2 6 1 The latter characteriza-
tion is Layton's, who, furthermore, describes it as a "wisdom monologue" 
parallel to that of the Jewish figure of wisdom or to the aretalogical speech-
es by the Egyptian Isis. 2 6 2 But as Poirier has pointed out, this comparison 
remains partial and can only account for a few characteristics in Thun-
der.263 Others restrict themselves to designating Thunder as a 
"åbenbaringstale"264/"Offenbarungsreden" or even as a "gnostische 
Offenbarungsreden" (my emphasis). 2 6 5 This specifically "gnostic" genre 
was developed by H. Becker in his work on the Fourth Gospel. 2 6 6 In his 
commentary, Poirier outlines the characteristics of this "Gnostic revelation 
discourse" and concludes that even though it is indisputable that Thunder is 
a revelation discourse combined with an appeal to the "hearers" in the 
texts, Becker's model does not cover the theme of the divine as being "sent 
out" that is of great significance in Thunder.267 Poirier chooses to 
characterize Thunder as "...un discours auto-déclaratoire, dont le seul autre 
exemple est la Protennoia trimorphe du Codex XIII". 2 6 8 He adds in a note 
that the so-called Pronoia-hymn in the long version of the Apocryphon of 
John has also been compared with Thunder with regard to its "I am"-
sayings. 2 6 9 Through a discussion of different styles of religious speech can-
vassed by, for instance, Johannine scholars, Poirier eventually analyses the 
literary form of Thunder as a "Botenselbstsbericht". This is a genre identi-
fied by J.-A. Buhner in his examination of the different features regarding 
the role of an envoy. This genre focuses on the self-presentation towards 
the receivers of the message and is summarized in two typical formula-
tions: "Je suis venue/viens de la part de.. ." and "je suis un tel et un 
y McGuire 2000, introduction. 
2 6 0 MacRae 1979: 231. 
2 6 1 Layton 1986: 38; see also Cox Miller 1986: 481 who just calls it a "poem". 
2 6 2 Layton 1987: 77-78. 
2 6 3 Poirier 1995: 97-98. The comparison to the Jewish Wisdom literature and the Isis 
aretalogies will be discussed below. 
2 6 4 Gilhus 2000. 
2 6 5 Bethge 1973: 99. Poirier mentions that also the editors of the apocryphal Acts of 
John describes Thunder as a "discours de revelation gnostique", cf. Poirier 1995: 98. 
2 6 6 Becker 1956. 
2 6 7 Poirier 1995: 98-99. 
2 6 8 Poirier 1995: 97. 
2 6 9 This will be touched upon below. 
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2 / 0 Poirier 1995: 100. 
2 7 1 Denzey 2001a: 442. 
2 7 2 Ibid. Denzey cites D. E. Aune's (1982) definition of a prophecy or an oracle as "a 
written or oral message from a god, occasionally encoded, mediated by a human 
spokesperson. It is a form of 'social communication', usually secured through destictive 
forms of behavior (possession or trance), and/or a verbal claim that the forthcoming (or 
preceding) message has a supernatural origin". 
2 7 3 Ibid.: 444. 
I l l 
te l . . . " 2 7 0 Thus, it is the combination of the theme of the divine as being 
"sent out" and "I am"-proclamations which signifies this kind of genre. 
Thunder fits well into this picture, and the identification of the genre as a 
"Botenselbstsbericht" or a "discourse of self-proclamation" emphasizes, in 
my opinion, the soteriological role of the female revealer. 
Nicola Denzey, on the other hand, points to the possibility that the con-
tent of Thunder (and TriPro for that matter) might as well be regarded as 
prophetic in nature. She writes: 
Trimorphic Protennoia? s aretalogical passages and Thunder: Perfect Mind 
might easily qualify as oracular literature; they are statements considered 
by a community to be inspired and contain first-person monologues that 
would have been "delivered" or spoken by a member of that community, 
presumably within a liturgical or catechetical context . 2 7 1 
Denzey bases her suggestion on a comparison between our two Nag 
Hammadi texts and Montanist prophesies, 2 7 2 focusing on the contact with a 
community which she seems to find more explicit in the prophetic literature 
than in a "revelatory discourse". This leads her to suggest that we should 
consider Thunder a song or a type of hymn instead of a poem, which does 
not mark its "impact on a religious community when recited aloud and con-
sidered a sacred, authoritative text." 2 7 3 
Poirier and Denzey both focus on the receivers/audience of the revela-
tion. I agree that this is an important feature of Thunder which, when put 
into focus, adds other perspectives to text, for instance, the use of the text. 
It is hard to say anything about the presumed use of Thunder, since there 
are no hints of, for instance, a ritual context in it. It may therefore be more 
fruitful to say something about Thunder's literary structure and its poetic 
devices, and analyze how these may affect the hearer or reader of the text. 
That implies especially an investigation of the function of paradox in 
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2 7 4 Poirier 1995: 103. 
2 7 5 Layton 1987, who characterizes Thunder's fundamental elements as "identity rid-
dles" and "exhortations", respectively. Layton divides the text into thirteen parts that 
follow the main shifts between the two elements. However, his division is not entirely 
unproblematic, in that some of the parts are not entirely pure "exhortations" or pure 
"identity riddles", but mixtures of the two kinds. On the other hand, already in his arti-
cle from 1986: 40 n. 9, he admits that some sayings are difficult to identify as one or the 
other element. 
2 7 6 Giversen 1975. Giversen distinguishes between four elements: self-proclamations, 
appellations, exhortations, and rhetorical questions. Giversen is faithful to the text in his 
division, but his procedure also leaves the text somewhat fragmented. 
2 7 7 Poirier 1995: 104. 
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Thunder, which will soon be discussed. First, however, we shall look at its 
structure. 
The structure of Thunder 
There is no doubt that at a first glance it is quite difficult to detect a logical 
structure within Thunder. As Poirier has shown, the text is neither a tale nor 
a didactic tractate. Furthermore there is no narrative framework which 
could provide the reader with a context. 2 7 4 In fact, there are only two ele-
ments that are easily identified, namely the self-proclamations in the "I 
am"-style and the exhortations, interpellations, and questions to the hearers 
of the text in the "you"-style. A paraphrase of the text that follows the 
shifts between these elements will look like those given by B. Layton 2 7 5 
and S. Giversen. 2 7 6 This sort of division of the text is perhaps necessary to 
outline one's first overview. On the other hand, the switches between the 
two elements are so frequent that the meaning of the text remains as ob-
scure as before it was divided up. For this reason I adhere to Poirier's the-
matically division of Thunder, although I do believe that the formal shifts 
from time to time also follow the thematical shifts in the text. 
Poirier divides Thunder into fifteen main paragraphs, which are then 
subdivided. The divisions are made on the basis of the specific vocabulary, 
themes or redaction of the single passages. 2 7 7 In most cases I agree with 
Poirier's divisions; however, there are some instances in which I choose 
differently. In what follows I compare my own division to Poirier's. I do 
not separate the single lines into "a" and "b" as Poirier does, since I find 
the result somewhat confusing, even though it is admittedly more accurate: 
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Poirier's fifteen paragraphs: 
§1 (13:1) Titre 
§2 (13:2-16a) Prologue 
(13:2-5a), (13:5b-15a), (13:15b-16a) 
§§3-14 (13:16b-21:5a) Développement 
§3 (13:16b-14:9a) 
(13:16b-22a), (13:22b-27a), (13:27b-32), (13:33-14:9a) 
§4 (14:9b-15a) 
§5 (14:15b-27a) 
(14:15b-17), (14:18-25), (14:26-27a) 
§6 (14:27b-15:29a) 
(14:27b-32a), (14:32b-15:l), (15:2-14), (15:15-16a), (15:16b-21), 
(15:22-24), (15:25-29a) 
§7 (15:29b-17:3b) 
(15:29b-30), (15:31-16:3a), (16:3b-31a), (16:31b-17:3a) 
§8 (17:3b-18:8) 
(17:3b-6a), (17:6b-18a), (17:18b-24a), (17:24b-32a), (17:32b-36a), 
(17:36b-18:5a), (18:5b-8) 
§9 (18:9-26) 
(18:9-20a), (18:20b-26) 
§10 (18:27-19:4a) 
(18:27-31), (18:32-19:4a) 
§11 (19:4b-20a) 
(19:4b-8), (19:9-15a), (19:15b-20a) 
§12 (19:20b-20:5a) 
(19:20b-25a), (19:25b-27), (19:28-20:5a) 
§13 (20:5b-26a) 
(20:5b-11a), (20:1 lb-18a), (20:18b-26a) 
§14 (20:26b-21:5a) 
§15(21:5b-32)£,p/fogw<? 
(21:5b-20a), (21:20b-32) 
Shortened from his structural analysis 1995: 103-112 in which he provides the reader 
with many explanatory comments, although without giving headlines except for the 
title, prologue and epilogue. See also the "traduction structurée" on pp. 341-348. 
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Structural analysis of Thunder: 
I have found it helpful for the sake of gaining an overview to divide Thun-
der into four main parts. I have marked the subdivisions by headings; it is 
important to note, however, that these headings by no means cover all top-
ics dealt with in the single parts; they only serve as "signposts": 2 7 9 
1. 13:1-14:15 "Beginning" 
(13:1) title; (13:2-16) prologue; (13:16-14:9) family relations; (14:9-
15) first linguistic passage. 
2. 14:15-18:8 "Opposite Social Concepts" 
(14:15-27) hate - love; (14:27-15:29) exalt - disparage; (15:29-17:3) 
Greeks - Barbarians; (17:3-18:8) small - large. 
3. 18:9-19:20 "Female Revealer" 
(18:9-20) the perfect mind; (18:20-26) hate - love; (18:27-35) sub-
stance - no substance; (18:35-19:8) damaged text; (19:9-20) union -
dissolution. 
4. 19:20-21:32 "End" 
(19:20-25) second linguistic passage; (19:26-34) knowledge of the 
name; (20:1-5) damaged text; (20:5-26) judgment-acquittal; (20:26-
28) bridge; (20:28-35) third linguistic passage; (21:1-5) damaged 
text; (21:6-32) epilogue. 
Of the four main parts, the first and the last are the easiest to delimit. The 
first is marked out by the prologue and the passage on family relations 
rounded off by the first linguistic passage, all of which introduce the reader 
to the female revealer, her provenance, her task and her way of descent. 
The same is true of the last main part, which I call the "End". This last part 
twice reemphasizes the linguistic theme that was raised in the "Beginning". 
I argue that this linguistic emphasis is part of the key to understand the fe-
male revealer, and it is further reiterated when located right before the epi-
logue of the text, where the female revealer discloses what can be expected 
for the ones who find her. 
The two parts that fall between the beginning and the end are, by con-
trast, not very easy to delimit and, as is obvious, the first of the two is much 
longer than the second. Moreover, it is not a straightforward task to decide 
2 7 9 I already argued for such a division in my Master's thesis Adskillelsens Åbenbaring 
from 2004: 22-24. 
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where to make the subdivisions, because of the repetition of themes 
throughout the text. For instance, the theme of "hate vs. love" is a returning 
feature which is elaborated in different directions that bind the social rela­
tions together across the text. The second major part of Thunder contains 
what I call "opposite social concepts". Through different passages that 
switch between self-proclamations and exhortations to the hearers, the fe­
male revealer communicates opposite concepts that all have something to 
do with human social life. These opposites are presented partly as concepts 
with which the female revealer identifies herself, partly as descriptions of 
the relationship between the female revealer and her hearers. The third 
main part concentrates on the female revealer through yet another sequence 
of self-proclamations. 
In the end a division of Thunder remains tentative, although I think that 
the four part structure makes sense as a rough survey. Poirier's division is 
very precise and detailed. However, it does not give the larger framework 
of Thunder, which I seek to capture by speaking of four parts. 
In what follows, I shall discuss the most distinctive features of Thunder, 
namely the "I am"-proclamations and the paradoxes. 
"I am"-proclamations and Thunder's literary parallels 
From the beginning of the research history of Thunder, the "I am"-
proclamations have been a central topic for discussion. They are closely 
related to the discussion of genre, since the self-proclamations form such a 
distinctive literary feature that they are unavoidable in the attempt to locate 
Thunder in relation to other texts. For this reason the present paragraph will 
include a discussion of Thunder's literary parallels. 
To begin with, Thunder's "I am"-proclamations (\HOK Te/ne) are clear 
parallels to the έγώ είμι-sayings found in the Gospel of John. 2 8 0 This was 
already noted by Giversen in his introduction and translation of Thunder 
into Danish from 1975. Giversen, however, did not think that Thunder adds 
anything to our understanding of the Fourth Gospel. 2 8 1 Another obvious 
Biblical parallel to the Thunder's "I am"-proclamations is the self-
presentation of the Jewish Wisdom figure, iran/Sophia, especially as she 
appears in Proverbs 8. The self-proclamations are not the only parallels be-
z w For instance John 8:12. 
2 8 1 Giversen 1975: 71 . Whether the Fourth Gospel adds anything to our understanding 
of Thunder is a topic that will not be addressed here. 
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Poirier 1995: 157-161. Poirier concludes: "Si elle (the female revealer) a hérité 
certains traits de la Sagesse biblique, elle a, en revanche, peu à voir avec la Sophia des 
mythes gnostiques classiques." Ibid.: 161. Thus, according to Poirier the classic Gnostic 
Sophia figure, who "falls" from the divine realm and causes the creation of the sensible 
world, has not very much in common with the female revealer of Thunder. 
2 8 3 Where nothing else is noted, all translations from Coptic are my own. 
2 8 4 This is also noted by MacRae 1977: 115, who adds that neither does Proverbs in-
clude the antithetical element. 
2 8 5 See Bergman 1968: 301-303. 
2 8 6 See especially Poirier 1995: 155. 
2 8 7 Quispel 1975: 88; MacRae 1977: 116 and Layton 1986: 44. 
2 8 8 MacRae 1970b: 133 and 1975: 3. 
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tween the two revealers, since many general themes from Jewish Wisdom 
literature, including the Wisdom of Solomon and Sirach, are repeated in 
Thunder. Poirier has treated this topic thoroughly in his commentary, in 
which he emphasizes the theme of the female revealer as being an envoy, 
searching and finding, as well as invitations to hearing her message. 2 8 2 The 
female revealer in fact proclaims herself to be the Sophia (Wisdom): "For I 
am the Wisdom of the Greeks and the Knowledge of the Barbarians" (^NOK 
Γ&Ϋ TCO<t>[i^ ] [NN£]eXXHN* ^γω TTNCDCic Ν[Ν]Β[^]Ρ[Β]^ΡΟ^ ) (16:3-5). 2 8 3 
There is no doubt that Thunder draws on and alludes heavily to Jewish 
Wisdom literature but as we shall also see in the case of the use of ancient 
philosophy of language, Wisdom literature is used by Thunder in a slightly 
different manner than it is in its original setting. Therefore, the female re­
vealer cannot be identified with the Jewish Dame Wisdom. Furthermore, 
even though we find "I am"-proclamations in Proverbs, the literary style is 
quite different from the one found in Thunder, since the former does not 
present monotonous series of self-proclamations, but only a few scattered 
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sayings. 
One obvious parallel to the monotonous "I am"-style of Thunder is the 
Isis aretalogies, in which Isis reveals herself in εγώ είμι-sayings. An in­
scription from Cumae 2 8 5 even parallels the content of specific passages 
from Thunder?*6 On the basis of the parallels between Thunder and the Isis 
aretalogies in both form and content, and the fact that both are female re­
vealers, several scholars have found that the author of Thunder must have 
been familiar with the aretalogies and perhaps been inspired by them. 2 8 7 
However, one important difference between them, which has been ob­
served by G. W. MacRae, 2 8 8 is that whereas Isis only employs positive des­
ignations for describing herself, the female revealer of Thunder employs 
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both positive and negative designations. For this reason MacRae does not 
see the Isis aretalogies as parallels to the contents of Thunder. Poirier calls 
attention to another element which marks a difference between the two, 
namely, the structural complexity of Thunder. Thunder is a combination of 
self-proclamations and exhortations, whereas the Isis aretalogies are lim-
ited to self-proclamations.289 
Within the Nag Hammadi library the most obvious parallel to Thunder is 
the Trimorphic Protennoia. I have already discussed the similarities be-
tween them in the introduction, so for the moment it suffices to repeat that 
TriPro also contains long sequences of ^NOK Te/ne-sayings. Another im-
portant subject of comparison is the "Pronoia-hymn" from the long version 
of the Apocryphon of John, which I have dealt with in the chapter on 
TriPro. The same can be said here, namely, that the Ο,ΗΟΚ Te/ne-sayings 
signify a specific mode of divine expression, which in these three examples 
is put into the mouths of female revealer figures not unlike the Jewish 
Dame Wisdom. One major difference, though, is that the female revealer of 
Thunder has been sent ("It is from the Power that I have been sent" 
( [ ΰ ] τ ^ γ τ ^ ο γ ο 6 ΐ &NOK 6BOX"£N [T]ÇOM) (13:1-2)), whereas both Protennoia 
and Pronoia descend on their own initiative. Moreover, once again the 
identification with opposite concepts is unique for the self-presentation of 
the female revealer of Thunder. The other revealers, like Isis, only present 
themselves in positive terms. 
A particular literary parallel to Thunder is found in the untitled text that 
is usually referred to as On the Origin of the World (NHC 11,5 and XIII,2). 
This text delivers a parallel to the "I am"-proclamations and also seems to 
quote directly from Thunder, or perhaps more probably, from a common 
unknown source. The passage in question is at the beginning of Thunder, 
where the female revealer identifies herself with opposite female characters 
(13:19-14:9). Thus, for instance, she proclaims: "It is I who am the woman 
and the virgin" (M40K T e Tec£me \χω τ π ^ ρ ο β Ν ο σ ) (13:19-20). This proc­
lamation and others belonging to the same passage are found in On the 
Origin of the World 114:7-15. Thus, 114:9 reads "It is I who am the wom­
an. It is I who am the virgin" (\UOK T e Τ£ΙΜ6. ^ NOK τ β Tn^poewoc). In this 
text the sayings are ascribed to Eve. Likewise, in another Ophite text, the 
Hypostasis of the Archons (NHC 11,4), one finds a short passage that con-
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z w See all three texts synoptically in Poirier 1995: 124-125. Poirier (1995: 122) ob­
serves that the passages in On the Origin of the World and the Hypostasis of the Ar­
chons are most likely quotations from an external source, since the passage On the 
Origin of the World introduced by the formulation: "therefore it is said about her, that 
she has said.. ." (AI^ τογτο cexcD HHOC epoc è,ax.ooc xe ) ; and in the Hypostasis of 
the Archons, it is introduced by x e . The passage in Thunder is far more well-integrated, 
however, Poirier does not doubt that the passage in Thunder also derives from some-
where else, since the vocabulary does not occur elsewhere in the text (Ibid. 128-132). 
2 9 1 Layton 1986: especially 48-51. 
2 9 2 Ibid.: 51. See below, where I discuss Layton's hypothesis in relation to the identifi-
cation of the female revealer with Epinoia. 
2 9 3 Poirier 1995: 138. 
2 9 4 See Lidzbarski 1978. 
2 9 5 Ibid.: 207: 35-36.1 have translated Lidzbarski's German translation. 
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tains similar sayings (89:16-17), although this time they are not formulated 
as self-proclamations but as Adam's praise of Eve. 2 9 0 
These parallels have led Layton to suggest that the solution to the iden-
tity-riddle of the female revealer in Thunder may be: Eve. Moreover, the 
hypothetical common source of these three Nag Hammadi texts may be the 
so-called Gospel of Eve cited by Epiphanius (Panarion 26.3.1). 2 9 1 
Epiphanius' extract describes a person who stands on a mountain and sees 
two men. He/she hears a thundering voice from the sky saying: έγώ συ και 
σύ έγώ, "I am you and you are me". According to Layton, this scene de­
picts the fleshly Eve being addressed by the heavenly Eve. Recalling the 
twofold role of Eve in the Hypostasis of the Archons (in which Eve is both 
understood as the heavenly Eve, the divine female principle, and the fleshly 
Eve), Layton considers that the female revealer in Thunder is a sort of 
heavenly Eve. 2 9 2 Poirier is not entirely convinced by Layton's hypothesis, 
since neither the Gospel of Eve nor the Hypostasis of the Archons contains 
the same kind of dynamic of thesis and antithesis as do Thunder and On the 
Origin of the World.293 
Another literary parallel to Thunder is found in the so-called 
"Dinanukht's Book" of the Mandean Ginza294 which offers not only a par­
allel to the "I am"-proclamations, but also to the antithesis and paradoxes 
which the other literary parallel have not been able to match. In the Book of 
Dinanukht, a heavenly Ewath reveals herself in sayings that are very simi­
lar to the ones professed by the female revealer of Thunder. Thus she pro­
claims: "I am death, I am life. I am darkness, I am light." 2 9 5 MacRae sug­
gests that perhaps the passage in the Ginza "echoes an older topos in the 
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The function of paradox and antithesis 
The most striking element in Thunder is, in fact, not the "I am"-
proclamations, to which many parallels may be enumerated, but rather their 
paradoxical nature. In this section I shall provide a rough survey of the dif-
ferent approaches to the function of paradox that have been adduced by a 
number of modern scholars. 
MacRae was one of the first to consider this topic. His point of departure 
was the comparison with the Isis aretalogies. The difference between the 
revelations of the two goddesses is, according to MacRae, that the purpose 
of the self-proclamations by Isis is to describe her universality, whereas the 
paradoxical self-proclamations by the female revealer in Thunder add an-
other dimension, so to speak, and describe her transcendence. He writes: 
She is not simply the truth or reality of all men's aspirations, but she is of a 
higher order than the moral, conventional and rational standards of the 
world.. .In the face of divine revelation no human values are adequate . 2 9 9 
With this observation MacRae laid the foundation for later approaches, 
which also, in one way or the other, understand the female revealer as a 
transcendent being. Layton is an exception in that he understands the func-
z y o MacRae 1977: 119. 
2 9 7 Poirier 1995: 140. 
2 9 8 For a few other literary parallels see Poirier 1995: 132-141, where he draws attention 
to P. Berol. 15995, f. 2 1 v , Apophasis Megale cited by Hippolytus in his Elenchos (VI, 
17:2-3), and A Naassene hymn to Adamas. 
2 9 9 MacRae 1970b: 133. 
119 
Mandean literature that has roots common with The Thunder."296 Poirier is 
not persuaded either by the parallel in the Ginza. He writes: 
A notre avis, le témoignage du Ginza illustre seulement à quel point le 
recours au paradoxe et au paralléllisme antithétique était répandu dans 
l'antiquité dès que l 'on voulait décrire en style poétique la transcendance 
d'un être divin. 2 7 
I agree with Poirier on this point, and he touches upon an important issue 
with regard to the antitheses and paradoxes in Thunder, namely their func-
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3 0 0 Layton 1986. 
3 0 1 McGuire 1992: 43. 
3 0 2 Ibid.: 48. 
3 0 3 Ibid.: 43. 
3 0 4 Poirier 1995: 119. 
3 0 5 Loc.cit. 
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tion of paradox as an expression of Thunder's affiliation with Greek rid-
dies. 3 0 0 
In her article from 1992 McGuire suggested that we should understand 
the unexpected blend of terms in divine self-description as if it "breaks 
down some of the restrictive functions of these polarities." 3 0 1 This is done 
either by including antitheses into the divine, or by turning them into para-
doxes and thus crossing the boundaries between them. Furthermore, 
McGuire argues that the antitheses indicate the liminality of the female re-
vealer as one who exists "betwixt and between" the visible and invisible, 
the immanent and transcendent. 3 0 2 Thus, McGuire does not follow 
MacRae's interpretation of the female revealer as transcendent, but rather 
as one who exists in between. Nevertheless, she does follow MacRae in the 
understanding of the antitheses as being reevaluated when they are com-
prised in one being. McGuire emphasizes that the readers of Thunder will 
come to new understandings of their "categories of difference" which: 
link the speaker directly to the conflicting, though sometimes overlapping, 
roles of women. In this way, the text opens new possibilities for the cri-
tique and reinterpretation of such polarities, the identities they shape, and 
the values they ascribe to the female gender in its divine and human mani-
festations. 3 0 3 
To Poirier the antithetical and paradoxical self-proclamations tell us that 
the female revealer is "un être absolu". 3 0 4 He focuses on the soteriological 
aspect of the treatise in that the task of the hearers is to find the female re-
vealer by recognizing her identity and thereby gain eternal life. This is done 
through a crossing (or transcendence) of all oppositions, for as Poirier 
writes:" en sa personne, elle les annule en les assumant." 3 0 5 He underlines 
that 
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The main interest of the group seems to be in the socio-anthropological aspects of 
the text, which find expression in articles concerning gender questions and cultural and 
social order. Moreover, Taussig's team also deals with genre questions and poetic style, 
as well as the adoption of Thunder in modern culture. I shall not discuss their approach-
es in detail here, since it would lead too far. 
3 0 8 Taussig 2010: 94. 
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les auditeurs sont invités avec urgence à ne plus l'enfermer, et, du même 
coup, à ne plus s'enfermer eux-mêmes, dans des catégories contradictoires 
et opposées qui ne sauraient valoir à son endroi t . 3 0 6 
The three approaches all agree on the one thing that the opposite concepts, 
whether formulated as antitheses or paradoxes, are nullified or transcended 
when comprised in the one divine being, the female revealer. McGuire's 
approach is somewhat "earthly-oriented", in that she argues that the nullifi-
cation of the opposite concepts makes the human being reevaluate its un-
derstanding of existing human relations. Poirier points to the recognition of 
the female revealer as an absolute being who claims a universal cult in 
which all opposites are transcended. 
In recent years two studies are of special interest. In 2010 a group under 
H. Taussig published a small volume on Thunder, which took the form of a 
new translation and introduction, the latter of which is a collection of arti-
cles that examine Thunder from different points of view. 3 0 7 With respect to 
the function of paradox and antithesis in Thunder, Taussig's team seems to 
be much in line with McGuire's socio-cultural approach, especially focus-
ing on gender questions, in that they find that the function of the language 
of Thunder is to: ".. .disorient and invert social order and identity patterns." 
It undoes "assumptions and create an open space where the assumptions 
had held sway." And "it bends gender by comically mixing masculine and 
feminine categories, calling into question the conventional gender bounda-
ries and connections between people." 3 0 8 
Moreover, N. L. Elkjær Olsen describes Thunder's language as a 
cataphatic discourse which constantly dissolves itself, corrects itself, and 
destabilizes meaning. Olsen suggests that we should understand this as 
equivalent to the function of an apophatic discourse, although language is 
still an important feature in Thunder. Therefore, she suggests that the main 
purpose of Thunder is of a performative nature. By reading the Thunder, 
the paradoxes and antitheses will eventually cause a condition of mental 
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Linguistic manifestation in Thunder: Perfect Mind 
In the analysis that follows, I will focus on three passages in Thunder 
which clearly show a keen interest in language, not only in playing with 
language to such a degree that the reader is puzzled or even confused by 
the complexity and paradoxical expression of the text, but also identifying 
the female revealer herself with language. The three passages, which I shall 
call the "linguistic passages", occupy key positions in the text with regard 
to its structure, which again has vital consequences for its overall interpre-
tation. As will be shown, I read these passages as constituting a link be-
tween Thunder and TriPro. The passages in question are: 14:9-15; 19:20-
25 and 20:28-35. It is important to note that Poirier only counts two of 
these as language-related, namely the first and the last, but also adds an-
other (21:11-13), which I do not. 3 1 1 
It is not an entirely new observation that the similarity between Thunder 
and TriPro has primarily to do with the linguistic reflections on the divine. 
Turner, Layton and Denzey have all seen this connection. 3 1 2 However, 
these scholars have referred to this aspect only in footnotes, mentioning it 
in passing, or touching lightly upon it. The articles by Layton and espe-
cially Denzey treat the topic in some detail. Layton's article "The Riddle of 
the Thunder (NHC VI,2): The Function of Paradox in a Gnostic Text from 
Nag Hammadi" summarizes a list of parallels between Thunder and other 
"Sethian" texts. Many of these are, in fact, parallels between Thunder and 
TriPro, but the article as such does not concern the relationship between 
Olsen 2011: 361-363 and 367. N. L. Elkjær Olsen is at the time of writing finishing 
her dissertation, which to my knowledge will be called: From Logos to Silence. Some 
Varieties of Textual andApophatic Performance in Hellenistic Gnosis-Literature. 
3 1 0 Although I do not consider the question of performativity. 
3 1 1 Poirier 1995: 147-149. 
3 1 2 Turner 2001: 153 note 23; Layton [1987] 1995: 87; Denzey 2001: 435. 
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irresolution by which common patterns of recognition and distinction are 
dissolved. 3 0 9 
Through my analysis of Thunder it will become apparent that I agree 
with McGuire, Poirier and Olsen 3 1 0 in many respects, although I shall add 
some new perspectives especially with regard to the understanding of op-
posites and the notion of the name. 
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these two texts in particular. Denzey, meanwhile, argues for a correspon­
dence between the Montanist logia and Thunder and TriPro that constitutes 
in "a marked emphasis on word, speech, and hearing in both sets of docu­
ments, the themes of divine speech or call, and the claim to a divine author-
ity." 3 1 4 
My own aim is to provide a more thorough analysis that follows up on 
the insights of these scholars. I shall now turn to the first linguistic passage 
that is located almost at the opening of Thunder, preceeded only by the pro­
logue and the passage on female identities/family relations. 3 1 5 
The first linguistic passage 
14:9-15 
... ^NOK ne IlKApCDq 
6 Τ 6 Μ ^ γ φ Τ ^ £ 0 4 * \ \ ω Τ6ΠΙΝΟΙ 
^NOK T 6 T6CMH 6Τ6ΝΜΤ)6Π6ΰ 
£ροογ * ^ γω nXoroc β τ β Ν ^ φ β 
neqeme · &ΝΟΚ ne π φ ^ β M 
π\γ\η · 
... It is I who am the silence 
that is incomprehensible, and the thought 
whose remembrance is great. 
It is I who am the voice whose sound 
is manifold, and the word whose form 
is manifold. 3 1 6 It is I who am the utterance 
of my name. 
3 1 3 Layton 1986: 52-54. 
3 1 4 Denzey 2001: 443. 
3 1 5 See above for my division of Thunder. 
3 1 6 I have chosen to follow the Coptic text closely in the translation of the saying: ^NOK 
Te T6CMH 6Τ6Ν^φ6Π6θ£ροογ· nXoroc exeN^cpeneqeiNe, in that I have rendered 
both εροογ and erne in singular ("whose sound is manifold" and "whose form is mani­
fold"), although it is a possibility to render both in plural because of the NMpe-. Cf. the 
translation of Poirier 1995: 180-181 "C'est moi la voix dont les sons sont nombreux et 
la parole dont les aspects sont multiples." and Layton 1987: 80 "It is I who am the voice 
whose sounds are so numerous: And the discourse whose images are so numerous." 
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In this passage, the reader is introduced to the identification of the female 
revealer with a number of linguistic terms. She identifies herself with si-
lence, thought, voice, word (sentence/discourse), and utterance. The se-
quence of linguistic terms may be visualized as follows: 
K^pcoq - eniMOiè, - fepooy) - CHH - Xoroc - qp^e - (?\u) 
Silence - Thought - (Sound) - Voice - Word/Discourse - Speech/Utterance -
(name) 
This sequence turns out to be much the same as the manifestation of Pro-
tennoia in TriPro: 
KApœq - Meeye - ?ροογ - CMH - Xoroc 
Silence - Thought - Sound - Voice - Word/Discourse 
The similarities between the two texts in this regard are striking, and indeed 
reason enough to assume that they also share, at least to a certain extent, a 
common theology. As is obvious from a first glance at the two sequences, 
there are of course some differences. First, however, I recall the Stoic se­
quence of verbal expression for comparison: 
διάνοια - φωνή - λέξις - λόγος 
Thought - Sound/Voice - Speech - Word/Sentence/Discourse 
Now, placed next to one another, the three lines appear closely similar. All 
three go from the inarticulate and unintelligible to the articulate and fully 
intelligible. Unlike the Stoic sequence, though, the two lines of linguistic 
manifestation in Thunder and TriPro begin in Silence. This will be dis­
cussed below. Meanwhile, all three agree that a "verbal expression" origi­
nates in thought (διάνοια/Μβεγε/επίΝΟί^). Even though the three terms are 
different and certainly connote different aspects of the noetic faculty, they 
do represent the location from which utterance issues, recalling the Stoic 
expression: Λόγος δέ έστι φωνή σημαντική άπό διανοίας εκπεμπόμενη (a 
sentence (logos) is an intelligible voice, issued from thought). 3 1 7 
The remaining, hearable aspects of the utterance are rendered somewhat 
differently in the three lines, although in my opinion still expressing the 
same sequence of levels and the same interrelation between these levels. 
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The differences will be analyzed below, as will the questions and difficul-
ties concerning the Coptic translations of the Greek words. For now it suf-
fices to indicate that the point of departure for the following analysis of 
Thunder is that the two Nag Hammadi texts clearly enclose the Stoic theory 
of language as an underlying matrix in their description of the divine mani-
festation. The resemblance between the three sequences is striking, and 
reading both Thunder and TriPro against the background of Stoic dialectics 
proves immensely helpful for the understanding of their linguistic themes. 
I will stress again that I am not proposing to give a "Stoic reading" of 
either of the two Nag Hammadi texts, in the sense of simply taking them to 
be Stoic texts, but rather to read them as having integrated existing phi-
losophical reflections into a revelatory framework. Furthermore, as is 
probably already apparent, Stoicism is certainly not the only philosophical 
school which has influenced the shaping of these two Nag Hammadi texts. 
In what follows I will analyze the single steps in the sequence of the lin-
guistic manifestation of the female revealer in Thunder. I will also take into 
consideration the preceding analysis of TriPro, pointing out differences and 
similarities between the two texts and their relation to Stoic dialectics. 
Silence 
The Coptic noun K^pcoq (silence) occurs only once in the entire text, 
namely, here in 14:9. It introduces the linguistic sayings and stands in di-
rect contrast to the text as a whole and the first linguistic passage in par-
ticular. This passage, I suggest, is about language and the manifestation of 
the divine in and through language. That makes it all the more striking that 
the goddess begins her linguistic sayings by stating that she is the silence. 
After all, the aretalogical style of the text provides a divine manifestation 
which is anything but silent. This incongruity, I would say, radically em-
phasizes the paradoxical nature of the goddess. She is silence; but on the 
other hand she incessantly speaks about herself. 
It is obviously important that "silence" occurs in direct relation to and as 
the introduction to a paragraph replete with linguistic terminology. First, 
the female revealer proclaims herself to be Silence whereupon she identi-
fies herself with Thought, Voice, Word/Discourse, and Utterance, of which 
only Thought must be considered silent. However, Silence as the clear con-
trast to any kind of sound must be understood as the stage before (or after) 
sound, and thus as belonging to the same field of terminology. In this par-
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In which is found passages like "the child of the silent silence, the crown of the silent 
silence, the glory of the father, the virtue of the mother." (Ill, 2; 42:21-43:1). 
3 1 9 Marsanes 4:19-24 "The thirteenth speaks concerning [the Unknown] Silent One, 
even the foundation of the indistinguishable One." Translation by Turner 2007a. There 
are many other examples in this text. 
3 2 0 Allogènes 53:23-25 "On account of the third silence of Mentality and the undivided 
secondary activity that appeared in the first thought, that is, the Barbelo Aeon, and the 
undivided semblance of division, even the Triple-Powered One and the nonsubstantial 
Existence, it appeared by means of an activity that is stable and silent." Translation by 
Turner 2007b. 
126 
ticular context in Thunder, the Silence fits well into the line of linguistic 
self-proclamations because it marks the level before any kind of sound and 
even before any thought. 
The silence is also characterized as "incomprehensible". This recalls the 
TriPro, in which the silence is also described as incomprehensible as well 
as immeasurable. Protennoia herself is once identified with the Silence 
(46*: 13), but otherwise it seems to designate a certain place or condition in 
which she and the Father exist together with the Sons of the Light/Thought. 
In the discussion of TriPro I argued that although the Stoic understand-
ing of a verbal expression underlies the sequence of manifestations of Pro-
tennoia it must be understood "upside-down". From the perspective of Pro-
tennoia and the initiate, i.e. the "the Sons of Light/ Thought", the highest 
semantic level is not situated within the logos, as it was for the Stoics, but 
rather within the Silence. The Silence is therefore the actual goal for the 
reader of this text. The same is true of Thunder. The reader must start at the 
(at least to the human mind) most intelligible level of the revealer, namely, 
the logos (Word /Discourse), and climb up the linguistic ladder towards its 
source: Silence. On the way up she/he will pass Speech, Voice, Sound and 
Thought. The goal is to find her and thereby find the "restingplace" in or-
der to live and not die again (21:28-32). But the manifestations of both Pro-
tennoia and the female revealer of Thunder go downwards from Silence to 
logos, following the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression. 
The notion of silence is a widespread feature that plays an important role 
in related Nag Hammadi texts, especially the Holy Book of the Great Invis-
ible Spirit (the Gospel of the Egyptians) (NHC 111,2 and IV,2), 3 1 8 Marsanes 
(NHC X) , 3 1 9 Allogènes (NHC XI,3) 3 2 0 and others. In these texts the concept 
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of silence is used to describe the undescribable and may thus be seen as a 
sort of apophatic portrayal of the divine. 3 2 1 
Thought 
From being Silence the female revealer of Thunder moves on to designate 
herself as the Thought (enmoi^). This Greek loan-word, epinoia, is often 
translated with "afterthought" in both its Coptic and Greek appearances. 
However, this is far from the only denotation epinoia possesses. From a 
brief look in the LS J, it appears that epinoia can have the sense of thought, 
notion, concept, idea, intelligence, and afterthought, among others. 
Scholars do not agree at all on the translation of eruuoi^ in Thunder, 
varying between "idea", "thought", "afterthought" and the untranslated 
"Epinoia". 3 2 2 Three translations vote for "afterthought" and only two or one 
for the remaining three possibilities. As is clear from my translation, I have 
chosen to render emuoi^ by "thought", thus following Poirier and McGuire. 
Yet this translation creates some inaccuracy when one takes into considera­
tion the Coptic noun Meeye, which is the common equivalent for "thought". 
This is clear from TriPro, where Protennoia is designated as Meeye 
(thought) and of course the πρωτ-eNNOi^ (first -Thought). According to 
Crum, Meeye can be either a translation of the Greek διάνοια, νόημα, 
έννοια, έπίνοια, and many other terms, which shows the broadness of the 
Coptic noun. The female revealer of Thunder is not designated as Meeye, 
but only as ernuoi^. Thunder does, however, use the Coptic Meeye, al­
though only in compound expressions such as Meeye e- (think of/recognize) 
(13:4, 6 and 16: 26, 31) and prmeeye (remembrance) (14:II) . 3 2 3 The obvi­
ous question is now why Thunder does not use Meeye for "thought" instead 
For an investigation of the notion of silence as a consequence of the "Greek pessi­
mism about the efficacy of language" see Mortley 1986a: 110-124. He writes: 
". . .somewhere in the history of Greek thought there began to develop a deep suspicion 
of discourse, and the corresponding belief that lack of words, or silence, could convey 
the deepest meanings sought." Mortley 1986a: 110. 
3 2 2 Taussig 2010: 2 "and the idea infinitely recalled". Gilhus 2002: 84 "og ettertanken 
med det mangfoldige minne". McGuire 2000:1 "and the much-remembered thought". 
Poirier 1995: 180-181 "et la pensée dont la memoire est riche". Layton [1987] 1995: 80 
"and afterthought, whose memory is so great". MacRae [1979] 2000: 236-237 "and the 
idea whose remembrance is frequent". Giversen 1975: 73 "og den eftertanke hvis om-
tanke er stor". Bethge 1973: 101 "und die Epinoia, an die vieles (in der Welt) erinnert". 
3 2 3 Poirier 1995: 362. 
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Following the terminology of Rasimus 2009. See introduction. 
3 2 5 For references to the Apocryphon of John I use the long version of codex II from the 
critical edition by Waldstein and Wisse 1995. 
3 2 6 According to King 2006: 106 note 24, one possible solution to the confusing fact that 
Epinoia is taking the form of an eagle and not a snake, could be "a pun (or mistransla-
tion) based on the phonetic similarities between "snake" (hiera) and "eagle" (hierax) in 
the Greek translation (LXX)". 
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of eniHOiô,, since the latter term is used in related Nag Hammadi texts with 
other implications than mere "thought". 
Within the corpus of Classic Gnostic texts (that is, including the tradi-
tional "Sethian", "Ophite", and "Barbeloite" texts) 3 2 4 Epinoia plays the role 
of the divine female spiritual principle, sent into the visible world to restore 
the deficiency of Sophia. She is the helper of Adam, the one who awakens 
him by giving him gnosis and thus making him remember. She is the me-
diator between the invisible and visible worlds. Such is the role of Epinoia 
in the Apocryphon of John, where she is identified as the "Epinoia of light" 
(Tenmoiè , Hnoyoe iN) and is referred to as "life" (XCDH) (Apocr. Joh. NHC 
II, 20:19). 3 2 5 Most importantly, though, she is called "the Epinoia of 
luminous Pronoia" (ΤΘΠΙΝΟΙ^ ΰτπροΝΟί^ N o y o e m ) (28:1-2), which shows 
that Epinoia is to be understood as the part of Pronoia/Barbelo which is 
present at the beginning of time when Man is created. She is described as 
assisting Adam, teaching him about the descent of his seed and about the 
way of ascent (ecTceBO MMMJ ^xeq^inei ^ΠΙΤΝ H n c n e p H ^ . . . e n H ^ i x BBCDK 
e£paä) (20:21-24). Furthermore, she is the one who awakens his thought 
(neqMeeye) . 
Especially interesting with regard to the figure of Epinoia in the 
Apocryphon of John is the fact that she is described as identical to the Tree 
of Knowledge of good and evil (22:4-6), or in the form of an eagle sitting 
on the Tree of Knowledge (23:27-28). 3 2 6 The tree is also of great 
importance in the Hypostasis of the Archons (NHC 11,4), in which the 
specific Ophite exegesis of Genesis is distinctive. The positive attitude to-
wards the snake in this story is due to the female spiritual principle, which 
resides within the snake as it persuades the woman to eat from the tree 
(89:31-90:12). In the Hypostasis of the Archons, the female spiritual prin-
ciple is not designated "Epinoia", but it plays the same enlightening role as 
Epinoia in the Apocryphon of John, and, in my opinion, they must be con-
sidered as representing the same aspect of Pronoia/Barbelo. So, whereas 
Epinoia in the Apocryphon of John is identical with the tree of knowledge, 
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King 2006: 104. In the Hypostasis of the Archons the story is told differently. When 
the Archons want to plant their seed in the woman (Eve), as she possesses the divine 
female spiritual principle, she laughs at them and turns into a tree (89:25), although it 
does not seem as if this tree is the tree of knowledge. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
by I. Gilhus 1985 that in the Hypostasis of the Archons the female spiritual principle 
(the Holy Spirit) fills out the role of Genesis' Tree of Life, in that Adam and Eve are 
thrown out of the garden so that they might not commit themselves to the Holy Spirit 
(91:7-11). See also Gilhus 1987. 
3 2 8 There are four instances of eniNoiè, in TriPro. See chapter on TriPro for references. 
3 2 9 Turner 2001: 227. 
3 3 0 Turner 2000b: 435. Cf. also my chapter on TriPro for an analysis of the role of 
Epinoia in this text. 
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the female spiritual principle in the Hypostasis of the Archons is incarnate 
in the snake in order to make humans eat. In both instances it is clear that 
eating from the tree gives humans the divine knowledge of good and evil, 
and that they are made to eat by an aspect of Pronoia/Barbelo. In the 
Apocryphon of John they might even be said to be eating o/Epinoia, since 
she is the tree! The point is of course, as King notes, that "the Tree of the 
Knowledge of Good and Evil...is associated with the teaching of Epinoia 
(and Christ)". 3 2 7 
In both texts, the classic motif of sleep and awakening is played out in 
relation to the Genesis account of Adam being put to sleep by Jahwe. The 
Apocryphon of John explicitly says that the sleep it is referring to is the 
sleep (Βφβ) of Adam's perception (^ICOHCIC) (22:25). The state of mind of 
Adam is also described as a drunkenness from which he is to become sober 
(ρΝΗφβ) by the help of Epinoia (23:8). The same soberness is achieved by 
the hearers at the end of Thunder when they have found their resting place 
and thereby also found her ( . . . φ ^ Ν τ ο γ ρ Ν Η φ β ïïcencDx e^p^ï 
βπογκΗΜΗΤΗριΟΝ* \Χ(Ό cenb.G\ne HHoei HnMà. βτΜΜ^γ. . . ) (21:27-30). 
In TriPro the term eniNOiô. is not used as a designation for Protennoia. 3 2 8 
Epinoia here functions rather in the same manner as in the Apocryphon of 
John, namely, as in Turner's words, an "avatar" of Pronoia/Barbelo.3 2 9 Ac-
cording to Turner, TriPro's "έπίνοια ("externalized έννοια") is the produc­
tive power of Protennoia later (39*,13-40*,7 as Sophia) stolen by 
Yaltabaoth." 3 3 0 
Even though the female revealer of Thunder is designated "Epinoia", she 
uses the same form of communication as Protennoia in TriPro and Pronoia 
in the long version of the Apocryphon of John, namely, the "I am"-
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declaration (M40K ne/xe). Moreover, the task of her descent is also soterio-
logical: the awakening of man, the communicating of gnosis and making 
man remember. The fact that these texts employ a similar kind of language 
for a similar soteriological act on the part of the divine female principle 
shows that whether the revealer/savior/enlightener is called Pronoia, 
Barbelo, Protennoia, Ennoia or Epinoia they are all simply different aspects 
of one and the same First Thought of the highest god, the Invisible Spirit. 
With some restrictions maybe even Eve, Sophia and Christ could be added 
to this list. On the other hand, several of these figures may be present with-
in the same text acting out different roles, but this does not mean that they 
are sharply distinguished. 
This is underlined by Turner in his analysis of the Sethian treatment of 
"the figure of Sophia, the divine wisdom of the Hebrew Bible". He 
writes: 3 3 1 
In the hands of Sethian Gnostics, the biblical functions of Sophia as crea-
tor, nourisher, and enlightener of the world were distributed among a hier-
archy of feminine principles: a divine Mother called Barbelo, the First 
Thought of the supreme deity, the Invisible Spirit; and a lower Sophia re-
sponsible for both the creation of the physical world and the incarnation of 
portions of the supreme Mother's divine essence into human bodies. Salva-
tion was achieved by the Mother's reintegration of her own dissipated es-
sence into its original uni ty . 3 3 2 
Furthermore he explicates: 
In the Sethian texts, Sophia becomes the cause of cosmogonie deficiency, 
so she is replaced on the transcendent plane by the higher feminine figure 
of Pronoia/Barbelo, and on the earthly plane by Pronoia's avatars Epinoia, 
Zôê, the spiritual Eve, and even the masculine Christ as the culminating 
Savior (rather as the Johannine prologue recasts a descending wisdom fig-
ure as Christ the Word ) . 3 3 3 
Now, how does all this relate to Thunder! The fact that the female revealer 
of Thunder designates herself as "Epinoia" implies that she is a 
manifestation of Pronoia/Barbelo/Protennoia. The female revealer employs 
3 3 1 I shall note here, that I already quoted this passage from Turner in the chapter on 
TriPro. I bring it again for the sake of clarity. 
3 3 2 Turner 2001: 223. 
3 3 3 Ibid.: 227-228. 
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the same tool of manifestation: the "^MOK ne/Te"-sayings. She descends, 
and her task is soteriological. And most importantly: she reveals herself in 
linguistic terms, as does Protennoia in TriPro. 
The association with the Sethian material was already suggested by 
Layton in his aforementioned article from 1986, in which he analyses 
Thunder as being closely related to Jewish Hellenistic Wisdom traditions, 
Isis aretalogies and Greek riddles. I have already discussed this above, 
however, I recall his points for the sake of clarity of my own argument. The 
solution to the riddle of Thunder Layton finds in the two related Nag 
Hammadi texts, the Hypostasis of the Archons and On the Origin of the 
World (NHC 11,5), which both share a few verses with Thunder?34 In these 
two texts the self-proclamations are either pronounced by Eve 3 3 5 or retold 
in a third person narrative about Eve, 3 3 6 which naturally led Layton to sug-
gest "Eve" as the solution to the riddle of Thunder?31 He also suggested, as 
we know, that these three Nag Hammadi texts might share a common liter-
ary antecedent in a certain "Gospel of Eve" mentioned by Epiphanius, but 
unknown to us . 3 3 8 Layton's insights show us that the sayings of the female 
revealer of Thunder are elsewhere uttered by Eve - the heavenly Eve, who 
is Epinoia residing inside the fleshly Eve as she awakens Adam. In the Hy-
postasis of the Archons this makes Adam proclaim her to be his mother, the 
midwife, the wife, and she who has given birth (89:11-17). 3 3 9 
The sort of interrelated identification between the different aspects of 
Pronoia/Barbelo which is apparent in Thunder is an intentional strategy 
which, according to King, "produces correspondences between diverse epi-
sodes and resource materials by identifying their main characters with each 
other. It also connects different levels of reality." 3 4 0 Thus, the female re-
vealer of Thunder is intentionally identified, directly or indirectly, with 
Pronoia, Epinoia, Eve, Sophia, Isis and perhaps others. 
See above in the introduction. 
3 3 5 On the Origin of the World (NHC 11,5 and XIII,2 (fragment)) 114:4-15. 
3 3 6 The Hypostasis of the Archons (NHC 11,4) 89:11-17. 
3 3 7 Layton 1986: 48. 
3 3 8 As Layton himself is very much aware, the thesis is extremely hypothetical and in 
the end probably unprovable. Nevertheless, it is certainly very interesting that 
Epiphanius has known of such a gospel and that it seems to have something in common 
with the material found in the three Nag Hammadi texts. 
3 3 9 The text may also be understood as if Adam is speaking to both the heavenly and the 
fleshly Eve. 
3 4 0 King 2006: 187 here speaking of the same strategy in the Apocryphon of John. 
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With the above discussion of Epinoia in mind, two things are of special 
importance to my analysis of Thunder. Firstly, the role of Epinoia as an 
aspect of Pronoia/Barbelo, who is the emissary of the Power (TOOH), sent 
to enlighten people and to make them find her. She is the one who is first 
present within humanity, awakening their thought from the sleep of percep­
tion by giving them knowledge. She is an aspect of Pronoia, the Thought of 
the Father. Subsequently she can also be understood and referred to as 
Thought. Secondly, if we consider the role of Epinoia in the Apocryphon of 
John and the female spiritual principle in the Hypostasis of the Archons as 
the one whose teaching is associated with the Tree of Knowledge, and if 
we place some value on the fact pointed out by Layton that Thunder shares 
some material with the Hypostasis of the Archons and On the Origin of the 
World where the sayings are associated with Eve - the heavenly Eve, who 
is also to be understood as Epinoia - then I suggest that we should under­
stand the role of Epinoia in Thunder in the following way. 
The female revealer of Thunder is Epinoia, that is, she is the sent aspect 
of Pronoia/Barbelo who has been sent to awaken man from his sleep of 
perception. By identifying herself with Epinoia and by making proclama­
tions which in related texts are associated with Eve, the female revealer of 
Thunder strongly alludes to the "Classic Gnostic" paradise myth. Hereby 
she also implies that her teaching is associated with the essence of the Tree 
of Knowledge. She is in fact her teaching, which recalls both her identifica­
tion with the Tree of Knowledge in the Apocryphon of John and the nu­
merous self-proclamations in Thunder. What Epinoia is doing in Thunder is 
awakening the thought of human beings by giving them the essence of the 
Tree of Knowledge, that is, the ability to recognize Good and Evil. Since 
she identifies herself with opposites like "knowledge and ignorance" 
(ncooyN \χω TMNT^TCOOYN) (14:26-27), "war and peace" (nnoXeMoc \γω 
Ί-ρΗΝΗ) (14:31-32), or "the union and the dissolution" ( π ^ ω τ ρ ΗΝ π Β ω λ 
6 Β θ λ ) (19:10-11), she provides the human being with knowledge of how 
this world is to be conceptualized in opposites - in "Good and Evil". In 
other words, she awakens man's ability to perceive the world and makes 
him remember the perfection of the divine world. This understanding of 
Thunder has not been suggested before and throughout the remaining anal­
ysis of the linguistic passages I shall return to it continually. 
Already the immediate context of the identification of the female reveal­
er with Epinoia confirms her role as a transmitter of gnosis - knowledge of 
the divine world - in that she is described as the one "whose remembrance 
132 
Chapter 4: The Thunder: Perfect Mind 
is great". Whereas "remembrance" (pnMeeye) is not even mentioned in 
TriPro, it is enormously important in the Apocryphon of John, especially in 
the so-called "Pronoia-hymn" in the long version of the text (NHC 11,1 and 
IV, 1). In all of her three descents into the "realm of darkness", Pronoia 
proclaims, in the "^NOK ne/Te"-style, that she is either "the remembrance of 
the Pleroma" (30:16), or "the remembrance of the Pronoia" (30:24, 35). 
Furthermore, when she awakens those who sleep, she enjoins them to re-
member and to follow their root (31:14-16). 3 4 2 In the context of the 
Apocryphon of John, Pronoia's descent reaffirms the act of her Epinoia at 
the creation of man. She seeks to awaken human beings and make them 
remember their divine origin, to bring them home, so to speak. This indeed 
recalls the understanding of "remembrance" in Thunder that I noted above, 
namely, that by making the human being eat from the Tree of Knowledge, 
Epinoia provides him with the divine knowledge which makes him remem-
ber the Pleroma. In addition to this, I shall invoke a different perspective on 
the notion of remembrance, which will turn out to correspond to my lin-
guistic focus on the text. 
In my discussion of the Platonic notion of diairesis in the chapter on an-
cient philosophy of language, it was concluded that a definition by division 
(diairesis) is not only focused on the final inseparable concept as the es-
sence of the thing in question. Rather, the whole process of the diairesis 
must be taken into account, so that the concepts or names, which are en-
countered in the different divisions, form part of the concluding definition. 
The final product of the diairesis is a unity of the many. Going through the 
diairesis and its many different concepts was suggested to be regarded as a 
process of anamnesis, of remembrance. What the performer of the diairesis 
is remembering while carrying out this procedure are the Platonic 
Ideas/Forms. 
Against this background I find it helpful to understand the notion of re-
membrance in Thunder in close relation to its language-related specula-
tions. This idea is supported by the fact that remembrance is mentioned in 
The notion of "remembrance" is a well-known phenomenon in Biblical studies. For 
the most part it deals with the remembrance of the covenant made between Jahwe and 
Israel; in the New Testament context it is the "new covenant" established between God 
and man through Jesus which is to be remembered in the Eucharist. 
3 4 2 I n his otherwise extensive commentary Poirier does not comment on the motif of 
"remembrance". 
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Contrary to the diversities of translation of CMH in TriPro, the translators of Thunder 
agree on rendering the Coptic noun by "voice" (in their respective languages). 
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direct relation to Epinoia, and moreover is situated within the first linguis-
tic passage. 
Epinoia's teaching is associated with the essence of what the human be-
ing receives from the Tree of Knowledge, namely, the ability to perceive 
and recognize good and evil, understanding "good and evil" as an indicator 
of all the opposites of which our language consists. What the Thunder is 
implying, then, by identifying Epinoia as the one whose remembrance is 
great, is that her teaching makes man remember not only that a part of him 
belongs in the divine world, but also his ability to perceive the world as 
constituted and conceptualized by opposites, as well as his ability to per-
ceive these opposites as a unity - as a whole. When later on in the third lin-
guistic passage, the female revealer of Thunder proclaims herself to be the 
"manifestation of the division" (noycDNg GBOX NTAi^epecic) (20:34-35), it is 
precisely the diairesis of opposite concepts she makes us remember. At the 
same time, she shows the reader how to grasp the unity of this plurality that 
she represents. 
Besides offering a new understanding of the antithesis and paradoxes of 
Thunder, this analysis also gives them sense, instead of reducing them to 
mere nonsense. I will return to this discussion below, but leave it for now 
in order to get back on track with the analysis of the first linguistic passage. 
As has been shown, the female revealer manifests herself in the same se-
quence of linguistic terms as does Protennoia in TriPro. However, until 
now we have only encountered the female revealer as Silence and Thought. 
Thus, she is still not uttered or articulated. The articulateness of her mani-
festation comes with the Sounds of her Voice. 
Voice 
An important difference between the manifestations of the female revealer 
of Thunder (Epinoia) and Protennoia is that the former does not explicitly 
identify herself with Sound fepooy), as does Protennoia throughout TriPro. 
In Thunder, Sound figures as a description of the multiplicity of the Voice 
(CMH): "It is I who am the Voice whose Sound is manifold". 
The Voice (CMH) 3 4 3 is a designation with which both the Epinoia of 
Thunder and Protennoia are identified. But whereas TriPro distinguishes 
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rather sharply between £ροογ and CHH, Thunder seems to be closer to the 
Stoic understanding of the Greek equivalent to CHH, that is, φωνή, than 
TriPro is. According to Diogenes Laertius' account of the Stoic theory of a 
verbal expression, φωνή is to be understood as indicating both animal, un-
articulated voice, that is, sound/noise (ήχος), and human unarticulated 
voice, which can also be regarded as a mere sound, but is human in that is 
is issued from thought. In the Stoic sequence the terms sound and voice are 
thus collected under the one category: voice (φωνή). So when Protennoia 
reveals herself as both sound and voice, she splits up the Stoic notion of 
φωνή into sound fepooy) and voice (CHH). Thunder does use the term 
"sound" (gpooy) but only as a descriptive term for Voice, thereby pulling 
sound and voice together. Thus it lies somewhat closer to the Stoic concep­
tion of φωνή as the unarticulated human voice. 
If the Stoic interpretation is followed, the identification of the Epinoia of 
Thunder with Voice means that she is now hearable but not necessarily in­
telligible. From a Stoic point of view, a voice is material because it causes 
the effect that it is heard by the recipient (the hearer). But whether Thunder 
also implies that the Epinoia of Thunder is material in that she becomes 
Voice is not clear from the text. However, since she descends into the ma­
terial world, she has to become material in some way in order to be recog­
nizable to the hearers of her message. 
A voice of thunder? 
In a wide range of religious literature, the moment of the descent or even 
revelation of the divinity is marked by a sound/clap of thunder. 3 4 4 It is the 
obvious, immediate conclusion to assume that the title of Thunder 
(T6BPONTH: Noyc ïïreXeioc) has something to do with the revelation which 
takes place in the text. In what follows I will argue that this understanding 
of ΒΡΟΝΤΉ is correct. I introduce the discussion of the title at this point 
because I understand ΒΡΟΝΤΉ to be at the core of my interpretation of 
Voice. 
In the nearest context of our texts, that is of course in the Biblical literature, Hellen­
istic philosophy as well as Hellenistic Egyptian literature the notion of thunder as a tool 
of revelation is widespread. See, for instance, MacRae 1970b: 130, in which he com­
pares with "Juppiter tonans of classical literature, the magical papyri, the God of the Old 
Testament, John 12:29, Rev. 10:3-4 etc." 
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Since the very beginning of the research history of Thunder, the title has 
been the subject of much discussion: firstly, due to the missing of the very 
first letter, secondly, because of the uncertainty of the connection between 
the two parts of the title, and thirdly, because of the connection between the 
title and the content of the text . 3 4 5 1 will mainly focus on the third issue. 
In 1973, M. Tardieu showed how the title of Thunder makes sense as an 
example of a φωνή θεοΰ (a voice of god). He suggested that "Thunder" is 
the name of the female revealer which again is qualified by the second part 
of the title: woyc NTeXeioc (perfect mind). 3 4 6 Furthermore, in an additional 
article from 1975, he argues that Thunder is part of a second-century, Mid­
dle Platonic exegetical tradition of the Platonic myth of Er, 3 4 7 where a clap 
of thunder and an earthquake mark the ascent of the souls to their original 
home. 3 4 8 Although Tardieu's thesis sheds some light on the understanding 
of the title, I do not agree that the myth of Er should be the direct literary 
source of Thunder.349 Poirier does not agree with Tardieu either. He 
acknowledges the originality of Tardieu's idea, but on the other hand criti­
cizes Tardieu for insufficiently and only on a very general level establish­
ing a link between the thunder figuring in the title and the text as a 
whole. 3 5 0 The problem of finding a link between the title of Thunder and 
the text it introduces lies in the fact that nowhere in the text is the term 
ΒΡΟΝΤΉ repeated. Nor is its Coptic equivalent £ρογΜΠ6 /£ρογΒ(Β)άα. 3 5 1 
Already in the editio princeps of the text by Krause and Labib 1971, it was suggested 
to reconstruct the first letter by " τ " , so that together with the proceeding "e" would con­
stitute the definite article r e . This is the current consensus, although it has not gone un­
challenged. In the translation into German (Bethge 1973) by the Berliner Arbeitskreis, it 
was suggested to reconstruct: NGBPOHTH, regarding Nebront as a parallel to the Mandean 
Namrus or the Manichean Nebroel or even the Jewish Nimrod, whose Greek spellings 
are Nebrot, Nebroth or Nebrod. The reconstruction of the Arbeitskreis should thus pro­
vide a close parallel to the figure of Sophia/Barbelo. See also Poirier 1995: 201-208 for 
a detailed discussion of the title. 
3 4 6 Tardieu concludes that Thunder draws on both Jewish and Christian ideas about the 
heavenly voice (see for instance Ps 77:18-19; Mt 3:17; 17:5), as well as traditions which 
describe Athena as μήτις, σοφία, νους, διάνοια, and νόητις. (p. 529). 
3 4 7 Republic X, 6 2 1 b 1-4. 
3 4 8 Tardieu 1975: 365-366. 
3 4 9 Ibid.: 367. 
3 5 0 Poirier 1995: 204-205. 
3 5 1 Giversen 1975: 71 makes an attempt to reconstruct the usual Coptic rendering of the 
Greek ή βροντή: π^ρογ une (the voice of heaven) in 18:9: &.ΝΟΚ λ.6 ne ππογο N|reXeioc] 
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\y(D T^M^n^ycic Ηπ[^ρο]γ u n e "Men jeg er den [fuldkomne] tanke og hvilen for 
[himlens stemme] (: tordenen)". The manuscript is so deteriorated in this particular 
place that it is impossible to decide if he is correct. It would surely be convenient, but 
Poirier finds the suggestion impossible, see Poirier 1995: 205, n. 35. 
3 5 2 Poirier 1995: 205. 
3 5 3 Ibid.: 206. 
3 5 4 Poirier 1995: 205. Giversen 1975: 71 also mentions this verse as having a possible 
connection to the thunder. 
3 5 5 Poirier 1995: 207. 
3 5 6 Loc.cit. 
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Meanwhile, it is the general opinion that the second part of the title might 
be reconstructed in 18:9 '\ΗΟΚ Λ 6 ne r iNoyc ïï|reXeioc]". Thus, the female 
revealer can be identified at least with the second part of the title. 
Even though Poirier is very much aware that thunder is rendered 
nowhere in the body of the text, he understands the compound title in such 
a way that one part explains the other, so that the female revealer is the 
perfect mind, which means that she is the thunder. He illustrates it in the 
following manner: βροντή = νους τέλειος = locutrice. 3 5 2 However, Poirier 
does not attach any great importance to the identification of the female re­
vealer with thunder; he only sees it as "une image traduisant le caractère 
divin ou l'autorité de la révélatrice et de son message." 3 5 3 One could object 
that this point of view is not very different from the one for which Poirier 
himself criticized Tardieu, since it is also a rather general thesis. On the 
other hand, Poirier seems to support the idea that thunder is alluded to 
throughout the text. He mentions as an example the verse which is being 
analyzed in this paragraph: "It is I who am the Voice whose sound is mani-
fold" (14:12-13). 3 5 4 Moreover, Poirier also calls attention to a passage from 
Psellus' commentary on the Chaldean Oracles, where, as Poirier cites, we 
meet: "«une voix articulée qui gronde du haut du ciel» exprimant les 
pensées d'un dieu qui «entend sans voix nos voix»." Poirier finds it 
interesting that Psellus speaks of "l'image de la voix du tonnerre pour 
illustrer un oracle qui porte sur le νους." 3 5 5 However, Poirier still compares 
the use of thunder in the title with apocalyptic literature and theophanies 
where the voice of thunder is only a cliché. 3 5 6 
Whether "Thunder" is actually the name of the female revealer, as Tar-
dieu suggested, remains an open question for now. It will be discussed 
when the notion of the name appears in the text. Considering the placement 
of the particular saying (14:12-13) within the first linguistic passage of 
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Thunder, I find it very resonable to assume that the "Voice whose sound is 
manifold" is in fact referring to the voice which the female revealer pro­
duces as she is sent into the world. Together with the notion of φωνή θεοΰ, 
this calls for an understanding of the thunder of the title as the voice of the 
female revealer. The thunder is the first sound heard by the receivers of the 
revelation. But thunder is still an unarticulated sound or voice, to some 
even a mere noise, and thus not an intelligible voice. 3 5 7 This is shown very 
clearly in a passage from TriPro (43*: 13-44*: 11), where the Powers hear a 
thunder, which they call a "sound from the exalted voice", and which they 
do not understand. They go up to the Archigenetor to ask him what the 
thundering was all about, but he does not know either. They are all 
frustrated about their lack of recognition. It appears that ΒΡΟΝΤΉ of the title 
of Thunder is to be understood in a similar way and in close relation to the 
linguistic manifestation of the female revealer. Her voice of thunder is the 
first encounter with the material world as an unarticulated sound/voice. But 
in order to be fully understood in the material world she has to transform 
herself into something intelligible - the logos. 
Word/Discourse 
The Xoroc (Word/Discourse) is to be considered the highest semantic level 
of both the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression and also as the (at least to 
the reader) fully articulate and perfectly intelligible mode of manifestation 
of the goddess. So far, the Epinoia of Thunder descends by the same lin­
guistic scheme as Protennoia, both employing the Stoic model for the de­
scription of a verbal expression, although with a few minor differences. 
But why, being the logos, does she describe herself as the one "whose 
aspect is manifold" (βτβπ^φβ neqeiue)? The translation of erne with 
"form" is only one of several possibilities. Most translators of Thunder 
render the Coptic word by "image", "appearance", or the like. 3 5 8 These 
renderings are certainly possible, and they make very good sense in that 
they catch the diversity of the self-proclamations of the female revealer. 
Here one might compare John 12:28-30, in which "a voice from heaven" (God's) is 
heard by Jesus, whereas some people in the crowd take it to be a case of "thunder". 
3 5 8 Taussig 2010: 2 "guises"; Gilhus 2002: 84 "uttrykk"; McGuire 2000:1 "forms"; 
Poirier 1995: 180-181 "aspects"; Layton [1987] 1995: 80 "images"; MacRae [1979] 
2000: 236-237 "appearance"; Giversen 1975: 73 "udseende"; Bethge 1973: 101 
"Abbilder". 
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She is indeed many different things. However, I find the proclamation far 
more complex that this. If we take the linguistic context into consideration, 
I find it more accurate to translate it, as McGuire does, by "forms", since 
this comes closer to the language-related conception of the term. According 
to Crum, erne is the Coptic equivalent of many Greek terms, including 
είδος, which again may have several meanings. I fasten on the language-
related context in which είδος has the connotation of class, kind or form, or 
more precisely: logical species?59 In the Statesman it is even found in the 
context of the notion of diairesis. This supports my assumption about the 
knowledge which is given through the revelation of the female revealer of 
Thunder, she is knowledge of "good and evil", that is, of opposite concepts 
by which we conceptualize our world. Through her teaching, the female 
revealer makes it possible to recognize the differences between concepts. 
She is herself associated with that teaching; therefore she is able to pro­
claim that she is "the logos whose form is manifold". The descent of the 
female revealer of Thunder is now described as follows: 
Silence - Thought - (Sound) - Voice - Word/Discourse 
In my opinion, this shows a clear familiarity with Stoic dialectics, albeit as 
used within a completely different framework than originally proposed. 
The two Nag Hammadi texts reframe this widespread linguistic theory into 
a revelatory setting, elaborating the classic notion of φωνή θεοΰ. However, 
I must stress an important difference which covers both the difference be­
tween Thunder and TriPro, on the one hand, and their sources of inspira­
tion, on the other: in both Nag Hammadi texts the revealers begin from Si­
lence. Since both texts are distinctly soteriological, and since a central 
theme, especially in Thunder, is about seeking and finding 3 6 0 the female 
revealer, this Silence must be considered the real goal for the hear­
ers/readers of the texts. Thunder may thus, as was also TriPro, be under­
stood as employing the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression, but turning it 
"upside-down", so that the Silence actually belongs at the highest semantic 
level, instead of the logos. 
3 5 9 Cf. LSJ. The specifically linguistic use of είδος is attested in for instance Plato's 
Sophist 235d and the Statesman 285b. 
3 6 0 See for instance Poirier 1995: 118. 
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Speech/Utterance 
\UOK ne πφ2θΐ6 Mn^pèwN ("It is I who am the utterance of my name") 
(14:14-15). The last concluding proclamation in the first linguistic passage 
poses new questions with regard to the linguistic relation. In what way are 
we to understand the Coptic term cpaoie? It is usually translated as either 
"speech", "utterance" or even "word", and thus understood as the Coptic 
equivalent for the Greek λόγος. However, Thunder clearly distiguishes be­
tween the untranslated Xoroc, which was employed in the preceding proc­
lamation, and Q)bJ£.e. Therefore, we must assume that in Thunder c p ^ e has 
a different connotation than Xoroc. 
In his commentary, Poirier renders cp^xe by "énoncé", thus understand-
ing it as corresponding to the Greek ρήμα 3 6 1 which means "that which is 
said or spoken" (not to be confused with how the Stoic lekton is described), 
"word", "saying" or "verb". 3 6 2 Poirier emphasizes that he does not under­
stand it as the specific, grammatical term "verb" as opposed to "noun", and 
I agree that such an understanding would not make much sense of the say­
ing. Poirier sees the meaning of a)bJK.e as "son acception générique de mot, 
language, acte d'énonciation". 3 6 3 I find this understanding very plausible 
since it underlines the linguistic context within which it is situated as well 
as points to the central feature of the saying: the name. However, Poirier 
ends his commentary on this particular proclamation by suggesting that 
φ ^ χ ε might also be rendering λέξις. Although this is not accounted for in 
the material employed by Crum, it is an attractive theory, since in that case 
Thunder might be even closer to the Stoic theory of language than assumed 
above. 
We may recall that the Stoic notion of λέξις was characterized both as a 
φωνή εγγράμματος and as εναρθρον, that is, a voice which is writable and 
articulate, λέξις is primarily understood as opposed to voice alone, which 
can also be a mere sound/noise (ήχος). It is important to remember, though, 
that a λέξις is still a φωνή, since it differs from λόγος in that it is not neces­
sarily intelligible, λέξις is the combination of different elements (στοιχεία), 
i.e. letters or primary sounds. This combination makes it both writable and 
articulate. 
According to Crum 613-614 this is certainly a possibility. 
LSJ: 949-953. 
Poirier 1995: 232. 
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In my analysis of TriPro I argued that CHH should be understood as the 
articulated, but not yet intelligible voice, since in that text it accounts for 
the level preceding the Xoroc (Word/Discourse), which is the articulate and 
fully intelligible level of a verbal expression (or in this case of the divine 
manifestation). In this way TriPro unites what is separate in the Stoic un­
derstanding of a verbal expression, namely, the φωνή and the λέξις. In 
Thunder it at first sight seems as if the same distinction is at stake. Howev­
er, if q)20£.e is understood corresponding to the Greek λέξις, it would follow 
that Thunder differentiates between CHH (voice) and qpeoie (speech), thus 
following the Stoic delineation of the different levels of a verbal expres­
sion. 
In Thunder CHH may thus be understood as both the inarticulate and ar­
ticulate, but unintelligible, Voice. Accordingly, Q)bJ&.e must be understood 
as the always articulate but still unintelligible 
Speech/Utterance/Pronouncement. However appealing this understanding 
of Q)bJ&.e may sound, it remains hypothetical, since we do not have any 
supporting sources at our disposal. Nevertheless, I do believe the hypothe­
sis makes perfect sense in this Stoic-inspired linguistic context. And when 
it is carried on to the analysis of the name, it is only confirmed. 
Name 
The name (P^N) of the female revealer of Thunder is a topic which has 
been treated separately in scholarship. The question is actually fairly sim­
ple: what is the name of the female revealer of Thunder! However simple, 
it is still a very good question. Throughout Thunder the female revealer 
speaks about her name, although she never reveals what it is. The first in­
stance occurs here in 14:15, where she proclaims herself to be "the utter­
ance of my name". The second instance (in 19:33 "It is I who am the 
knowledge of my name") is located in direct connection with the second 
linguistic passage, and the third in 20:32-33 "It is I who am the name of the 
voice and the voice of the name". This proclamation is part of the third lin­
guistic passage. Furthermore, in the epilogue of Thunder we find two oc­
currences of p^u (21:9, 11). However, these do not seem to refer to the 
name of the female revealer. The first of these (21:9) is found in the middle 
of a somewhat fragmented section of the page, and is therefore not easily 
analyzed. The female revealer is talking about the "great power" (TNO<S 
HGOH) and about not moving the name (H^KIH nnp^u), but it is not clear 
141 
Linguistic Manifestations of Divine Thought 
Poirier 1995: 198-199 suggests the following reconstruction of the passage: NTNOC 
Ν<50Μ· &γα) ne[T][>£epèjT4 N^KIM &η ΜΠΡ^Μ' [ne r^Jep^Tq Π6ΝΤΜΤΓ^ΜΙΟΪ ("de la 
grande puissance et celui [qui] [se tient debout] n'ébranlera pas le nom. [C'est celui qui 
se tient] debout qui m 'a créée."). 
3 6 5 Cf. Poirier 1995: 227. See also Thomassen 1993a. 
3 6 6 Tardieu 1974: 524. 
3 6 7 Poirier 1995: 205, n. 33. 
3 6 8 McGuire 1992: 45. 
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who it is that is not moving the name. Poirier suggests that the subject of 
N^KIM \u is the same as in 21:10 [neT^£]ep^Tq neNT^qT^Mioï ("It is he 
who stands firm who created me") . 3 6 4 From this follows that the one whose 
name she is saying in 21:11 is her creator. Therefore it is not her own name 
in this part of the text, unless she is herself to be understood as the name of 
her creator in line with the nature of the Son in the Gospel of Truth.365 
Anyhow, the three instances where the female revealer is referring to her 
own name are all found in direct relation to the three linguistic passages. 
This, I believe, is not just a simple coincidence but an intentional strategy 
in order to make apparent the connection between the linguistic 
manifestation of the female revealer and her name. 
As has already been mentioned, it was suggested by Tardieu that the 
name of the female revealer corresponds to the ΒΡΟΝΤΉ of the title of Thun­
der, so that her name is "Thunder". 3 6 6 Even though Poirier understands the 
title in such a way that the female revealer is the "perfect mind" and there­
by also the "thunder", he notes that this does not imply that the name of the 
female revealer is ΒΡΟΝΤΉ. Nevertheless, he agrees with the view of 
McGuire, whom he cites from an unpublished article where she discusses 
the two parts of the title: "It is possible that these terms simultaneously 
name both the text and its speaker". 3 6 7 Here it seems as if McGuire agrees 
with Tardieu that "Thunder" actually is the name of the female revealer, 
although she expands the signification of that name to embrace the text in 
its entirety as well. In agreeing with this statement Poirier appears ambiva­
lent, although in the end, I believe, he does not approve of the suggestion 
that "Thunder" is her real name. In another, published, article from 1992 
McGuire formulates her position a bit differently, and in my opinion quite 
to the point: "...in defining herself as "the utterance of my name", the 
'voice' of the text links her identity directly to philosophical and religious 
reflection on the divine 'name' and to the central activity of the text, the 
self-revelatory utterance of that name." 3 6 8 McGuire rightly links the notion 
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of the name in Thunder with speculation on the divine name. This derives 
primarily from Jewish reflection on the name of Jahwe. More importantly, 
she describes the manifestation of the female revealer as an act of utterance 
of that name. 
My own opinion is much in line with that of McGuire, although I wish 
to amplify her statement, ΒΡΟΝΤΉ is not the actual name of the female 
revealer, understood in such a way that she holds the name "Thunder" be­
fore, under, and after her manifestation. Rather, ΒΡΟΝΤΉ is the sound which 
is heard by the hearers of her manifestation. The rumbling thunder is the 
sound of her revelation, the voice which is heard as she utters her name. It 
is noteworthy that the female revealer never refers to herself as the logos of 
her name, but only as the utterance, knowledge and voice of her name. If 
she had gone all the way to the logos, her name would probably have been 
understandable to the human rational mind. Her divine and real name 
remains a secret, since it is unutterable in the language of this world. When 
uttered in this world of rational discourse, her name sounds like thunder. If 
the hearer recognizes this, then he has also recognized/remembered the 
structure of language and thus the human conceptualization of the world. 
For she is the knowledge of her name. 
Another perspective on the notion of the name is the specific linguistic 
one, which obviously occupies an important position in the present study. 
In the above chapter on ancient philosophy of language, the question of 
names was discussed in relation to the Cratylus and to Stoic etymology. 
The fundamental question for both traditions was about the relation 
between a thing and its name. The conclusion which Socrates presented in 
the Cratylus was that names are at the outset naturally attached to the 
things they name, although names do not sufficiently describe the essence 
of things. Therefore it is necessary to look at the thing itself in order to 
grasp its true nature. If this understanding of name and referent is taken 
into consideration with regard to the name of the female revealer of Thun­
der, we see that her name, as it is heard, within this world - ΒΡΟΝΤΉ - does 
not capture her true essence. In order to find her it is not enough to know 
her name, i.e. to know her as "Thunder", since that does not sufficiently 
give her full signification. Rather, one has to chase her through the 
numerous opposites which in fact constitute her teaching, with which again 
she herself is associated. 
Another point of comparison between the reflection on names in the 
Cratylus and Thunder is the manner in which the earthly name of the 
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female revealer is composed, emphasizing that it is a hypothetical attempt. 
Socrates advances a theory concerning the use of certain sounds/letters 
which bear in themselves basic meanings which are reflected in the names 
in which they are employed. I already mentioned the example of the letter 
rho, which according to Socrates is a tool to express change, since 
pronouncing rho makes the tongue vibrate. Applied to ΒΡΟΝΤΉ, this idea 
actually makes sense, since rho marks the rumbling of thunder, as well as 
the necessary changeability of the female revealer as she enters into a 
world that is chacterized by change and movement. However, Socrates still 
admits that not all names are perfect and that some names might even be 
misleading, so the conclusion is, in the end, that in order to comprehend the 
true nature of things (and gods?) one must look into the things themselves. 
Therefore, hearing and recognizing the female revealer as "Thunder" is 
somewhat misleading, and this sound of her name can never provide the 
hearer with knowledge of her real essence. This point coincides better with 
the Stoic notion of "sound-words" which, according to Long, 3 6 9 is a revi­
sion of the Cratylus. The Stoics agreed with Plato that a name is naturally 
attached to the thing it is naming. But they did not understand single letters 
or syllables as containing meanings. Contrary to this, they assumed that 
certain "sound-words" affect us sensuously in that the similarity between 
sound and referent becomes manifest. They are associated with what the 
Stoics called "primary sounds" (των πρώτων φωνών), that is, sounds that 
imitate the things they name as a sort of onomatopoeia. However, these 
"sound-words" do not explain or contain the meaning of what is being said, 
as Long stated: "The word's sound is appropriate to but not fully constitu­
tive of its significance."3 7 0 So, the sound of the female revealer is BPONTH 
which obviously is a "sound-word". Being an onomatopoetic of the thunder 
phenomenon, however, it does not really capture the essence of the revealer 
who is signified by this thunder. This kind of approach to names is what 
Long, in relation to his discussion of the Cratylus, calls a 'formal natural­
ism". Its focus is not on the phonetic values of a specific name, but on the 
form it signifies. We may again recall Long, when he says that this form of 
Long 2005. For a closer discussion of Long's article see my chapter on Ancient Phi­
losophy of Language, Stoic etymology and the Cratylus. 
3 7 0 Ibid.: 47. 
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naturalism is strong in that "meaning transcends its phonetic representation: 
the same meaning or form can be expressed in different languages.. , " 3 7 1 
Conclusion on the first linguistic passage 
In the above analysis of the first linguistic passage, I have sought to show 
how the author of Thunder is deeply involved in language-related specula-
tion on the divine. As was clear from the visualized sequence of the mani-
festation of the female revealer, her way of descent follows the same pat-
tern as the one by Protennoia in TriPro, although with a few minor differ-
ences. To summarize the manifestation of the female revealer: 
Silence - Thought - (Sound) - Voice - Word/Discourse - Speech/Utterance -
(name) 
Even though some of the terms vary from the manifestation of Protennoia, 
both texts show a dependency on a tradition which is built upon the sys-
tematic reflections on language especially developed within Stoic dialec-
tics. The sequences of manifestation followed by the divine female entities 
of the two Nag Hammadi texts are rooted within the Stoic theory on Voice 
which reflects on the sequence of a verbal expression. This is characterized 
by a movement from the unarticualted thought and sound/voice (phone), 
over the articulated yet unintelligible speech (lexis) to the articulated and 
fully intelligible word/discourse (logos). Reading this short passage from 
Thunder, I find the similarity with the Stoic theory quite striking, above all 
because of the cluster of terms contained within the sequences. The linguis-
tic manifestation of the female revealer moves from the Silence, the stage 
which is even before thought, over the Thought and the Voice (and Sound) 
to the Word/Discourse and finally the Speech/Utterance. So the same clus-
ter of linguistic terms, used by the Stoics to describe an utterance, is em-
ployed in Thunder to describe the manifestation of the divine. At the same 
time Thunder combines the use of Stoic material with the Platonic notion 
on the name found in the Cratylus, which again was revised by the Stoics. 
Poirier also sees this passage of Thunder as a section that uses a vocabu-
lary of grammar. However, he approaches it slightly differently. Firstly, he 
sees a coherence between the vocabulary employed by Thunder and the 
1 Ibid.: 44. 
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description of the five stages of knowing adduced by Plato in the Seventh 
Letter. I summarize the progression of terms as they are quoted by Poirier: 
όνομα, "nom" 
λόγος, "définition" 
εϊδωλον, "représentation" 
επιστήμη (και νους αληθής τε δόξα), "science", "connaissance" 
δ δη γνωστόν τε και αληθώς έστιν δν, "l'objet de la connaissance et ce qui existe 
ι-, 372 
vraiment . 
This line of progression certainly contains concepts that correspond to the 
line of manifestation of the female revealer of Thunder, and the fact that 
the movement goes from "name" to "that which truly exists" (which I ex­
pect Poirier to believe corresponds to Silence) brings great coherence to her 
manifestation in that it includes the name in the sequence. Moreover, as 
Poirier rightly writes, where the movement in Plato is one of ascent, that of 
the female revealer is one of descent; in other words, the sequence is turned 
"upside-down". Poirier's own hesitation about this comparison is that while 
Plato's different levels of knowledge are distinct from each other, the levels 
of the female revealer characterize different manifestations of the same re­
ality. 3 7 3 This problem is absent as her linguistic manifestations are com­
pared to the Stoic sequence, since the latter is basically a division 
(diairesis) of φωνή, from which it follows that the various divisions are all 
part of the so-called summum genus, the concept which is being defined, 
which in the Stoic case is the voice. The last undividable concept, the log­
os, thus cannot be understood apart from the previous levels of the division, 
that is, sound, voice and speech. They are necessary parts of the logos. In 
Thunder, the different manifestations of the female revealer must be under­
stood similarly, which was also Poirier's point. Although the comparison 
with the Seventh Letter is illuminating, I find the resemblance with the Sto­
ic material much stronger both with regard to the correspondence between 
the different terms of the sequences and to the interrelatedness between 
these terms. 
Poirier also presents three solid parallels to the series of manifestations 
in Thunder. Firstly, the Tripartite Tractate (128:19-129:34) describes the 
names that are surpassed by the sacrament of baptism. These names are 
3 7 2 Poirier 1995: 225-226, who refers to section 342a 6-b 2 in the Seventh Letter. 
3 7 3 Ibid.: 226. 
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parallel with many of the self-designations of the female revealer in Thun­
der. φ 6 Λ 6 (word) £ ρ ^ γ (voice) Noyc (mind) MNTKAPCDH (silence). 3 7 4 Alt­
hough Poirier does not comment more on this particular passage, the simi­
larity with the first linguistic passage in Thunder is obvious. However, the 
sequence of the Tripartite Tractate is one of ascent, thus it mentions the 
"word" 3 7 5 as the first level. Moreover, the "mind" is part of the sequence in 
the Tripartite Tractate, but not in Thunder. Here it constitutes the second 
part of the title. Thirdly, the sequence in the Tripartite Tractate is not for­
mulated as "I am"-proclamations and it is employed in a fairly different 
context than in Thunder. The "I am"-proclamations in particular are what 
unites Thunder with TriPro. It may simply be the case that, as Poirier also 
notes, these "categories de la pensée" were rather prevalent in Gnosticizing 
milieus. 3 7 6 It is important to acknowledge, though, that the terms are used 
in very different ways and contexts in Thunder and TriPro on the one hand, 
and the Tripartite Tractate on the other. However, this naturally does not 
imply that the Tripartite Tractate does not rely on Stoic dialectics. 
Another parallel is found in the Simonian Apophasis, attested in Hippol-
ytus' Refutatio omnium haeresium VI, 12, 2, which enumerates six roots of 
the engendered world: νους, έπίνοια, φωνή, όνομα, λογισμός and 
ένθύμησις. These terms, however, only overlap the sequence of self-
designations by the female revealer in Thunder to a certain extent. Like in 
the case of the Tripartite Tractate, the terms in the Apophasis are employed 
differently than in Thunder?11 
Finally, Poirier calls attention to a passage from Augustine's De doctrina 
Christiana describing the manifestation of the Word (Verbum) in a se­
quence very much like the one we find in both Thunder and TriPro. Poirier 
reconstructs the sequence as follows: cogitatio - verbum - sonus - vox -
locutio. 3 7 8 This is indeed an obvious parallel, which confirms the extent to 
which these categories of thought and language were employed. Without 
Translations are rendered as Poirier (1995: 227) brings them, although one could 
argue for different translations of these words. For instance ερ^ γ, which is another 
spelling of εροογ, could also be translated with "sound" as it is done in Thunder and 
TriPro. However, "voice" is still possible. 
3 7 5 The Coptic word cpexe may be a translation of the Greek λόγος. 
3 7 6 Porier 1995: 227. 
3 7 7 Loc.cit. and ibid.: 147-149 for a close analysis of the Simonian material in relation to 
Thunder. 
3 7 8 Ibid.: 228. 
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being an expert in Augustinian Studies, I assume that this line of linguistic 
terms builds upon his theories of language as found in the De Dialectica, in 
which he defines most of the above mentioned terms. According to Long, 
Augustine draws heavily upon Stoic dialectics. 3 7 9 This indicates, in my 
opinion, that later Christian and Jewish thinkers were influenced by Stoic 
dialectics, if they had not directly adopted them. There is no doubt that 
something similar is at stake in Augustine's description of the manifesta-
tion of the Word as we encounter in our two Nag Hammadi texts, namely, 
the topic of linguistic manifestation which furthermore connects these texts 
to the Johannine logos Christology. However, both the two Nag Hammadi 
texts and the passage from Augustine differ from the Johannine logos tradi-
tion in that they contain the same cluster of linguistic terms. This cluster, I 
argue, derives from the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression. Thunder, 
furthermore, expands its use of ancient philosophy of language, since it al-
so implies Platonic language-related topics, such as the notion of the name 
and diairesis. 
In the end Poirier does not place much value on the linguistic manifesta-
tion of the female revealer, describing the function of the passage as fol-
lows: "...pour illustrer la transcendance et l'immanence de l'entité su-
périeure qui prend la parole tout au long du monologue." 3 8 0 Thus, accord-
ing to Poirier, the linguistic sayings are just another way of describing the 
transcendence and immanence of the female revealer. 
Before I turn to the second linguistic passage in Thunder, I recall my 
four part division of Thunder, since the major part of the text lies in-
between the first and the second linguistic passages. The first linguistic 
passage is followed by the second major part of Thunder (14:15-18:8), in 
which the female revealer's proclamations and exhortations primarily focus 
on the relationship with her hearers. Through opposite concepts that de-
scribe their ambiguous relationship, the female revealer calls attention to a 
wide range of social relations. These are followed by the third major part of 
Thunder (18:9-19:20), in which the female revealer returns to describing 
herself. Right before the second linguistic passage, it seems as if the female 
revealer anticipates the linguistic theme especially as it is expressed in the 
third linguistic passage. By her proclamation "It is I who am the joining 
and the scattering. It is I who am the union and it is I who am the dissolu-
3 7 9 Long 2005: 49-55. 
3 8 0 Poirier 1995: 224. 
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t i o n " 3 8 1 ( ^ H O K ne π^ωτρ H H FIBCDX GBOX* ^ Ν Ο Κ ne Τ Μ Ο Ν Η · ^ γ ω κηοκ ne 
π Β ω λ ) (19:10-12), the female revealer touches upon a central issue of the 
notion of diairesis, with which she identifies herself in the third linguistic 
passage. Moreover, she alludes to the theme of female characters, especial­
ly with reference to the figure of Eve, which was a central topic of the first 
major part of Thunder. Thus she proclaims: "I, I am sinless, and the root of 
sin derives from me. It is I who am desire of the sight, and it is in me that 
continence of the heart exists." (b,uoK \HOK ογ^τΝΟΒβ' ^ γω TNoyue 
ΜΠΝΟΒ6 ΟγβΒΟλ N £ H T T6* \ H O K T6 ΤβΠΙθγΜΙ^ gNOYgOpeÆKT \\(Ώ 
Tenqp^Teiô. ΰ φ Η τ eccpoon ÏÏ£HT) (19:15-20). 
Now I will turn to the second linguistic passage. 
The second linguistic passage 
19:20-25 
... it is I who am 
the Hearing that is receivable to everyone 
and the Speech that cannot be 
grasped. I am a mute 
who cannot speak and great 
is my multitude of speaking. 
The second linguistic passage is not so long as the other two and does not 
add much to the linguistic theme of the text compared to the first and third 
passages, which might be the reason why Poirier does not include it in his 
listing of passages containing "les categories du language et de la pen-
sée". 3 8 2 At first glance the passage is about hearing and speaking as framed 
3 8 1 See below for further analysis. 
3 8 2 Poirier 1995: 147-149. See above for the discussion concerning the identification of 
the linguistic passages. 
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in paradox. But a closer look shows that it fits nicely into the linguistic line 
of thought that was launched by the first linguistic passage. It is obvious 
that this second linguistic passage does not follow the same sequence of 
terms that derived from the Stoic theory on voice. There is, however, good 
reason to believe that the passage nonetheless addresses these terms. 
The Hearing and the Speech 
The female revealer begins by identifying herself with the Hearing 
(ποωτΰ). In the text as a whole, the notion of "hearing" plays an essential 
role, in that the female revealer from time to time calls upon her "hearers" 
to make them listen to her message: "And you hearers, hear me" (^γω ïïpeq 
ccDTM CCDTM epoï) (13:7). Now she is herself that hearing, but what does 
she mean? As I see it, there are a couple of possibilities, which are not nec-
essarily mutually exclusive. Firstly, the female revealer may be understood 
as being the content of her message, that is, she is what the hearers of her 
manifestation actually hear. The sense of the proclamation would thus be: it 
is I who am what you hear. This understanding corresponds to the interpre-
tation of the saying in 14:14-15 "It is I who am the utterance of my name". 
This saying, I argued, shows how the female revealer is heard when she 
utters her name and becomes manifest in the visible world, namely, as 
thunder. The thunder is what the hearers at first hear when she enters into 
the world uttering her name. This reading sheds light on the present pas-
sage, since it underlines the auditory focus of her manifestation. The female 
revealer as the "hearing" illustrates that her manifestation is meant for the 
ear, that is, it is through the sense of hearing that one is made able to com-
prehend the divine. Furthermore, the fact that the sound of thunder is the 
first which is heard of the manifestation of the female revealer makes it 
clear that this thunder is receivable to everyone, since everyone is able to 
hear thunder. 
Secondly, as the "hearing" the female revealer may be understood as the 
one who makes the hearers able to hear. In other words, she provides the 
hearer with the sense of hearing. If this idea is taken a bit further, one may 
consider the function of the sense of hearing as the one through which 
young children learn to speak. They learn to speak their language and thus 
this language is fashioned. Again, I will recall a saying from the first lin-
guistic passage in which the female revealer is identified with Epinoia the 
Thought: "and the Thought (Epinoia) whose remembrance is great" (14:10-
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11). In relation to this proclamation, I argued that as Epinoia the female 
revealer could be understood as the provider of the knowledge of "good 
and evil", that is, opposites, since she in related texts (especially Ophite 
material) is presented as the helper of Adam, who, from inside the snake, 
makes the human being eat from the Tree of Knowledge. The knowledge 
that they gain is the knowledge of how to conceptualize their world in op-
posites, in "good and evil". 3 8 3 Seen from this perspective, the proclamation 
about the female revealer being "Hearing" alludes to the ability of concep-
tualizing the world through the language that is heard with the sense of 
hearing. 
The proclamation continues with what might seem as an opposition to 
the first part of the saying. Now, the female revealer is the "Speech that 
cannot be grasped". However, it is easily interpreted when read in relation 
to the first linguistic passage, in which "speech" also figures. Speech is the 
articulated yet unintelligible voice, so it cannot be grasped by the human 
rational mind. 
Poirier has a slightly different understanding of the saying: 
...le sens pourrait être que la révélatrice, insaisissable dans son discours, le 
devient en se faisant écoute de sa propre parole chez ceux qui sont destinés 
à l'entendre. En d'autres termes, on ne peut prétendre saisir sa parole si 
l'écoute de cette parole n'est point en même temps accordée par celle qui 
par le . 3 8 4 
What Poirier points to by stating that the female revealer is insaisissable is 
the numerous paradoxical self-proclamations adduced by the female 
throughout the text. These make her somehow ungraspable because she 
identifies herself with opposites, yet she is also graspable, as she makes 
herself the hearing of her speech. 
Even though Poirier's interpretation seems to encompass both parts of 
the saying, I think it makes sense to regard the saying as a continuation of 
the linguistic manifestation of the female revealer. The "hearing" is the fe-
male revealer as she becomes manifest as the sound that is receivable to 
everyone, but as she begins to speak she is incomprehensible and ungrasp-
able, yet still hearable. Two of the different levels of intelligibility are al-
3 8 3 See above for the discussion. 
3 8 4 Poirier 1995: 327. 
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luded to in this saying, which confirms the nature of the saying as a linguis-
tic one. 
The Mute and the Speaker 
The proclamation that follows continues the oppositional structure of the 
sayings which are so characteristic for Thunder. The opposition is of course 
between muteness and speech, which are both attributed to the female re-
vealer. Poirier finds this interpretation the most probable since it underlines 
the paradoxical nature of the female revealer, whom he rightly analyses as 
a kind of sapiental figure: 
En attribuant la loquacité à la locutrice, l'auteur cherche peut-être, par delà 
le contraste entre le mutisme et l 'abondance des paroles, à accentuer le 
caractère paradoxal de la figure sapientielle qui s'exprime dans Brontè . 3 8 5 
However, one might also consider other interpretations than an emphasis 
on paradox. Poirier himself mentions the analysis of J.-P. Mahé, 3 8 6 which 
addresses the passage in relation to the linguistic theme of the text, espe-
cially the passage that I designate the third linguistic passage (20:28-35). 
Mahé sees the muteness and the speech of the female revealer as a refer-
ence to the physical nature of the writing, that is, specific letters, syllables 
and so forth. The text as a physical object is referred to in 20:33-35 "It is I 
who am the sign (semeion) of the writing and the manifestation of the divi-
sion (diairesisy\ Although in this later saying there is no mention of the 
single elements (στοιχεία) of writing, that is, the very letters of the alpha­
bet, Mahé sees strong allusions to these elements, simply by her identifica-
tion with the writing. As the physical text in itself, i.e. the writing, the fe-
male revealer, is mute. However, her multitude of speaking is great, as this 
text is read out loud. 3 8 7 Poirier finds Mahé's interpretation possible, alt-
hough he does not think it probable in the present context of Thunder?** 
Here I disagree. I think, as Mahé, that the saying strongly alludes to the lin-
guistic features of the text and that the self-designation of the female re-
vealer as mute could very well refer to the physical nature of the text. On 
the other hand, the muteness of the letters is the prerogative of only six let-
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ters. These we already encountered in the reading of the Stoic theory on 
Voice, as attested by Diogenes Laertius, in which they were identified as 
άφωνα: β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ . 3 8 9 Although this was not the kind of muteness that 
Mahé was referring to, I thought it worth mentioning. I assume that the 
kind of muteness he speaks of is equivalent to the idea we find in Plato's 
Phaedrus 275d-e where Socrates speaks about writing: 3 9 0 
Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very much like painting; 
for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a 
question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; 
you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question 
them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and 
the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, 
alike among those who understand and those who have no interest in it, and 
it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly 
reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or 
help itself. 
A writing stands as it is written. It does not answer when you question it; it 
remains silent. This may be the best interpretation of the muteness of the 
female revealer. She is the writing which is silent - in fact, she is herself 
identified with the Silence (14:9). The saying that follows is naturally in 
opposition to the preceding one, for even though she is a mute who cannot 
speak, her multitude of speaking is also great. Continuing the line of 
thought established by Mahé, one may understand this saying as the writing 
that, however silent, speaks incessantly. The self-designation of the female 
revealer as referring to a mute and at the same time as one who speaks em-
phasizes, in my opinion, her linguistic manifestation as Silence and Speech. 
Meanwhile, this point goes hand in hand with the interpretation of the spe-
cific saying as the female revealer becomes manifest in the writing itself. 
The context of the passage from Phaedrus is interesting in other respects 
as well, in that it deals with the function of letters and writings: they weak-
en one's memory, since when writings exist, one does not have to memo-
rize everything. A writing makes you remember what you have forgotten 
about. If the female revealer is to be understood as the writing itself, she is 
the one who makes the reader/hearer remember. This calls to mind our in-
terpretation of the identification of the female revealer with Epinoia, whose 
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function is to awake the mind of the human being and make him remember, 
not only his divine origin but also how the world is conceptualized in oppo-
sites. Thus the female revealer is also the manifestation of the division 
(diairesis) in 21:35. This saying is found in the third linguistic passage, to 
which I will turn before long. However, we shall first investigate the pas-
sage that is located in between the second and the third linguistic passages. 
The location alone shows that this passage is of great importance. 
The knowledge of my name 
The passage may be divided into two (19:25-35 and 20:1-25), of which the 
first part somehow maintains the linguistic theme, however mixed with ex-
hortations to the hearers as well as self-proclamations concerning her de-
scent and her name: 3 9 1 
...Hear 
me in gentleness and 
learn from me in roughness. 
It is I who cry out 
and it is upon the face 
of the earth that I am cast out. 
It is I who prepare the bread and <...> 
<...> my mind within. It is I who am the 
knowledge of my name. It is I 
who cry out. And it is I who 
listen. 
Poirier attaches this passage very closely to the previous (linguistic pas-
sage), in that he understands the passage as running froml9:20b through 
20:5a. 3 9 2 He understands the present section as taking part in a vocabulary 
of "audition, parole, non-parole, loquacité, écoute, instruction puis cri, 
écoute, manifestation, énoncé, refutation...", 3 9 3 in other words a linguistic 
vocabulary. I agree with Poirier about the connection between this and the 
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foregoing passages, but I think the interruption by another saying (19:31-
32), which Poirier also mentions, disturbs the progression of the text 
enough for us to separate the two passages. This does not change the fact 
that the present passage is in many ways of essential importance for the 
linguistic theme in Thunder. I shall concentrate on a few of the sayings. 
The first relevant saying deals with the circumstances concerning the 
descent of the female revealer: "It is I who cry out and it is upon the face of 
the earth that I am cast out." 3 9 4 Firstly, the saying clearly alludes to her lin­
guistic (or in this particular case phonetic) manifestation in the world. Her 
cry corresponds to the sound/voice that she makes as she enters into this 
world. Secondly, the female revealer refers back to the very beginning of 
the monologue, where she proclaimed herself to be "sent forth from the 
Power" (ΰτ^γτΜ)γο6ΐ M40K esoX £ïï TOOM) (13:2-3). 
The saying that follows is somewhat confusing. It does not fit into its 
context, and it seems as if the scribe has omitted something. 3 9 5 It must be 
noted here that the proclamation is important, since it contains the only oc-
currence of uoyc (mind) in Thunder besides the one in the title. 
The second saying that I wish to concentrate on is the one which resumes 
the notion of the name of the female revealer: "It is I who am the 
knowledge of my name" (^NOK r e TTHCDCIC ΗΠ^Ρ^Η·). I have already 
touched upon the significance of this proclamation in relation to the first 
linguistic passage, in which the female revealer proclaimed herself to be 
the utterance of her name (14:14-15). The name of the female revealer is of 
essential importance to the overall interpretation of Thunder. Throughout 
this revelatory monologue, the hearers are constantly confronted with the 
question of the identity of the female revealer. She ceaselessly speaks about 
herself in ways that make one listen and think. That is the mission of 
Epinoia: to make human beings reflect upon her and her teaching, with 
which she is associated. This idea was already exposed at the very begin­
ning of the text where the female revealer proclaimed: "And it is to those 
who reflect upon me that I have come" (^γω NTè,ïéî q^NeTMeeye epoï) 
(13:3-4). Meanwhile, she never reveals her actual name - only the sound of 
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it, which is the thunder, as I argued above. Her divine name remains unut-
terable and secret, since it cannot be expressed in human rational language. 
Recognizing this is the same as knowing about her name, and therefore she 
is also the knowledge of her name. This secrecy of the name recalls the Pla-
tonic notion of the name, which I take to be very illuminating for the inter-
pretation of Thunder. For even though the Platonic Socrates advocated a 
natural relation between a name and referent in the Cratylus, his conclusion 
was that a name does not really capture the true essence of the things it 
names. To recognize the true essence of a thing, one has to look into the 
thing itself. I believe this idea is integrated in the Thunder on two levels. 
Firstly, the name of the female revealer is never revealed, not only because 
this name is holy, but also because it is not through her actual divine name 
that the hearers come to know her. In order to know her, they will have to 
look at her, that is, to listen carefully to her message, and not seek for her 
name. Her name is in this way superfluous, and the hearers are forced to 
think about her without knowing her name. That is the knowledge of her 
name. 
Secondly, the Platonic notion of the name also plays a role with regard to 
the message of the female revealer. What she reveals is, to a high degree, 
names: that is, names of things, conceptions, human relations and qualities. 
She reveals them in pairs of opposites, since this is how the human rational 
language conceptualizes the world. But is she in fact at the same time tell-
ing the hearers that these conceptions are nothing more than mere concep-
tions? That these do not reflect the true nature of things and that in order to 
grasp the essence of reality, one must abandon rational language? The an-
swers to all of these questions are, in my opinion, positive. The Platonic 
notion of the insufficiency of language in general and names of objects in 
particular partly forms the basis of the language-related speculations that 
are so fundamental for Thunder. Another part is the Stoic theory on Voice. 
These are the most central issues for my interpretation of Thunder, and they 
will become further developed through the analysis of the third linguistic 
passage. First, we must look at the second of the two passages that are lo-
cated in between the last two linguistic passages. 
Judgment and acquittal 
This passage (20:1-25) addresses the topic of judgment and acquittal. Un-
fortunately the top of page 20 is rather fragmented (as is the case with most 
of the pages). However, some words are readable, and some have been re-
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constructed. What is of special interest is the first word in line three. 
MacRae reconstructs ç4>[p]M-ic ("seal") 3 9 6 which could imply some kind of 
baptismal context referring to the baptism of the "Five Seals" of the 
"Sethian" tradition. 3 9 7 Seen in the context of the topic of judgment, this re-
construction could only make sense if it referred to the judgment of the 
soul. What could possibly point towards a baptismal scene is the mention-
ing of the garment feëcco) in 20:18-25: 
For what is inside of you is what is outside of you, 
and the one who shaped you on the outside 
has made an impression of it 
inside of you. And what 
you see outside of you, 
you see inside of you; 
it is manifest, and it is your garment. 
Garments are a central ingredient in the process of the baptism of the "Five 
Seals". However, TriPro has only one occurrence of £BCCD "garment" 
(47*: 17) and it is not in connection with the passage on baptism, but in re-
lation to the descent of Protennoia as logos "wearing everyone's garment". 
Nevertheless, in the passage on baptism (48*:6-35) the Greek term for 
"garment" occurs, namely CTOXH (στολή). In Turner's translation, it is ren­
dered "robes" in 48*: 15 and 17, but in 49*:30 it is rendered "garments", in 
spite of a recollection of baptism in the latter passage, which is about the 
person who has "stripped off the garments of ignorance and put on a shin­
ing Light". Turner thus distinguishes between the old garments that are 
stripped off, and the new robes that are achieved as one of the five seals. 
Even though some sort of garment is present in the baptismal scene in 
TriPro, the theme of judgment and acquittal is completely absent. 
Poirier does not agree with MacRae about the reconstruction of line three 
on page 20. He gives: M(j>[p]^cic "des énoncés". 3 9 8 This he finds fitting with 
regard to his reconstruction of [ncH]HeiON "signe" in the next line. These 
MacRae 1979: 250-251. 
3 9 7 For the most recent study of the baptismal rite of the five seals see Sevrin 1986. See 
also Turner 2001: 238-253. 
3 9 8 Poirier 1995: 194-195. 
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reconstructions are possible 3 9 9 and they fit into the context of the linguistic 
theme from the previous passage. In this way they also point ahead towards 
the third linguistic passage in which CHMCION is also present. On the other 
hand, these linguistic terms do not belong to a context of judgment, aquittal 
and garments, which may be the reason why Poirier does not count the first 
five lines of page twenty as part of the rest of the page. 4 0 0 
The theme of judgment in combination with that of garments suggests an 
interpretation which is formulated quite clearly in a passage from the Sen­
tences ofSextus (NHC ΧΙΙ,Ι) 30*:11-17: 
Say with [your] mind that the body [is] the garment of your soul; keep it, 
therefore, pure since it is innocent. Whatever the soul will do while it is in 
the body, it has as a witness when it goes unto judgement. 
On the other hand, the paradoxical presentation of the theme in Thunder 
calls for a slightly different interpretation. As Poirier notes in his analysis 
of the passage 20:1 lb-18a, the judge who is referred to in this passage is in 
fact the judge inside ourselves: "Ce juge n'est autre que le juge intérieur, 
c'est-à-dire l'intellect ou la conscience des auditeurs." 4 0 1 Thus it is not 
some exterior, perhaps divine judge who condemns the human being, but 
the human being himself. 
After this, the female revealer calls upon her hearers as an introduction 
or a "bridge" to the third linguistic passage: 
Hear me, you hearers 
and learn of my words 
you who know me (20:26-28) 
This short exhortation makes the importance of the passage that follows 
quite clear. That is the third linguistic passage, to which I will now turn. 
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The third linguistic passage 
This passage is found towards the end of the text. As the last of the three 
linguistic passages it takes up a central position as the last trump which not 
only emphasizes the message of the two preceding passages, but also gives 
the reader the actual key to understanding the complexity of the text. Fur­
thermore, the passage also underlines the importance of analyzing Thunder 
as a whole in relation to its linguistic focus. 
20:28-35 
. . . &NOK ne 
nCCDTH 6ΤφΗΠ N£CDB NIM" 
&NOK ne Π φ ^ 6 6Τ6Η^γ 
φ^Μ^£Τ6 HMOq- \ΗΟΚ Π6 
npèwN ÏÏTCHH' &γα> T 6 C H H 
Μπρ^Ν* &.ΝΟΚ ne ncHHei 
ON WTC V ^ï ' Y^<T> Πθγσ>Ν£ 6Β0λ 
NTAi^epecic* ^γω ^NOK... 
... It is I who am 
the Hearing that is receivable in everything. 
It is I who am the Speech that cannot be 
grasped. It is I who am 
the Name of the Voice and the Voice 
of the Name. It is I who am the sign 
of the writing and the manifestation 
of the division. And I... 
Unfortunately the passage continues into a lacuna. It seems as if the text 
would have continued along the same lines for a least a few more verses. 
The linguistic focus of this passage is apparent, but the interpretation of 
each verse may contain some difficulties. The text begins almost identically 
with the preceding linguistic passage, although with a minor variation in 
that this passage has (\HOK nccDTH β τ φ Η π , "it is I who am the Hearing 
which is receivable...") N£CDB NVM, "in everything" 4 0 2 instead of ΝογοΝ NVM, 
I follow the translation of Poirier 1995: 196-197, "C'est moi qui est recevable en 
toute chose", which indicates that he understands the w- as the preposition "in". This 
corresponds to the translation of Layton [1987] 1995: 84 "It is I who am the listening 
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"to everyone" as in 19:21-22. The difference between the two passages 
may not be significant, and Poirier ascribes the variation to an inconsis­
tency on the part of the translator. 4 0 3 However, the "NOYON M M " in 19:21-22 
refers primarily to persons, 4 0 4 whereas the "N£CDB NIM" in 20:29 refers to 
things. 4 0 5 So, if one chooses to translate the N - with "in" (as Poirier does) 
instead of "to", it could have the implication that the manifestation of the 
goddess as the "Hearing" is not only receivable to everyone, i.e. to every 
human being, but also in everything, i.e. everything belonging to the realm 
into which she descends. This resembles a passage at the beginning of 
TriPro 35*: 11-20, where Protennoia proclaims to exist within everything 
including, for instance, every Power as well as every material soul. 
Whether the difference between the two linguistic passages is an inconsis­
tency on the part of the translator/copyist or not, the interpretation of the 
verses remains by and large the same. The female revealer as the Hearing is 
receivable both to everyone and in everything. The latter I understand as 
the sound of the female revealer as she becomes manifest in the visible 
world. It is a sound of thunder that is receivable in everything, that is, she is 
to be imagined as one who resonates in everything. The numerous exam­
ples of the shaking of the foundations as the divine enters into the world are 
good examples for comparison. 4 0 6 In TriPro it even happens by a thunder­
ing sound (43*: 15). 
The following saying is identical to the one found in the second linguis­
tic passage: "It is I, the Speech that cannot be grasped." Recalling the 
analysis of the previous occurence of this saying, the female revealer is un-
graspable as Speech because she has not yet reached down to the level of 
the rational logos. Understood in terms of the Stoic sequence of a verbal 
expression: she is articulate, but still unintelligible. 
Once again, Thunder takes up the issue of the name: "It is I who am the 
Name of the Voice and the Voice of the Name" (\UOK ne n p ^ N NTCMH* 
^γω xecMH Μ π ρ ^ Ν ' ) . This saying reaffirms my interpretation of the saying 
in which the female revealer proclaims herself to be the utterance of her 
that is acceptable in every matter". MacRae [1979] 2000: 250-251 on the other hand 
translates "I am the hearing that is attainable to everything" (my emphasis in all three 
quotations). 
4 0 3 Poirier 1995: 326-327. 
4 0 4 Crum: 482. 
4 0 5 Crum: 653. 
4 0 6 See for instance the Apocryphon of John 30:19-20. 
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name (14:15). Her manifestation in this world is an act of utterance of the 
divine name. This utterance is heard as a thunder. In the present saying the 
uttering of the name must be understood as the voice. It is significant for 
the saying that it is pronounced both forwards and backwards, so to speak. 
This I understand as an indication of the identification of the female re-
vealer with her own name as well as the content of that name, that is, her 
own teaching. Poirier supports this as he writes: "En se présentant à la fois 
comme «nom de la voix» et «voix du nom», la locutrice affirme l'identité 
et l'interchangeabilité du véhicule (voix) et du contenu (nom) de la 
révélation qu'elle communique..." 4 0 7 Furthermore, Poirier ascribes the say-
ing of the female revealer to the Judeo-Christian tradition of the non-
communicative divine name. The association with this tradition affirms her 
divine character. 4 0 8 I agree with Poirier that Thunder is somehow depend-
ent on the tradition concerning the divine name. However, in my interpreta-
tion I put much more value on this issue, since I believe that Thunder de-
velops the topic in a linguistic philosophical direction. 
In Stoic terminology, the "voice/sound of the name" is what is heard 
when the divine name is uttered in this world: it sounds like thunder 
(ΒΡΟΝΤΉ), ΒΡΟΝΤΉ may thus be understood as a "sound-word", an 
onomatopoesis of the phenomenon of thunder. Therefore, ΒΡΟΝΤΉ, as the 
word/name of the thunder phenomenon, may be regarded as the "name of 
the voice/sound". So, what is in fact at stake in this particular saying is a 
punning on the onomatopoetic name for thunder. In the article by Mahé 
from 1981 to which I have already referred, he argues for a language-
related understanding of this particular verse. He sees it as alluding to the 
Semitic writing system, in which different points around the consonants 
represent the vowels. 4 0 9 He writes: "«Je suis le nom de la voix (= les 
consonnes que l'on vocalise) et la voix du nom (= les voyelles qu'on insère 
entre les consonnes)...»". 4 1 0 However intriguing this interpretation may be, 
it is not a possible interpretation, since the Semitic vowel system is a later 
4 U / Poirier 1995: 327. 
4 0 8 Ibid.: 328. Poirier mentions as examples the rabbinic tradition of the use of Drøn (the 
name) instead of the tetragram. Moreover, he also points to the following New Testa-
ment texts: Ac 5:41; (3 Jn 7 (?)) and Rev 19:12. 
4 0 9 Mahé 1981: 57. Against the background of this, he suggests that Thunder may be a 
translation of an original Syrian or Aramaean text. This, however, remains an open 
question. 
4 1 0 Ibid. n. 47. 
161 
Linguistic Manifestations of Divine Thought 
1 Cf. LSJ 1593. 
162 
invention than the time of composition of the Nag Hammadi Codices. 
Moreover, the Greek relation is emphasized continuously throughout 
Thunder and must be considered the main influence on this text with regard 
to its linguistic features. 
If the Stoic line of thought is continued, we may assume that the sound-
word, "ΒΡΟΝΤΉ", has a sensuous effect on the human being. What kind of 
effect would that be? Fear of a powerful force, awe and wonder? On the 
other hand, neither the name "ΒΡΟΝΤΉ" nor the voice/sound it is making 
when pronounced really capture the essence of the revealer who is signified 
by this thunder. Therefore, according to Plato's Socrates, we must look into 
the things themselves in order to be able to grasp their true essence. For this 
reason it is important to recall that the female revealer constantly tells her 
hearers about who she is, that is, she is herself the content of the linguistic 
manifestation of the divine name. 
In this way Thunder guides the reader ahead to the next proclamation 
that speaks about the meaning of text and of how we are to understand the 
female revealer in relation to her numerous antithetical and paradoxical 
self-proclamations. 
Sêmeion and diairesis 
I cannot emphasize enough the importance of the last verse of the third lin-
guistic passage: &NOK. ne ncHMeiON ï ï n c V à r ^ γ ω πογα>Ν£ GBOX 
NTAigepecic "It is I who am the sign of the writing and the manifestation of 
the division". Both parts of this verse contain terms that belong within a 
language philosophical framework that had been developed hundreds of 
years before the composition of Thunder. The terms are not adopted by 
Thunder on a "one-to-one" scale, but rather used in a wholly different con­
text. However, this does not change the fact that the central characteristics 
of these terms are sustained and that they play an essential role in the over­
all understanding of Thunder. 
Sëmeion 
The meanings of the term CHMGION are myriad depending on the context in 
which it is employed. 4 1 1 Of these Poirier prefers the meaning that implies 
the single letters or characters of the alphabet or the diacritical signs that 
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accompany letters and words. Furthermore, also with regard to the 
diairesis, he adopts a narrow sense of the term in that he understands it as 
the act of reading a text composed as scriptio continua. He writes: 
...l'acte de lecture n'était rien d'autre qu'une opération «discriminante», 
une διαίρεσις, et cette operation ne pouvait se réaliser sans une certaine 
compréhension du texte qui permettait d'opérer des regroupements, c'est-
à-dire des passages de la διαίρεσις à la σύνθεσις, laquelle, au-delà des 
lettres, faisait apparaître des syllabes, puis des mots et enfin des énoncés . 4 1 3 
Mahé argues along the same lines, although he speaks about Semitic 
languages: "...Sëmeion signifie le point qu'on place au-dessus d'une letter 
et diairesis peut être un signe de separation entre deux mots." 4 1 4 The ap-
proach of these two scholars focuses on the details of the physical text. The 
"sign" of the writing thus corresponds to letters or diacritical signs. The 
female revealer thereby proclaims herself to be the very letters of the writ-
ing. In this way she is regarded as being present in the text itself. As Cox 
Miller formulated it in 1986: "she is what she speaks..."415 Cox Miller's 
article is seminal with regard to exploring the language-related speculations 
within Thunder. She employs Thunder as her point of departure for an in-
vestigation of "a particular...appropriate linguistic response to linguistic 
reality in certain religious texts from late antiquity." 4 1 6 These are the so-
called "magical" texts in which one finds several examples of linguistic 
manifestations of the divine. However, the kind of divine language found in 
these texts is very different from the language of Thunder. Cox Miller 
points to the related Nag Hammadi text the Holy Book of the Great invisi-
ble Spirit (Gospel of the Egyptians), in which language-related speculations 
play an essential role. She quotes for comparison a passage that in many 
respects is relevant: 
And the throne of his (glory) was established (in it, this one) on which his 
unrevealable name (is inscribed), on the tablet (...) one is the word, the (Fa-
ther of the light) of everything, he (who came) forth from the silence, while 
he rests in the silence, he whose name (is) an (invisible) symbol. (A) hid-
den, (invisible) mystery came forth iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii(iii) ëëëëëëëëëëëëë-
4 1 2 Poirier 1995: 324; 328. 
4 1 3 Ibid.: 325. 
4 1 6 Loc.cit. 
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ëëëëêë(ëë o) ooooooooooooooooooooo uu(uuu)uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu eeee-
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee aaaaaaa(aaaa)aaaaaaaaaaa öööööööööööööööööööööö. 
And (in this) way the three powers gave praise to the (great), invisible, un-
nameable, virginal, uncallable Spirit... 4 1 7 
In this short passage it is quite clear that the Holy Book of the Great Invisi-
ble Spirit also operates within a "linguistic-divine" framework. Many of the 
features that play a central role in the descriptions of the linguistic manifes-
tations in Thunder are present: the silence, from which the Father comes 
forth; the name that is unrevealable; and a strange linguistic manifestation. 
To Cox Miller the paradoxical self-proclamations by the female revealer of 
Thunder correspond to the vocal manifestation of the Invisible Spirit in the 
quoted passage, in that both are incomprehensible. She understands the vo-
cal "mysteries" as the signs as she writes: "Here is the "sign of the letter" 
with a vengeance!" 4 1 8 Cox Miller makes some important observations 
which in my opinion are right on target with regard to what is at stake in 
Thunder. For instance, the manner in which she describes the linguistic 
manifestation of the divine in Holy Book of the Great Invisible Spirit: 
"When the God who is 'an invisible symbol' breaks into human speech, his 
sounds are the echoes of the alphabet, the vowels" (my emphasis). 4 1 9 
Breaking into human speech is exactly what happens when the female re-
vealer and Protennoia in TriPro descend into the human world. Protennoia 
even descended below the language of the powers. 4 2 0And that the sounds of 
the God are echoes of the alphabet makes perfect sense if these sounds are 
understood in terms of the Stoic notion of "primary sounds", 4 2 1 since these 
are the most original of sounds and thus perhaps closer to the divine. When 
all this has been said, I think Cox Miller jumps a bit too fast from Thunder 
to the "vocal mysteries". It is true that the paradoxes in Thunder are in-
comprehensible, but nowhere in Thunder do we find the same kind of vocal 
mysteries as for instance in the Holy Book of the Great Invisible Spirit or 
even in TriPro.422 The words and concepts employed in Thunder are in fact 
4 1 7 Ibid.: 483. Gospel of the Egyptians/Holy Book of the Great Invisible Spirit (NHC 
111,2; IV,2) 43:18-44:13. 
41*Loc.cit. 
4 1 9 Loc.cit. 
4 2 0 See above for the analysis of this particular verse (41*:26-28). 
4 2 1 Cf. the chapter on philosophy. 
4 2 2 There are several examples in the Nag Hammadi Library of "vocal mysteries", see 
for instance the Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth (NHC VI,6) (56:17-22 and 61: ΙΟ­
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comprehensible by the human rational mind, if they are understood sepa-
rately. What makes them incomprehensible is the fact that they are com-
prised in a single being - the female revealer. So, what in my view discon-
nects Thunder from the texts that communicate the divine through mystical 
vowel spells is the fact that the very words employed by Thunder are intel-
ligible and not just nonsense. At the beginning of her article, Cox Miller 
states that "...from a rational analytical perspective, the structure of her 
(the female revealer's) language is nonsense." 4 2 3 1 agree that proclaiming to 
contain opposites like "the whore and the holy one" or "knowledge and ig-
norance" within one and the same being is certainly paradoxical. Neverthe-
less, the concepts used are intelligible, contrary to the vowel spells of 
TriPro. Moreover, the apophatic discourse, which is obviously an essential 
feature of the Holy Book of the Great Invisible Spirit as well as TriPro, is 
not present in same manner in Thunder. In Thunder we do not find procla-
mations like "I am the invisible within the Thought of the Invisible one. I 
am revealed in the immeasurable ineffable (things). I am incomprehensible 
existing within the incomprehensible."(rnPro 35*:7-ll). The only time the 
female revealer of Thunder proclaims herself to be incomprehensible is 
when she is Silence (^NOK n e nKApœq β τ β Μ ^ γ φ τ ^ Ο Η ' ) (14:10). Only two 
other instances of "apophatic-like" language are found in the proclamation 
about the "speech that cannot be grasped" (^NOK n e π φ ^ β 
6Τ6Μ^γφ^Μ^£Τ6 H H o q ) (19:22-23; 20:30-31). The notions of Silence and 
the ungraspable Speech are apophatic features that without doubt link 
Thunder to these other texts. The topic of the name that is actually never 
revealed may also be counted among these specific aspects of Thunder. 
However, I still believe that there is something more at issue in Thunder 
than apophatic thinking alone. In what follows it will become apparent that 
the key to my underunderstanding of the opposite self-designations of the 
female revealer lies within her own identification with the meaning of the 
text. I shall now return to the saying in which the female revealer proclaims 
herself to be the sign of the writing. 
Once again I find Stoic dialectics to be illuminating for the analysis of 
the linguistic features of Thunder. As I described in the chapter on ancient 
philosophy of language, the Stoics distinguished between the "things which 
15); Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1) (52 and 127); the Trimorphic Protennoia (NHC ΧΙΙΙ,Ι) 
(38*:29). 
4 2 3 Cox Miller 1986: 481. 
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signify" (σημαίνοντα) and the "things which are signified" (σημαινόμενα). 
The former referred to the corporeal subjects with regard to language, for 
instance, sound, writing, verbal expressions and etymology. The latter re­
ferred to the incorporeal subjects of language such as the meaning of what 
is being said, that is, lekta.424 If this Stoic distinction is taken into consider­
ation in the analysis of the present saying in Thunder, it becomes apparent 
that the female revealer may in fact be understood as being both that which 
signifies and that which is signified, showing how tightly these two ele­
ments are connected. The female revealer is the sign of the writing. From a 
Stoic perspective this implies that she is that which signifies the writing. 
This means that she is the corporeal subjects of the text. These are the 
sounds which are hearable when they are uttered and the single words of 
the text, both as written and as read out loud. In other words: she is the text. 
This further underlines the informative, knowledge-giving and revelatory 
role of the text, which functions as the medium between the divine and the 
human world. This interpretation resembles what has already been said by 
Poirier and Cox Miller, 4 2 5 with the exception that they understand CHM6ION 
as the single letters of the alphabet, which is not the usual sense of the 
term. 4 2 6 The Greek terms for "letter" are typically στοιχεΐον or γράμμα. 4 2 7 
Meanwhile, the female revealer is also herself the content of the text. 
That is what her many self-proclamations are telling the reader/hearer, as in 
Cox Miller's words: "she is what she speaks". 4 2 8 As I have pointed out sev­
eral times, the female revealer is to be regarded as being associated with 
her own teaching. Therefore, I suggest that the proclamation in question 
may also be read as saying that the female revealer is what is signified by 
the text. This has in fact already been seen by McGuire: "In identifying the 
divine as the 'sign (semeion) of writing,' the text reflects back upon itself, 
identifying the divine with the hidden significance of this text ." 4 2 9 
In Stoic terminology, the female revealer is thus the incorporeal mean­
ing of the text, which means that she may be identified with the Stoic 
See the chapter on philosophy for a more detailed discussion of the two subdivisions 
of Stoic dialectics. 
4 2 5 See above. 
4 2 6 Cf. L S / 1593. 
4 2 7 Cf. LSJ 358 and 1647. In the passage from Diogenes Laertius about the Stoic theory 
on voice that I analysed above, the term στοιχεΐον was employed. 
4 2 8 Cox Miller 1986: 482. 
4 2 9 McGuire 1992: 49. 
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lekton. It is important to emphasize that Thunder does not explicitly say 
this, nor was it probably the intention of the author to imply this under­
standing. Nevertheless, the Stoic distinction between σημαίνοντα and 
σημαινόμενα, which inevitably implies the notion of the lekton, is an excel­
lent analytical tool in attempting to understand the close relation between 
the female revealer and her teaching. 
The essence of that teaching is given in the next saying, which I under­
stand as the key to the understanding of the paradoxical self-proclamations 
of the female revealer of Thunder. 
Diairesis 
The third linguistic passage ends by the female revealer proclaiming herself 
to be the "manifestation of the division" (πογωΝ£ eso\ NTAi^epecic). As I 
have already mentioned above, this saying has been analysed by Poirier 
and Mahé as constituting a continuation of a specific focus on textuality, in 
relation to which they also understood CHMGION. AS division (diairesis), the 
female revealer is the division between words, showing the reader how to 
divide and distinguish between words in a text written in scriptio continua. 
This interpretation is very plausible and fits well into the linguistic focus of 
the passage. However, as in the case of sëmeion, I believe that the term 
diairesis may also be understood at a much broader level, if still a linguistic 
one. As was shown in my investigation of the term in the chapter on an-
cient philosophy of language, diairesis was a central topic in Platonic dia-
lectics, distinguishing between concepts in order to achieve a definition. 
Since it appears in a language-related context in Thunder, I suggest that we 
understand its use against a Platonic background. Before considering the 
specific use of diairesis in Thunder, I shall recall the essence of the notion 
as it is presented by Plato. 
The method of diairesis was a tool of definition employed by the dialec-
tician in order to obtain a precise definition and to grasp the true essence of 
a given concept through an investigation of its name. This investigation 
(the diairesis) was carried out through a systematic division of the genus 
(the concept in question) into subgenera, each of which were again divided 
into other subgenera until no further division could be made. Then the un-
dividable concept (the infima species) was reached. The divisions were 
made between dichotomies/opposites. My analysis above of diairesis em-
phasized the following three things: 
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1) A diairesis uncovers the complexity of a single concept, in that the 
method shows how the concept in fact comprises all the different as-
pects that are encountered during the process. In other words, it is a 
unity of the many. As the dialectician acknowledges the complexity 
of the name in question, he recognizes in this diversity the true es-
sence and reality behind that name. 
2) Proceeding through a diairesis is a process of remembrance (anam-
nesis). This means that as one chases the essence of a given name 
through the various dichotomies, one recalls at the same time all 
these opposites. They are recalled as forms and recognized as being 
part of the name in question. "Knowledge is knowledge of differ-
ences" as Minardi concluded. 4 3 0 This is connected to the last central 
issue: 
3) The differences between the forms are made known in that they are 
defined only in relation to one another. That which is to be under-
stood, e.g. "non-being", may actually be said to exist in relation to 
"being". So, opposites exist in inter-dependency. 
If these features concerning the method of diairesis are taken into consid-
eration in the analysis of the concept in Thunder, central aspects of the text 
are elucidated. 
The female revealer of Thunder proclaims that she is the manifestation 
of the division (diairesis). In light of the Platonic notion of diairesis I sug-
gest that the saying indicates that she reveals herself as the knowledge of 
differences. The numerous paradoxical and antithetical self-proclamations 
in Thunder, which are generally understood to signify the transcendence of 
the female revealer, may in this way in fact be understood as expressions of 
her own diairetic manifestation. This approach provides us with an entirely 
new understanding of Thunder, since it brings the opposite concepts into a 
new light that makes it possible to understand them as more than mere 
paradoxes. They may now be seen as concepts of difference, opposites 
which embrace all facets of human language. It is important to emphasize 
here that the proclamation is situated within a linguistic framework, a point 
that makes it even more reasonable to interpret the concepts in terms of a 
language-related perspective. 
If the Platonic perspective is pursued, the notion of diairesis in Thunder 
indicates that something is being defined. In this case, it is clear (because of 
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the self-proclamations) that it is the female revealer herself who is under 
investigation. Throughout Thunder, the reader is met with a wide range of 
different self-designations by the female revealer ranging from concepts of 
female identities (biological and social) over concepts of power and weak-
ness, to concepts relating to judgment and acquittal. It is obvious that 
Thunder does not follow the systematic structure of a traditional diairetic 
definition, since it employs the notion of diairesis in a completely different, 
revelatory kind of framework interwoven with exhortations to the hearers. 
Nevertheless, many of the same features which are characteristic of the phi-
losophical employment of the notion of diairesis, are present within Thun-
der as well. 
The numerous self-designating oppositions of the female revealer signify 
that she embraces all these different concepts in one being, that is, herself. 
From a philosophical perspective, she is a unity that comprises the many. 
Even though the concepts are conflicting and may thus be designated para-
doxes (as they are comprised within one being), they must all still be re-
garded as expressions of the one unity which is the female revealer. Thus, 
the diairesis of Thunder is characterised by an enumeration of dichotomies 
which all share the same essence: the female revealer. And it is only 
through a reflection on all of them together that one might be able to grasp 
her true identity. She is identical with these differences, showing that one 
half of the pair cannot exist without the other, since they are interdepend-
ent. This makes her the "manifestation" of the division. McGuire seems to 
support this approach: 
Finally, as 'the manifestation of difference,' the text suggests that the 
speaker's significance is manifested in the differentiation of features, the 
distinction of categories, the processes of separation and dissolution, and 
the multiplicity of expression and interpretation. 4 3 1 
Through a reflection upon these opposite concepts, the hearer will eventu-
ally come closer to her: "It is to those who reflect upon me that I have 
come" (Trr^ïéï q^NeTMeeye epoi) (13:3-4). This is intimately related to the 
description of the process of a diairesis as a process of remembrance. For 
in her identification with the figure of Epinoia (14:10), the female revealer 
situates herself within the activity of providing the human being with the 
ability to reflect upon and know "good and evil", that is, opposites. This 
1 McGuire 1992: 49. 
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understanding of the role of Epinoia is found in the Hypostasis of the Ar­
chons.432 The opposite concepts are concepts of reality which may be re­
garded as equivalent to the Platonic forms (είδος). So when the female re­
vealer proclaims to be "the word whose form is manifold" (nXoroc 
βτβΝ^φε neqeiNe) (14:13-14), she refers to the various concepts with 
which she identifies herself. The concepts of reality are the forms which the 
human being knew before he was cast into oblivion, 4 3 3 and which the fe­
male revealer now makes him remember through her manifestation. The 
identification of the female revealer with Epinoia as the provider of the 
ability of reflection and knowledge is, in my opinion, the core of what the 
female revealer of Thunder stands for. She provides the human being with 
knowledge of how to conceptualize the visible world in opposites. This 
conceptualization is at the same time understood as an act of remembrance, 
which is why the female revealer proclaims to be "the Thought (Epinoia) 
whose remembrance is great" (14:16-17). The human being is given the 
knowledge that makes him able to recognize and conceptualize the world 
as "good and evil", that is, in opposite concepts. The female revealer is as­
sociated with her own teaching as unifying dichotomies, a fact that makes it 
possible for her to proclaim herself to be "knowledge and ignorance", "war 
and peace", "strength and fear", "whore and holy", "first and last". These 
opposites show, as many interpreters have pointed out, that paradox can be 
comprised within the divine and that the female revealer as such is tran­
scendent. 4 3 4 With this I agree. However, I think she does more than just tell 
her hearers that she is transcendent. Her message is directed towards them 
and their ability to grasp her sayings. She gives them the ability to concep­
tualize their world, which means that she provides them with language. 
According to Turner, we find in Marsanes (NHC X) an employment of 
the notion of diairesis. The passage appears to very similar to what we 
have found in Thunder. 
[...] promise that [the articulation marks (διαίρεσις) will] begin [to separate] 
them by means of a sign [and] a point, the [uninflected (upright = ·) one] 
See the analysis of Epinoia given above. 
4 3 3 Cf. the above analysis of the identification of the female revealer with Epinoia. The 
theme of the human being's oblivion or "sleep" is not explicitly present in Thunder, but 
is drawn into the interpretation of Epinoia and remembrance by a similar theme being 
found in the Hypostasis of the Archons. 
4 3 4 See my introduction to the present chapter, in which I present the different approach­
es to this question. 
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and the [inflected (bent = ,)] one. So also [are the images] of being: [they 
derive from a joining] of the letters (elements) in [a holy union] according 
to a [juxtaposition] where they exist independently. . . . 4 3 5 
Turner obviously reconstructs major parts of this passage, a fact that makes 
his analysis somewhat hypothetical. Nevertheless, I find his analysis very 
interesting since it points in the direction of the specifically Platonic meth­
od of division: 
In X 33, 16-34, 6 it seems that Marsanes understands the divisions or 
διαίρεσις of speech represented by punctuation to symbolize the "method 
of division and synthesis" applied by Plato to the study of true reality, 
which he calls "dialectic". 4 3 6 
The context in which Marsanes discusses the issue of diairesis is one of 
"alphanumeric speculation" on the soul. This implies long sections in 
which the text speculates about the relation between the letters of the Greek 
alphabet and the constitution of the soul, the celestial, angelic powers and 
the elementary constituents of the sensible world. 4 3 7 The phonetic consid­
erations in Marsanes are clearly related to the theories of sound and voice 
that are found in TriPro and Thunder, but are also different. For instance, 
Marsanes" s narrative follows a so-called "ascent pattern", whereas both 
TriPro and Thunder follow "descent patterns". 4 3 8 Indeed, the latter texts 
employ the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression as a scheme of descent 
into the visible/hearable, that is, sensible world. On the other hand, this 
does not change the fact that Marsanes makes use of language-related 
speculation in its description of the divine that may even originate in Pla­
tonic dialectics. Moreover, if Turner's analysis of Marsanes' use of the no­
tion of diairesis is taken into consideration with regard to Thunder, this 
connection not only establishes yet another link between Thunder and the 
"Sethian" tradition, it also supports my understanding of diairesis in Thun­
der. 
But there exists gentle [discourse] and there exists another discourse [re­
lated to] [permanent] substance of this [sort that speaks] of [that which is 
Marsanes 33:16-34:2.1 use the translation given by Turner in 2001: 624-625 since it 
shows his own reconstructions, on which he bases his analysis. 
4 3 6 Turner 2001: 625. 
4 3 7 Turner 2007: 632. 
4 3 8 Thus, Turner 2001: 80-84. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have investigated the linguistic features in Thunder against 
the background of ancient philosophy of language. In three passages (14:9-
15; 19:20-25 and 20:28-35), which I call the linguistic passages, the female 
revealer of Thunder identifies herself with a number of language-related 
concepts that are of Platonic and Stoic origin. It is clear that Thunder does 
not use these philosophical features on a one-to-one scale, but rather inte-
grates them into a revelatory framework, thereby giving them a new "fla-
vour". 
Through analysis of the three linguistic passages in Thunder, I found that 
the female revealer employs the same model for her descent into the world 
as Protennoia does in TriPro. They both use the Stoic sequence of a verbal 
expression as a scheme of descent, although beginning from within Silence, 
moving from the unintelligible and unuttered Thought over the uttered but 
unintelligible and inarticulate Sound and Voice, and over the articulate yet 
unintelligible Speech to the intelligible and articulate Logos 
(word/discourse). In Thunder the movement only appears in the first lin-
guistic passage (14:9-15), and it goes as follows: 
KApcDq - eniMOiè, - (epooy) - CMH - Xoroc - φ2οςε - (P^N) 
Silence - Thought - (Sound) - Voice - Word/Discourse - Speech/Utterance -
(name) 
Marsanes 35:20-36:2. Again I bring Turner's translation because of his reconstruc­
tions. Turner 2001: 625. 
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See above. 
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invisible], and it [manifests] the difference [between the Same] and the 
[Different and] between the whole and a [part] of an [indivisible] sub-
439 
stance... 
This passage displays the same kind of reflection as is found in Thunder 
about the way to express diversity held within a single substance, namely, 
in the difference between "Same and Different", that is, between opposite 
concepts that only exist in interdependency. This discussion derives from 
the Sophist in which it is concluded that "non-being" actually exists but 
only in relation to "being". 4 4 0 
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This is the linguistic descent of the female revealer of Thunder. It shows 
how the female revealer works on different levels of intelligibility, a fact 
that is emphasized by the repetition of several of these features in the re-
maining two linguistic passages. 
The linguistic descent of the female revealer of Thunder must be under-
stood "upside-down", as I also argued in the case of Protennoia. The Logos 
is not the highest semantic level of manifestation of the female revealer, as 
it is in the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression. Rather, the highest se-
mantic level of the divine lies within Silence. The Silence is therefore seen 
as the actual goal for the hearers of Thunder since their task is to find her. 
She comes from the Silence, so that is where they must go. Now, for a hu-
man being to reach the level of Silence means that one has to abandon lan-
guage. But how can that be, when Thunder is constantly speaking about 
language? 
In her linguistic manifestation, the female revealer of Thunder descends 
into the sensible world of sound and rational language. She descends as 
Epinoia, in the rumbling of thunder that is ungraspable by the human mind 
and in Speech that is reachable (articulate), although not fully intelligible. 
Finally, she descends as the Word/Logos in many forms. The Stoic se-
quence of a verbal expression is used to describe the different levels of in-
telligibility that the female revealer of Thunder passes through during her 
descent, moving from unintelligibility to intelligibility. In other words she 
descends downwards until she reaches the level of the Logos, which is the 
level of rational discourse. She descends to this level in order to be able to 
speak to the hearers and to teach them about language. I argue that her task 
is to reveal the structures of human language by being manifest on the dif-
ferent levels of that language. There are different aspects of this proposal 
that imply the female revealer's diverse modes of manifestation: 
Firstly, as Epinoia, the female revealer alludes to her role as the provider 
of knowledge of "good and evil"; in other words, she provides the human 
being with the ability to conceptualize his world in opposites. She gives 
him language. 
Secondly, the notion of the name is important in two ways: 1) It reflects 
the pondering upon the name of the female revealer, showing that "thun-
der" is only the sound/voice of her name in the sensible world; and 2) 
against this background, it reflects the Platonic critique of names (words). 
This is shown by the fact that her true name is never revealed, but only at-
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tainable to a certain extent. It is not through her name that one will grasp 
her true essence. 
Thirdly, the two former points are connected where the female revealer 
proclaims that she is the manifestation of the division (diairesis). The Pla-
tonic method of diairesis was an attempt to overcome the problem of the 
insufficiency of names. Through a division of a chosen concept (genus) 
into a pair of opposite subconcepts (subgenera) which again are divided 
into other opposites, one will eventually reach an undividable concept 
(infima species), which is the closest one can get to the essence of the con-
cept in question. An important feature to recall here is that all the subdivi-
sions form part of the name which is being defined. They all contribute as-
pects of the larger image of the thing in question. Therefore the numerous 
self-proclamations may be partly understood as a diairetic investigation of 
the essence of the female revealer, because her own name, of which only 
the voice is revealed, does not sufficiently describe her true essence. All the 
opposite pairs are thus not only paradoxes, but also diairetic descriptions of 
her. They form the plurality that is united in her as a single being. More-
over, the opposite concepts are also the teaching of Epinoia, as she reveals 
the knowledge of how to conceptualize the world and speak about it, while 
at the same time being associated with that teaching herself. She reveals 
language by being language. 
The hearers' task is to find the female revealer in all these sayings, so 
she provides them with essential concepts like, for instance, "knowledge 
and ignorance". These concepts make it possible for the hearers to obtain a 
more complex and detailed knowledge of her, because, as in a diairesis, the 
many different concepts all form part of the thing in question, in this case 
the female revealer. 
Now, through a reflection upon the language that they are being given, 
the hearers approach the female revealer. However, as they become ac-
quainted with the structures of this language, they also discover its insuffi-
ciency, since, according to Plato, a thing's name cannot capture the true 
essence of the thing. In order to grasp the reality of something one would 
rather have to look at the thing itself. Understood in this manner, the nu-
merous self-designating concepts that are pronounced by the female re-
vealer do not describe her properly. In order to fully grasp her, the hearers 
must gaze at the revealer herself, that is, they must reach the level of intel-
ligibility from which she came: the Silence. This of course means abandon-
ing rational discourse and venturing beyond the level of Logos. Then the 
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hearer will become sober, find her and his resting place, and he will not die 
again ( φ ^ κ τ ο γ ρ Μ Η φ ε ïïcenœx e^p^ï β π ο YKHMHTHPION * ^ γ ω c e N ^ r n e 
MMoei MnMè, 6ΤΜΜ^γ ïïcecDN^- ^ γ ω ïïceTHcœT 6Μογ) (21:27-32). 
From the above analysis, it has become clear that Thunder is a text in 
which Platonic and Stoic dialetics and philosophy of language simultane­
ously play a decisive role in the descriptions of the divine descent. These 
philosophical schools, which traditionally have been seen almost as oppo­
sites, are united in Thunder's revelatory framework. This bears witness to 
Thunder's free integration of different traditions for the use of its own pur­
pose. The tradition of Greek dialectic is thus combined especially with 
themes that belong to Jewish Wisdom-Speculation. I have not dealt with 
this topic which in the present discussion, but it adds one more, and a very 
important, feature, not least with respect to several of the self-
proclamations, to a picture that is in itself already quite rich.441 
For an analysis of Thunder's affiliation with Jewish Wisdom traditions see Poirier 
1995: 157-161. 
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The aim of this dissertation has been to investigate the use of language-
related terminology in the two Nag Hammadi texts the Trimorphic 
Protennoia and the Thunder: Perfect Mind. This has been done against the 
background of ancient philosophy of language as it appears in Platonic and 
Stoic dialectics. It has not been the aim to suggest either a Stoic or Platonic 
reading of the texts, but rather to show how the ancient Greek material is 
present as an underlying matrix in the two texts. It has been shown that 
both Nag Hammadi texts employ the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression 
to describe the progressive linguistic manifestations of the divine Thought. 
In this way, the Stoic theory has been integrated into revelatory frame­
works of Late Antiquity, and thus given a wholly new sense. In the analysis 
of Thunder, it was shown how certain features originating in Platonic phi­
losophy of language also play a central role for the text's overall concep­
tion of human language. In this way, Thunder provides an example of a 
free interplay between notions developed in two philosophical schools of 
thought which are traditionally understood as incompatible. The disserta­
tion was organized in such a way that the chapter on Ancient Philosophy of 
Language served as a background for the following two chapters that ana­
lyzed the linguistic features in TriPro and Thunder. 
The Stoic sequence of a verbal expression is contained in the part of their 
dialectics called "that which signifies'Von voice which deals with the cor­
poreal aspects of language. It is summarized by Diogenes Laertius and 
through a close reading of his presentation of it, it became clear that the 
Stoics understood a verbal expression as a division of voice (φωνή) into 
different levels of intelligibility, from inarticulate sound/voice (φωνή) over 
articulate but unintelligible speech (λέξις) to the fully articulate and intelli­
gible sentence/word (λόγος). The Stoic focus is directed towards the logos 
as the highest semantic level of the sequence. This dissertation argues that 
TriPro and Thunder adopt this specific Stoic cluster of linguistic terms in 
their respective descriptions of the descent of divine Thought. At the same 
time, I have argued that they turn the Stoic sequence "upside-down" with 
regard to the semantic content of the different levels. 
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In TriPro, the divine First Thought of the Father, Protennoia/Barbelo, 
descends three times into the sensible world, as Sound (2ροογ), Voice 
(CMH) and Word (Xoroc) respectively. This line of manifestation follows the 
Stoic sequence, so that Protennoia becomes increasingly perceptible to the 
human mind with each descent she makes. She descends from within Si­
lence (KApcoq), to recollect the "part" that was stolen by Yaltabaoth from 
the Innocent One, that is, Sophia. The missing part of Protennoia, which is 
referred to as "Epinoia" or the Spirit (breath), now resides within the soul 
of human beings. Protennoia leads the initiate to recollection and ultimate 
knowledge through the baptism of the Five Seals, stripping him of igno­
rance, and placing him within the Silence whence she first descended. 
Protennoia descends progressively down to the level of rational discourse 
(logos) which, according to the Stoic model, is a mode of communication 
that is fully articulate and intelligible. At this level, she is able to reach and 
awaken the faculty of reflection within the human soul, namely the part of 
Protennoia called Epinoia. From the level of logos she re-ascends together 
with the enlightened person, and thus, the Stoic sequence is turned "upside-
down" in that the highest semantic level in the "dialectic cosmology" of 
TriPro lies within the Thought of the incomprehensible Silence. 
In Thunder, we saw that the female revealer uses the same cluster of lin­
guistic terms for the description of her manifestation. Thus, in the first of 
the three passages that I have called the linguistic passages, the female re­
vealer identifies herself with Voice (CMH) (and Sound fepooy)), Word 
(Xoroc) and Speech ( φ ^ β ) . As Protennoia descended from Silence, so the 
female in Thunder also begins her linguistic manifestation by claiming to 
be the incomprehensible Silence. It is clear enough that this sequence dif­
fers slightly from the one identified in TriPro, but it is important to 
acknowledge that we are dealing with a cluster of terms, which clearly 
plays a central role in especially these two Nag Hammadi texts, and which 
originates in Stoic dialectics. Due to the monotonous "I am"-style of Thun­
der, there is no narrative which provides the reader with an apparent idea of 
the aim of the manifestation. However, I have suggested that the linguistic 
manifestation of the female revealer is, in fact, about language. Besides the 
use of Stoic dialectics, this is grounded on a number of facts that are related 
partly to Thunder's implementation of Platonic philosophy of language, 
partly to its affiliations with the "Barbeloite" and "Ophite" traditions. I 
would like to underline that this interpretation offers entirely new insights 
for the study of Thunder. In Thunder, the use of the Stoic sequence of a 
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verbal expression is combined with the pondering on the name of the fe-
male revealer. 
In the Platonic dialogue, Cratylus, we meet the, to our knowledge, earli-
est instance of Greek language-related speculation. The question dealt with 
is that of the correctness of names. Even though Socrates in this dialogue 
holds a naturalistic position towards naming, that is, to understand the rela-
tion between a name and its referent as one of natural correspondence, he 
acknowledges that names may sometimes be misleading. Therefore, Plato 
ends his Cratylus by letting Socrates emphasize that in order to grasp the 
true essence of a thing, one must look at the thing itself and not its name. 
Against the background of Platonic critique of names (words) and the 
Stoic notion of "primary sounds", it was shown how the name of the fe-
male revealer, when uttered in the sensible world, sounds like the rumbling 
of thunder, even though "Thunder" is not her actual name, since that is ac-
tually never revealed. In Plato, the reflection on the insufficiency of names 
led to an attempt to solve it by the method of definition by division -
diairesis. Through a division of a chosen concept into opposite sub-
concepts, which are then divided again and again until the final undividable 
concept is reached, the dialectician would eventually uncover at least part 
of the essence of the concept in question. All concepts encountered during 
the division form part of that essence, so that the final outcome may be 
considered a unity of many concepts. It was argued that the process of a 
diairesis can be regarded as a process of remembrance, namely, the re-
membrance of the differences between the various aspects contained in the 
concept. Therefore, recognizing the differences that the opposite sub-
concepts show is the same as obtaining knowledge about these differences. 
With this in mind, it is striking that the female revealer in Thunder pro-
claims to be "the manifestation of the diairesis" presenting one pair of op-
posites after the other, at the same time as she is manifest as the "Thought 
(Epinoia) whose remembrance is great". Thus, this dissertation suggests 
that we should understand the opposite concepts contained in a single be-
ing, the female revealer, not only as mere paradoxes, but rather as diairetic 
descriptions of her. 
Moreover, I have put much weight on the fact that the female revealer 
identifies herself with Epinoia. I understand this identification against the 
background of the "Ophite" myth exemplified by the narrative found in the 
Hypostasis of the Archons, and of the "Barbeloite" account found in the 
Apocryphon of John regarding the role of the female spiritual princi-
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ple/Epinoia as the provider of knowledge of "good and evil". As was also 
the case in TriPro, Epinoia is in these two other Nag Hammadi texts the 
aspect of the divine Thought which provides man with the ability of reflec­
tion and conceptualization, in other words: language. As she appears spe­
cifically in the story of the eating of the Tree of Knowledge, the knowledge 
she gives to the human being is the knowledge of "good and evil", that is, 
of opposite concepts, a knowledge that makes him able to recognize and 
conceptualize the visible world according to that principle. Therefore, when 
the female revealer proclaims to be Epinoia, I argue that Thunder not only 
alludes strongly to these "Classic Gnostic" traditions regarding the figure 
of Epinoia, it also explains what the text is all about, namely the recogni­
tion of the conceptualization of language in opposites. The female revealer 
is herself associated with her own teaching, which makes it possible to see 
her as revealing language by being language. The readers of Thunder will 
thus become aware of the structure of their own language, but at the same 
time they will also acknowledge the limits of that language. So, in order to 
fully comprehend the essence of the female revealer they must ascend with 
her into Silence. In this way, the Stoic sequence of a verbal expression is 
turned "upside-down" also in Thunder. 
The use of ancient philosophy of language in TriPro and Thunder may 
be regarded as a development or expansion of the widespread phenomenon 
of the manifestation of the divine as a φωνή θεοΰ, a voice of God, often 
experienced as a clap of thunder. This is combined with Jewish Wisdom 
traditions on the creative and simultaneously saving Thought of the Father, 
the mediating and female aspect of God, which descends to enlighten hu­
mankind. The two Nag Hammadi texts thus use philosophical reflection on 
verbal expressions as a perceptible, outward progression of thought to de­
scribe the process of the manifestation of the divine Thought in the sensible 
world, which at first is heard as a thundering sound, but which is further 
comprehended as it reaches the level of rational discourse - the logos. In 
this way, our two Nag Hammadi texts manage to unite several ancient tra­
ditions in a highly speculative and subtle way. The same is true for the 
Johannine Prologue, although it does not reckon with various levels of de­
scent. 
This dissertation has offered new insights into the study of TriPro and 
Thunder especially with regard to their relation to ancient philosophy of 
language. I think many aspects of this topic have been overlooked by pre­
vious scholarship, which has concentrated on other important matters on 
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which this study is built. With regard to TriPro, my point of departure has 
primarily been the work of Poirier and Turner, who have both called atten-
tion to similarities with the Stoic material. I have sought to turn their in-
sights into a study of its own, which hopefully will inspire others to pro-
ceed with the investigation of linguistic themes in other ancient literature. 
Besides my argument that TriPro employs the Stoic sequence of a verbal 
expression "upside-down", I have proposed an analysis of the reason for a 
linguistic manifestation of Protennoia, namely that in order for her to liber-
ate her stolen part, which constitutes the human rational faculty and its abil-
ity of reflection, she must descend linguistically to be able to communicate 
with that rational faculty. 
The dissertation suggests placing Thunder in close relation to the "Clas-
sic Gnostic" tradition, not least due to its reliance on the function of the 
figure of Epinoia in texts belonging to this tradition. Moreover, its combi-
nation of "I am"-proclamations and linguistic terminology links it tightly to 
TriPro, which I consider expressing a "Barbeloite" line of thought. I have 
aimed at a well-defined topic in which I have carefully examined the spe-
cific use of linguistic terminology in these two Nag Hammadi texts. How-
ever, the study may of course be expanded to embrace several other ancient 
thinkers, who have also employed philosophy of language in their descrip-
tions of the divine. In further studies, one might wish to include especially 
the works of Philo, Plotinus and Augustine. With this baggage it might be 
desirable to consider other "Sethian" and "Valentinian" sources in more 
detail. 
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D.L.: Diogenes Laertius 
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Ancient Sources 
Biogenis Laertii. Vitae Philosophorum, vol. I. Libri I-X, M. Marcovich 
(ed.), (Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum teubneriana), 
Stutgardiae et Lipsiae in Aedibus B. G. Teubneri Mim. 1999. 
Epiphanius: 
The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis. Book I (Sects 1-46), translated by 
F. Williams (Nag Hammadi and Manichean Studies 63), Leiden, Boston, 
Brill, 2009. 
Hippolytus: 
Refutatio Omnium Haeresium, M. Marcovich (ed.) (Patristische Texte und 
Studien 25), Berlin New York, Walter De Gruyter, 1986. 
Irenaeus: 
Adversus Haereses I, translated by N. Brox (Fontes Christiani. 
Zweisprachige Neuausgabe christlicher Quellentexte aus Altertum und 
Mittelalter), Freiburg, Herder, 1993. 
Gospel of Judas: 
The Gospel of Judas. Together with the Letter of Peter to Philip, James and 
a Book of Allogènes from Codex Tchacos. Critical Edition, R. Kasser and 
G. Wurst (eds. of Coptic text) with Introductions, Translations and Notes 
by R. Kasser, M. Meyer, G. Wurst and F. Gaudard, Washington, The Na-
tional Geographic Society, 2007. 
The Nag Hammadi Codices: 
The Coptic Gnostic Library, vol. I-V, J. M. Robinson (ed.), Leiden, Brill, 
2000. 
For the Thunder: Perfect Mind (NHC VI,2), I use the edition of Poirier 
1995. Cf. Bibliography. 
For the Trimorphic Protennoia (NHC XIII, 1), I use the edition of Poirier 
2006. Cf. Bibliography. 
Plato: 
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Piatonis Opera, I. Burnet (ed.), Tomus I, (Oxford Classical Texts), Lon­
don, Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Piatonis Opera, I. Burnet (ed.), Tomus II, (Oxford Classical Texts), Lon­
don, Oxford University Press, 1964. 
Loeb Classical Library: 
Statesman; Philebus, translated by H. North Fowler, London, William 
Heinemann LTD, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 
1962. 
Euthyphro; Apology; Crito; Phaedo; Phaedrus, translated by H. North 
Fowler, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Theaetetus; Sophist, translated by H. North Fowler, Cambridge, Massachu­
setts, Harvard University Press, 1967. 
Cratylus;Parmenides; Greater Hippias; Lesser Hippias, translated by H. 
North Fowler, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Timaeus; Critias; Cleitophon; Menexenus; Episles, translated by R. G. 
Bury, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2005. 
Republic, translated by Paul Shory, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1943. 
Stoic Sources: 
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. I-IV, H. von Arnim (ed.), Leipzig, Κ. 
G. Saur München, 2004. 
Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, Band 1-4, K. Hülser (ed.), 
Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1987. 
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Danish summary 
Denne afhandling undersøger brugen af antik platonisk og stoisk sprogfilo-
sofi i to tekster fra Nag Hammadi: Førstetanken i Tre Former (NHC 111,1) 
(herefter Førstetanken) og Tordenen: Fuldkommen Forstand (NHC VI,2) 
(herefter Tordenen). Disse tekster udviser en gennemgribende brug af et 
særligt sprogfilosofisk vokabular i beskrivelsen af den guddommelige Tan-
kes nedstigning og åbenbaring i den sanselige verden. Således manifesterer 
Tanken sig som henholdsvis Lyd, Stemme og Ord. Denne særlige form for 
nedstigning i sproglige termer, foreslår jeg at kalde "sproglig manifestati-
on". 
Den antikke litteratur byder på mange eksempler på en sådan form for 
åbenbaring, især fra jødiske og kristne kilder, hvor Guds stemme eller Ord 
ofte indtager en vigtig plads. Inden for Nag Hammadi biblioteket selv fin-
der vi også flere eksempler på "sproglig manifestation". Afhandlingen be-
grænser sig til at behandle de to ovennævnte tekster, idet de har flere fæl-
lestræk, der binder dem sammen på en særlig måde: Begge tekster integre-
rer sprogfilosofisk materiale i åbenbaringsmonologer. De er fremført af 
kvindelige guddommelige skikkelser, og begge tekster gør brug af den are-
talogiske genre gennem anvendelsen af "jeg er"-udsagn, som endvidere er 
formuleret som antiteser eller paradokser i Tordenen. Dertil kommer at tek-
sterne tydeligvis er influeret af jødisk visdomslitteratur, lige såvel som Epi-
noia-figuren spiller en væsentlig rolle i begge tekster. 
Med udgangspunkt i disse ligheder søger afhandlingen at få klarhed over 
deres særlige brug af sprogfilosofiske termer. For at opnå dette indledes 
med en gennemgang af centrale emner fra den platoniske og stoiske sprog-
filosofi (kapitel 2). I Platon-dialogen Kratylos, som er det tidligste bud på 
en sprogfilosofisk refleksion, vises, hvordan Sokrates, på trods af sin natu-
ralistiske opfattelse af forholdet mellem en ting og dens navn (dvs. det at et 
navn stemmer overens med den ting, det benævner), indser, at ikke alle 
navne fanger essensen af det, de benævner, særlig godt. Derfor konkluderer 
Sokrates, at for at begribe den virkelige essens af en ting, må man se på 
tingen selv, for man begriber den ikke alene gennem dens navn. Diskussio-
nen i Kratylos om navnes korrekthed viser en grundlæggende skepsis over 
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for sprogets tilstrækkelighed, som kom til at præge den platoniske tradition 
fremover. Denne utilstrækkelighed blev bl.a. forsøgt overkommet ved 
hjælp af den særlige definitionsmetode, der kaldes diairesis-metoden. Ek-
semplificeret ved udvalgte passager fra Phaedrus og Sofisten, fremhæves i 
kapitel 2 flere vigtige elementer ved metoden, som senere skal vise sig af-
gørende for analysen af Tordenen. Gennem en opdeling af en given katego-
ri i modsatrettede underkategorier, som igen opdeles, indtil det udelelige 
koncept er nået, forsøges der med diairesis-metoden at definere det under-
søgte koncepts virkelige essens/mening. I gennemgangen af metoden frem-
hæves det især, at samtlige modsatrettede underkategorier er dele af den 
helhed, der ender med at være definitionen af det undersøgte koncept. Der-
for kan der tales om en "enhed af mange". Diairesis-metoden kendetegnes 
endvidere ved at være en memoreringsproces (anamnesis), hvorigennem 
den, der anvender metoden, opnår erkendelse af de modsætningspar, som 
underkategorierne udgør. 
Filosofikapitlet fortsætter med en gennemgang af grundtrækkene i stoisk 
dialektik. Gennem en analyse af en udvalgt passage fra Diogenes Laertius 
gøres det klart, at stoikerne forstod et verbalt udsagn som en opdeling 
(diairesis) af lyd i forskellige semantiske niveauer. Således begynder et ud-
sagn med en lyd (φωνή), der udsendes fra tanken (διάνοια). Denne lyd er 
uartikuleret og uforståelig, men bliver på næste niveau en stemme (λέξις), 
som er artikuleret, men ikke nødvendigvis forståelig. Udsagnet bliver først 
både artikuleret og forståeligt, når det ytres som et ord/sætning (λογός). 
Den stoiske teori har derved ordet som sit højeste semantiske niveau. 
I kapitel tre og fire argumenteres der for, at den stoiske teori anvendes 
som en underliggende matrix i Førstetanken og Tordenen. De guddomme-
lige kvindelige åbenbarere i de to Nag Hammadi-tekster manifesterer sig 
således fremadskridende efter den stoiske model, dog begyndende helt inde 
fra stilheden: 
stilhed - tanke - lyd - stemme - ord/sætning 
En vigtig forskel er dog, at for de to Nag Hammadi-tekster ligger det høje-
ste semantiske niveau ikke i ordet/sætningen, men derimod i stilheden. Så-
ledes foreslår jeg, at disse tekster integrerer den stoiske forståelse af et ver-
bal udsagn i en åbenbaringssammenhæng, men at de vender den "på hove-
det" således, at det højeste semantiske niveau er i stilheden. I Førstetanken, 
der analyseres i afhandlingens kapitel 3, ses det ved, at den guddommelige 
204 
Dansk resumé 
Førstetanke (Protennoia) stiger ned som sproglige termer for at redde den 
"del" af hende som blev stjålet af Yaltabaoth fra den Uskyldige (So-
phia/Visdommen). Denne "del" bliver omtalt som "Epinoia" eller "Anden" 
og eksisterer nu inde i menneskets sjæl. Protennoia henter sin "del" tilbage 
ved at føre mennesket gennem De fem segls dåb, hvorved det bliver af-
klædt uvidenheden og til sidst placeret i stilheden, hvorfra Protennoia først 
udgik. Af denne grund forstår jeg stilheden, og ikke ordet (logos), som det 
egentlige mål for mennesket. 
Afhandlingen foreslår ydermere en tolkning af årsagen til brugen af 
sproglig manifestation i Førstetanken. Det hænger sammen med, at det er 
på grund af Epinoia, at Protennoia stiger ned. Epinoia udgør den evne i 
menneskets sjæl, der gør det muligt at opfatte og erkende logiske sammen-
hænge. Ved at manifestere sig som sproglige termer formår Protennoia at 
vække og tale til netop denne opfattelsesevne i mennesket. 
Tordenens brug af sprogfilosofi (kap. 4) kommer til udtryk gennem især 
tre "sproglige passager". I den første af disse manifesterer den kvindelige 
åbenbarer sig som den klynge af termer, der oprinder i den stoiske forståel-
se af et verbalt udsagn: fra stilhed til ord. Også i denne tekst vendes det 
semantiske indhold af den stoiske model "på hovedet", idet tilhøreren ved 
at finde sit "hvilested" også finder den kvindelige åbenbarer, der som det 
første identificerer sig med stilheden. Jeg argumenterer endvidere for, at 
udover indoptagelsen af den stoiske model er Tordenen også influeret af 
den platoniske kritik af navne, idet den i kombination med den stoiske fore-
stilling om "oprindelige lyde" viser, hvordan den kvindelige åbenbarers 
navn lyder som torden, når det udtales i den sanselige verden. "Torden" er 
således lyden af hendes navn - et navn som i øvrigt aldrig afsløres. 
Derudover foreslår jeg at forstå Tordenens paradokser på baggrund af 
den platoniske diairesis-mctodc. Den kvindelige åbenbarer proklamerer at 
være "manifestationen af adskillelsen (diairesis)" samtidig med, at hun 
præsenterer sig selv som det ene modsætningspar efter det andet. Hun viser 
altså, hvorledes hun som én enkelt enhed indeholder adskillige modsatret-
tede koncepter. Hun er en "enhed af mange". Det er også vigtigt i denne 
forbindelse, at hun manifesterer sig som "tanken (Epinoia) hvis hukommel-
se er stor", for derved kan teksten sættes i forbindelse med centrale aspek-
ter af diairesis-metoden. Tordenens mange modsætningspar er derfor ikke 
kun paradokser, men også diairetiske beskrivelser af den kvindelige åben-
barer. Afhandlingen lægger stor vægt på, at den kvindelige åbenbarer præ-
senterer sig som "Epinoia". På baggrund af den "ophitiske" myte, eksem-
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plificeret ved fortællinger fra Johannesapokryfen og Arkonternes Hyposta-
se, forstår jeg "Epinoia" som menneskets fatteevne, samt dets evne til at 
konceptualisere verden i "godt og ondt", dvs. i modsætningspar. Når den 
kvindelige åbenbarer i Tordenen derfor manifesterer sig som Epinoia, fore-
slår jeg, at hun netop henviser til menneskets fatteevne og viser, hvordan 
verden konceptualiseres i modsætningspar. Hun åbenbarer således sproget 
ved at være sproget. 
På baggrund af Tordenens ligheder med Førstetanken samt dens brug af 
Epinoia-figuren foreslår jeg at betragte Tordenen som tæt knyttet til de 
"ofitiske" og "barbeloitiske" traditioner. 
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This dissertation examines the use of ancient Platonic and Stoic philosophy 
of language in two texts from the Nag Hammadi Codices: the Trimorphic 
Protennoia (NHC XIII, 1) (hereafter TriPro) and the Thunder: Perfect Mind 
(NHC VI,2) (hereafter Thunder). These texts employ language-related 
speculation in their descriptions of the descent of divine Thought. In its de­
scent into the sensible world, Thought manifests itself progressively in lin­
guistic terms as Sound, Voice, and Word. I shall suggest that we call this 
kind of descent a "Linguistic Manifestation". 
The manifestation of the divine in linguistic terms is a well-known fea­
ture in ancient literature. We see examples of this especially in Jewish and 
Christian sources in which the Word (λόγος) or Voice of God (φωνή θεοΰ) 
is a central feature. Within the Nag Hammadi Codices we also find several 
examples of linguistic manifestations of divinity, as well as examples of 
use of language-related terminology in theological expositions. 
This study is limited to dealing with TriPro and Thunder only, since they 
share more than one characteristic, and these common traits separate them 
from other occurrences of what one might call a "theology of language". 
These two texts integrate language-related speculation into revelatory 
frameworks, which are shaped as monologues performed by divine female 
figures. Thus, besides their linguistic manifestations, both texts articulate 
an aretalogical style by employing "I am"-proclamations (Ο,ΝΟΚ Te/ne) in 
the presentation of the female revealers. In addition, it seems that the figure 
of Epinoia plays an important role in the overall unfolding of the two trac­
tates. Moreover, both texts are clearly inspired by Jewish Wisdom tradi­
tions concerning the Thought of the Father as the mediatrix of heaven and 
earth. These similarities are hard to disregard when reading through the 
texts, and they clearly invite for a comparative analysis of them. Finally, 
the texts are even connected codicologically, insofar as codex XIII, which 
contains TriPro, had already in Antiquity, been tucked inside the covers of 
codex VI in which Thunder is found. 
Because of the above connections, I present a new approach for re­
searching the two Nag Hammadi texts, which takes into consideration the 
similarities between them as well as their common source of inspiration: 
philosophy of language. 
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The first of the three main chapters deals with ancient philosophy of lan­
guage. Beginning with the Platonic dialogue entitled Cratylus, which pro­
vides the earliest instance of a language-related speculation, we see how 
Socrates, despite his naturalistic approach to the question of the correctness 
of names, also acknowledges that names not always capture the true es­
sence of the thing they name. In order to grasp the true essence of a thing, 
one must look at the thing itself. The insufficiency of names was a problem 
which was solved by a method of definition by division, that is, the method 
of diairesis, known from passages in the Phaedrus and the Sophist. 
Through a division of a chosen concept into opposite sub-concepts, which 
are then divided again and again until the final undividable concept is 
reached, the dialectician would eventually uncover at least part of the es­
sence of the concept in question. All concepts encountered during the divi­
sion form part of that essence, so that the final outcome may be considered 
a "unity of many" concepts. I emphasize that the process of a diairesis can 
be regarded as a process of remembrance, namely, the remembrance of the 
differences between the various aspects contained in the concept. There­
fore, recognizing the differences that the opposite sub-concepts show is the 
same as obtaining knowledge about these differences. This is particularly 
important for the understanding of Thunder. 
After this, I examine the major issues of Stoic dialectics. Through a read­
ing of a central passage in Diogenes Laertius, it becomes apparent how the 
different levels of a verbal expression go from inarticulate sound/voice 
(φωνή) over articulate but unintelligible speech (λέξις) to the fully articu­
late and intelligible word/sentence (λόγος). The Stoic focus is directed to­
wards the logos as the highest semantic level of the sequence. This disserta­
tion argues that TriPro and Thunder adopt this specific Stoic cluster of lin­
guistic terms in their respective descriptions of the descent of divine 
Thought. 
Chapters three and four provide a thoroughgoing analysis of selected 
passages from TriPro and Thunder. The passages are chosen due to their 
linguistic focus. I argue that the specific progressive sequence of linguistic 
manifestations found in these texts is of Stoic origin, but that they turn the 
levels of semanticity "upside-down". Whereas in the Stoic theory it is the 
end point of the process, namely, Word/Discourse (λόγος), that has the 
highest value, in the two Nag Hammadi treatises it is rather the beginning 
of the process (in fact, Silence) that has highest value. 
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In TriPro, the divine First Thought of the Father, Protennoia/Barbelo, 
descends three times into the sensible world, as Sound fepooy), Voice 
(CMH) and Word (Xoroc) respectively. This line of manifestation follows the 
Stoic sequence, so that Protennoia becomes increasingly perceptible to the 
human mind with each descent she makes. She descends from within Si-
lence (K^pœq), to recollect the "part" that was stolen by Yaltabaoth from 
the Innocent One, that is, Sophia. The missing part of Protennoia, which is 
referred to as "Epinoia" or the Spirit (breath), now resides within the soul 
of human beings. Protennoia leads the initiate to recollection and ultimate 
knowledge through the baptism of the Five Seals, stripping him of igno-
rance, and placing him within the Silence whence she first descended. 
Protennoia descends progressively down to the level of rational discourse 
(logos) which, according to the Stoic model, is a mode of communication 
that is fully articulate and intelligible. At this level, she is able to reach and 
awaken the faculty of reflection within the human soul, namely the part of 
Protennoia called Epinoia. From the level of logos she re-ascends together 
with the enlightened person, and thus, the Stoic sequence is turned "upside-
down" in that the highest semantic level in the "dialectic cosmology" of 
TriPro lies within the Thought of the incomprehensible Silence. 
Thunder, which is analyzed in chapter four, expands its use of ancient 
philosophy of language to draw also on Platonic language-related topics. 
The female revealer uses the same cluster of linguistic terms for the de-
scription of her manifestation. Thus, in the first of the three passages that I 
have called the linguistic passages, the female revealer identifies herself 
with Voice (CMH) (and Sound fepooy)), Word (Xoroc) and Speech (cp^e). 
As Protennoia descended from Silence, so the female in Thunder also be-
gins her linguistic manifestation by claiming to be the incomprehensible 
Silence. It is clear enough that this sequence differs slightly from the one 
identified in TriPro, but it is important to acknowledge that we are dealing 
with a cluster of terms, which clearly plays a central role in especially these 
two Nag Hammadi texts, and which originates in Stoic dialectics. 
Against the background of Platonic critique of names (words) and the 
Stoic notion of "primary sounds", it is shown how the name of the female 
revealer, when uttered in the sensible world, sounds like the rumbling of 
thunder, even though "Thunder" is not her actual name, since that is actual-
ly never revealed. Furthermore, if we take into consideration the above 
mentioned Platonic method of definition by division - diairesis, it is strik-
ing that the female revealer in Thunder proclaims to be "the manifestation 
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of the diairesis" presenting one pair of opposites after the other. Thus she 
shows, how she as a single being contains many opposite concepts in her. 
She is a "unity of many". At the same time, she is manifest as the "Thought 
(Epinoia) whose remembrance is great". The figure of Epinoia is under-
stood in light of the "Ophite" myth exemplified by passages from the 
Apocryphon of John and the Hypostasis of the Archons, where she is the 
provider of the human capacity for reflection, perception and conceptual-
ization by giving humankind knowledge of "good and evil", that is, oppo-
site concepts. Thus, I argue that the opposite categories in Thunder not only 
are to be understood as paradoxes, but also as diairetic descriptions of the 
female revealer. When the female revealer proclaims to be Epinoia, I argue 
that Thunder not only alludes strongly to these "Classic Gnostic" traditions 
regarding the figure of Epinoia, it also explains what the text is all about, 
namely the recognition of the conceptualization of language in opposites. 
The female revealer is herself associated with her own teaching, which 
makes it possible to see her as revealing language by being language. The 
readers of Thunder will thus become aware of the structure of their own 
language, but at the same time they will also acknowledge the limits of that 
language. So, in order to fully comprehend the essence of the female re-
vealer they must ascend with her into Silence. In this way, the Stoic se-
quence of a verbal expression is turned "upside-down" also in Thunder. 
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